Two years have passed since Dmitry Medvedev and Barack Obama signed in Prague a new agreement limiting offensive nuclear weapons — the newest (third) Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Since 8 Apr. 2010, both sides have managed to undo all the benefits of this treaty, quarrel over a wide range of military issues and now stand on the brink of a new arms race.
The Need for Virtue
At this meeting in Prague, both sides assumed the responsibility to limit their offensive nuclear potential. They could have no more than 800 strategic missiles, could only deploy 700 of them at any given time and capped the number of nuclear warheads to be carried on these missiles at 1,550.
At the same time, Russia managed to shake free of American observers and their close oversight of the Votkinsk factory, where many Russian strategic missiles are produced. The flow of technical information from recent launches became more open.
But, taking into account the rapid aging of strategic missiles Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, 500 warheads is not a real reduction in forces. Lowering the overall number of warheads available for use could be achieved by decommissioning the aging “many-headed” rockets (that is, ones with multiple warheads) already planned to be removed from service.
If there is not a radical increase in the speed of new rocket production for ones with multiple independent reentry vehicle capacity, Russian nuclear potential will fall below the Prague level.
Experts have publicly stated that if current trends continue, Russia’s number of nuclear weapons will sink as low as 1,100-1,200 warheads. (Strategic aviation forces are included in this number, but they play a secondary role in the Russian nuclear triad.) In order to meet the ceiling established by the Prague agreement, Russia must force new nuclear missiles into service.
This sober assessment is inexorable proof that under current conditions, Moscow is unable to increase the number of nuclear warheads mounted on strategic rocket carriers. In this sense, the Prague agreement can be seen as a clever and pragmatic victory of Russian diplomacy.
How? Moscow has legally obligated the U.S. to match its own weapons production to Russia’s rapidly decommissioning arsenal, which is proceeding entirely independently of the process of global non-proliferation. Seems like Moscow made a virtue of necessity.
It’s not among the greatest achievements for a former superpower – that’s for sure. But what was the alternative? Very simple: Lose these warheads just the same, and have the U.S. not be obligated to similarly limit their own nuclear forces. But at the same time, Prague created a whole range of restrictions and demands that have strongly interfered with domestic industry and military matters.
Strategic Management of Risks
After the above-listed benefits, the positive side of the Prague agreement runs out. The modest achievements made in limiting offensive potential are increasingly contradicted by the continuing arms buildup of American strategic forces and their potential acquisition of entirely new weapons.
People are already talking about a European component of a global American anti-missile shield. In the last few months, this issue has triggered an open catastrophe between Moscow and Washington. It is all the more striking because they are not even formally negotiating yet, but are still in the consultation phase.
The U.S. will create their own missile shield system. They will make it mobile, with a flexible architecture highly integrated with information-technology systems, an ideal method to detect military developments. Russia sees this infrastructure as a potential source of risk, since it is capable of influencing or defeating a potential “second strike” by Russian nuclear forces.
Moscow has taken a tough position and demanded technical and legal guarantees. In return, it’s received general discussions about how the system is not pointed at any one country in particular, vague talking points about the unrelenting deployment of the system and demands to once again discuss limitations on tactical nuclear weapons (to which the Russian Joint Chiefs of Staff will react quite unfavorably). The situation has been deadlocked since summer 2011.
A different issue is discussed less frequently: the concept of PGS (“Prompt Global Strike”), a program recently adopted in American strategic forces. Its basic concept is to gain the ability to carry out a precise conventional strike in any place on Earth within 60 minutes of the decision being made.
This system is assumed for now to use three different types of military hardware. This includes the precise marine-launched ballistic missile Trident (armed with conventional warheads), hyperspeed winged missiles (the prototype X-51 Waverider is currently used) and the likely usage of “space platforms.”
The last item most likely has military satellite drones in mind. One of them, the X-37, has already been in near-earth orbit for more than a year.
Uncertainty About Launches
The deployment of a flexible, fully modernized missile shield capable of detecting any fiery flight raises many issues. The missile shield could certainly be seen as raising the threat of a “disarming strike” on Russian nuclear forces. The possession of such weapons raises numerous risks for the Russian Federation and lowers the threshold for foreign politicians to use them.
In answer, Moscow can adopt (and indeed, already has for several years started to adopt) a so called “military-technical answer,” referring to deployment of new rocket complexes. Their military hardware grants a greater chances of success at breaking through the missile shield.
In other words, a head-on strategy has been chosen for countering the missile shield’s ability to allow a mass nuclear strike by a potential enemy. Military personnel are concrete people. They think in terms of the survivability rate of launches in a second strike and the mathematical expectations from warheads launched against an opponent’s territory. If some disrupting factor means Russian strategic forces cannot achieve their minimum permissible level of performance, then their military capabilities must be upgraded.
No one can say how the hypothetical fourth START, which would run until 2020, will look in this light (or more accurately, in this fog). It is difficult to imagine a worse environment for developing negotiations over further nuclear weapons disarmament. It’s more believable to forecast an arms race, just not as full-forced and bitter as in the Cold War.
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