The American Administration and the Syrian Crisis

Almost a year has passed since the beginning of the Syrian crisis and the growth of widespread support for demonstrations against the regime. Thousands of victims have fallen. Yet Washington has not clearly said “Go” to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, as it did in the case of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and Libyan General Moammar Gadhafi after him. Maybe the obvious question is why hasn’t Washington said it yet?

On the one hand, there are undoubtedly many considerations related to the geopolitics that Syria is engaged in; and, on the other hand, to the way the regime has managed the crisis, successfully turning it into an international crisis, which has returned a Cold War atmosphere to international relations. From a third angle, there are American reasons, related to the financial crisis, which pushed Washington to retreat inward, especially with presidential elections coming up.

Clearly the crisis, by virtue of the relationships Syria established in past decades, and their connection to ongoing conflicts in the area (especially the conflict with Israel) is not considered just an internal crisis tied to freedom and regime change. Instead, it is expressive of a wider regional system, which extends from Tehran to south Lebanon by way of Damascus, and probably al-Maliki’s Baghdad and some of the Palestinian Authority. So, this system appears to be a single bloc associated with what is happening in Syria. On a practical level, it presents a united front, and has the power to put a match to the most critical and sensitive areas of the Middle East and Arab Gulf. This is another extremely delicate and important matter, in Washington’s judgment. Washington continues to look for guaranteed results for any military action here or there, especially after what happened to it in Afghanistan and Iraq. Likewise, in view of the organic nature of the relationship between Tel Aviv and Washington, it does not have the ability to take a risk in a region in which Israel is at the heart of its strategy.

It seems that what complicated this regional scene, and lessened the influence of Turkey and the Gulf, was the entrance of Russia and China onto the frontlines of the crisis, and their use of the veto, twice, in the international Security Council. This is what brought the Cold War atmosphere back to international relations. Perhaps the basis of the Russian position, and to a lesser extent the Chinese, is Syria’s importance in external international conflicts, and thus in their calculations. This is what renders the political, diplomatic and intelligence face-off between these parties so predominant, starting with each party clinging to its own interests and perspectives.

Without a doubt, the way Washington is dealing with the Syrian crisis does not mean that it wants the regime to stay. Rather, it wants to change it by a different strategy than it used in Libya, seeing that the particularities of Syria are different, and fearing that the military option would lead to the unknown because of the nature of the regional and international system linked to the Syrian crisis. So, one could say that Washington is pursuing a strategy of pushing the regime toward self-destruction — a composite approach resting on the gradual increase of sanctions, an increase in political and diplomatic pressure in international circles and giving a prominent role to regional countries, especially Turkey and the Arab Gulf countries, in addition to the Arab League. Most important of all is support for the Syrian opposition and overseeing its arming, since the operations which the Syrian Free Army are still carrying out clearly indicate that it is getting more support, training and guidance (in terms of tactics, fighting, weapons, target sites and increased numbers). So Washington ultimately wants the fall of the regime. It wants to push it toward self-destruction under the influence of internal elements of its security forces, military and economy.

Doubtless the dangers of the American method for Syria and its people appear very great — whether by allowing the security’s approach to dominate the situation (which would mean more killing, victims and destruction), or from the angle of unraveling the fabric of the Syrian society and nation and the risk of sliding into civil war, under various slogans and names, and lengthening the duration of the crisis. The truth of the matter is that Washington’s first concern is its own interests and those of Israel, not the form of government in Syria or the blood of Syrians, which is being poured out every day.