Empire vs. Empire: Part III

New “Warsaw Pact” — On the Basis of the SCO?

Remarkable words were spoken by the Patriarch of Moscow and all Rus Kirill in a televised interview on “Rossiya-1” on the second day after Orthodox Christmas. He called Russia to world leadership and emphasized that this could become a major theme for a genuine national dialogue.

It is thought that His Holiness has thus determined the national idea that Russian politicians have been tormenting themselves searching for the last two decades, yet they never came up with anything good even to this day. Maybe they should have listened to the people.

According to data from the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), the farther we get from the USSR, the more people consider that the Soviet period (in particular, 1960-1980) was a time of much greater security, peace and stability in the world. In 2007, 47 percent of our citizens believed this. In 2008, half called the Soviet period (1960-1980) the most peaceful and secure. In 2011, 55 percent called the Soviet period the most secure and quiet. And Russian society is still nostalgic for the Warsaw Pact. In any case, according to recent VCIOM data, 80 percent of those polled thought that our country has only lost from the dissolution of this bloc. Today’s national nostalgia for the Warsaw Pact is, first of all, nostalgia for security in the world. For the world itself. Because since the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact, the world (including Europe) has seen those wars which it had not known for 40 years. Since the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO has turned from a bloc that threatened war and was always preparing for war, into a bloc which constantly conducts wars.

The Russian government does not realize this or does not recognize it. In contrast, Russian society does realize it, and in one form or another, does recognize it. Therefore, the majority of Russian citizens would like Russia to find the means today to “establish an international military-political bloc, similar to the Warsaw Pact.” This demand is supported by 51 percent of citizens, with 23 percent against. Moreover, support for such an idea is characteristic of all political sectors of Russian society and the electorates of all political parties. In the opinion of 89 percent of Russian citizens, “The Warsaw Pact was defensive and peaceful in nature. Thanks to it, we managed to avoid nuclear war, and supported peace and stability on the European continent for a long time.” Global experience shows that the most stable economic partnerships in the world, including the Atlantic community and the Japanese-American partnership, were built on the basis of cooperation in providing security.

The conservation of Russia’s leadership position in the post-Soviet countries lies largely in the establishment of EurAsEC, which unites Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan. In the view of political scientist Yuri Shevtsov, there has been a great bloc established around Russia, on the basis of the Customs Union, the Single Economic Space, the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe and integration into the framework of the CSTO is also increasing. The return of Vladimir Putin to the post of president, in his opinion, also fits within the framework of “weighting” Moscow’s role in integration processing in the CIS. “In the case of successful integration, Russia and its allies could withstand the wave of instability coming from the Middle East and Central Asia,” proposes Shevtsov. “In the case that they fail to build a strong bloc of countries around Russia, instability from Asia will spread into the post-Soviet countries, including Russia.”

It is difficult not to agree with the political scientist. Success in internal and external affairs is imperative for Russia. But here is what Igor Korotchenko, Chief Editor of the journal National Defense, says:

“Experience shows that attempts to agree on something by purely political methods are futile. If you are weak, if there is no real military force behind you, even if you have a lot of money and your economy is working, they will still trample you when they need to. The experience of Libya shows that this happens, but then again, it’s the same with all previous experiences beginning at the start of the 1990s.”

However, strange to say, the leaders and leading politicians of the countries now included in the “purely economic” associations in the CIS repeatedly emphasize that there is no talk of politics, and avoid even the mere impression of the least military component. Other than the CSTO, of course. From my point of view, that is pure trickery.

Today in Central Asia, including the territory of the CIS of course, there are three regional groups operating successfully: he Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan), the Collective Security Treaty Organization and the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). Each of these organizations addresses its own tasks, but all are directed toward one goal: integration of its member states. In this connection, a legitimate question arises about the possibility of unifying them. First of all, pay attention to the composition of these organizations. There are eight permanent members in various combinations. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan are members of all three organizations. Armenia, a member of the CSTO, received observer status in EurAsEC last year. It is expected to join the organization in the capacity of a permanent member. If a unified Russian-Belarusian government is formed — which both countries have expressed an interest in — then the problem of Belarusian participation in SCO and EurAsEC is automatically solved. Uzbekistan is part of the CSTO and SCO, has applied for membership in EurAsEC, and has concluded an agreement on allied relations with Russia.

The purposes of the CSTO are close to China, which is striving to establish a security belt of friendly nations around itself.

Moreover, it is interested in development of strong trade, economic and communications links with all of the Central Asian states and Russia. These issues are relatively well solved within EurAsEC. An open question remains on Armenia joining SCO. But there are already real conditions for combining SCO, CSTO, and EurAsEC, just based on their composition.

In addition, the goals and tasks of the SCO, CSTO and EurAsEC often intersect, and their activities augment each other. Thus, the main tasks of the SCO are increasing stability and security in a broad region, uniting participants, development of economic cooperation, energy partnerships, joint science and cultural activities. At the same time, security issues are part of the CSTO sphere of activities: organizations established especially to adopt preventive measures in case of flare-ups of tension or military threats. Within the framework of the CSTO, a common defense space is developing. EurAsEC handles the tasks of economic integration and the areas of foreign trade and customs policies in parallel with the SCO. At the same time, EurAsEC includes a council of the heads of the border services, whose missions include issues concerning the fight against terrorism.

These are only a few examples of how the goals and tasks are aligned. In reality there are many more. A similar parallelism and doubling sometimes yields negative results. It is apparent that unifying all three organizations would enable consolidation of forces to solve the tasks facing them, would increase effectiveness of command and coordination activities, and would avoid incompatible activities. The most important result of unification would be to strengthen processes of integration, the resolution of existing contradictions and problems in the Central Asian region, and, as a consequence, its exclusion from the notorious “Arc of Instability.” Besides that, it would end the conflicts of interest of the main geopolitical players in Central Asia.

The geopolitical factor favors unification. Today, geopolitical processes are ongoing amidst the struggle against America’s aims for world hegemony. Central Asia became one of the arenas of this struggle, where the U.S. is implementing two of its most important tasks according to the doctrine of Paul Wolfowitz. First, it is attempting to block integration of the region’s governments around Russia. Second, it is preventing the transformation of the SCO into a military-political bloc or other powerful geopolitical formation capable of opposing the U.S. This activity began after the SCO’s Astana Declaration was announced.

In the journal Foreign Affairs (2005), Frederick Starr published an article, “A Partnership for Central Asia,” which describes Washington’s new Central Asian initiative, directed toward the establishment of a regional forum, “Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development” (GCAP). The author suggests uniting the Central Asian states and Afghanistan under the direction of the U.S., without the participation of Russia, China, Iran or Pakistan, with a goal of establishing a security zone of sovereign governments on the basis of “U.S.-linked security infrastructures.” But even earlier, in 1997, Washington declared the Central Asian countries a zone of their long-term strategic interests. And in March 1999, the U.S. Congress adopted the “Silk Road Strategy Act,” which addressed support for economic and political independence of the Central Asian countries, which could reduce America’s energy dependence on the unstable Persian Gulf. This would require the development of bilateral contacts with the countries of post-Soviet Central Asia. To resist damaging external influences will be significantly easier with the forces of the three “sibling” organizations, if they may be called that. There is no doubt that this influence not only is not declining, but it will actually grow.

In establishing a new system of international relations, the formation of a collective system of regional security is a very relevant task.

The basis of the new geopolitical unification, from my point of view, could be the SCO. The general territory of the member states of this organization encompasses 30 million square kilometers, that is, 60 percent of the territory of Eurasia. The population is one-fourth of the population of the planet.

Moreover, Mongolia, Pakistan, India and Iran have observer status in the SCO, and Sri Lanka and Belarus have dialogue partner status. I will add another fact: the official members of the world “Nuclear Club” are Russia, the U.S., Great Britain, France and China. India and Pakistan are also nuclear powers. Israel too, it would seem, though they themselves don’t recognize that. It is not difficult to imagine what a huge nuclear potential could be included in the framework of a unified military-economic structure, even without considering the potential of other types of weapons, military forces and means.

Also in the SCO’s favor is the fact that in the 10-year existence of the organization, we can confirm that the SCO has stood the test of time. Currently within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, there are none of the centrifugal forces that we observe in the CIS. One can also say that in the post-Soviet space, the SCO is a much more powerful and long-range organization for international cooperation. And although there are a few contradictions and frictions among the SCO members, SCO looks like a sufficiently monolithic structure. And should Russia’s influence in SCO become less than in the CIS, then SCO will play an important role for Russia in connecting China to multilateral cooperation in Central Asia, and to other regions in the future. For the governments of Central Asia, where the unilateral influence of Russia or China is viewed with some fear, their joint presence in the framework of the SCO, where all Central Asian states are equal members and all issues are decided by consensus, would be a much more effective mechanism for joint actions.

Despite the fact that the SCO is positioning itself as a regional organization that is building its policy on the position of support for security in Central Asia and the rest of the world, a few Western researchers reasonably emphasize the obvious opposition of the organization to the countries of NATO, particularly the U.S. And rightly so. At the Bishkek summit in 2007, an agreement was signed on long-term good neighborliness, friendship and cooperation. This was intended to strengthen good relations among the participating states. In the opinion of political scientist Andrei Kokoshin, “This agreement could play a very important role in establishing a new system of world politics, a new world order, more fair, less fraught with acute crises, than that which arose after the breakup of the bipolar system, when the dominant forces tried to become the only remaining superpower — the U.S.” The main result of the unification of the SCO, CSTO and EurAsEC truly could become the basis of a multidisciplinary, complex system of development and security. That is what the proponents of a unipolar world fear so much. In fact, the second pole of geopolitical influence is appearing again. The world will obtain stability, peace and confidence in the future.

The formation of the NATO bloc took four years after the war. Six years after NATO, practically from nothing, the Warsaw Pact was established. Although NATO accepted each member country individually, now the collective membership of the Alliance is actually also an international organization, like the European Union, the “Visegrad Four” or the “Weimar Triangle.”

The question is, how long is needed to create a single, unified military-economic organization from three mutually connected, active, international structures which are solving very similar problems in the same general geopolitical region? That is a question for the politicians. Strong and far-sighted politicians!

Patriarch Kirill said the words.

In the new military doctrine of the U.S., they step back from conducting two wars simultaneously, but not from war in general. We will be realists: America has brought the world to the brink of a Great War. The empire that can oppose an aggressive empire needs to be established today.

Editor’s note: This is the final installment of a three-part translation of Valery Panov’s “Empire vs. Empire.”

Read Part I here.

Read Part II here.