The American Delusion

President Barack Obama has come and gone, and what the Right feared and the radical Left hoped for didn’t happen. The U.S. president didn’t push, and the peace process didn’t advance. It is becoming clear that when it comes down to it, regardless of all its power and might, neither the United States nor its president are able to find solutions to international conflicts when the sides involved are unwilling to take the steps necessary to advance those solutions. It’s not just in the Middle East, but also in Cyprus, Kosovo, Bosnia and even Kashmir. The United States held a stance and recommended a solution for each of these conflicts — and over the years, there have been several — but not a single one of those suggestions was realized.

One can understand the fears of the right and wonder at the unrealistic hopes of the radical Left. The Left is not usually enthusiastic about U.S. foreign policy, and it certainly doesn’t appreciate what is referred to in political jargon as “American imperialism.” When Washington tries to force its opinion on any nation, the Left sees it as an expression of imperialist aggression, and rightly so. It is only in the case of Israel that the leftists in Europe and the U.S., along with parts of the radical Left in Israel, hope that the United States will interact with Israel as if it were a banana republic. It’s simply better not to talk about the logical — and ethical — contradiction inherent in this stance.

This doesn’t mean that the United States hasn’t the political capability to bring about positive results in the midst of Middle Eastern turmoil. But that ability does not rely solely on political power or the desires of the president; it depends, rather, on context. There are, in fact, two contexts within which the United States possesses a strong opportunity to advance positive processes, or at least to prevent the radicalization of negative processes. In the absence of these contexts, however, Washington is unable to force an agreement between sides. Obama learned this lesson through the failures he experienced at the beginning of his first term.

It is worthwhile to examine what these two contexts are. The first context is in the case of actual war, when there is an underlying fear that the conflict will turn into a broader regional war or even boil over into a clash between the major powers. In such situations, the United States can utilize its powers and bring the fighting to an end by applying heavy pressure on Israel. This is what happened in 1956 during the Suez Crisis when President Dwight Eisenhower exerted force not just on Israel, but also on France and England. This is what happened in the last days of the Yom Kippur War when Secretary of State Henry Kissinger brought to a halt the advances of the Israel Defense Forces, IDF, that had already reached the western bank of the Suez Canal. This is what happened when President Ronald Reagan compelled Prime Minister Menachem Begin to stop IDF advances into western Beirut after the Syrian murder of Bachir Gemayel during the First Lebanon War. This is what happened when the government of the first George Bush prevented Israel from attacking Iraqi missile launchers during the First Gulf War.

In all of these cases, there was a clear and direct American interest in keeping the situation from deteriorating. American pressure was sharp and focused: Its intent was to bring an end to the fighting. In these cases, a one-time act allowed for rapid and unequivocal confirmation, while a lack of response to American demands could lead to an immediate and deep confrontation with Washington.

The second context is the exact opposite of the first: It involves a situation in which Israel and the Arabs have, of their own initiative, arrived at a negotiation that has become stalled before reaching its conclusion and in which broad agreements have been achieved on all but a few issues. This was the case about a year after Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, when Israel and Egypt agreed on a majority of issues in two-way negotiations, but a few sensitive points remained unresolved and complicated their conclusion. Then, and only then, President Jimmy Carter brought Begin and Sadat to Camp David and, while steamrolling the two sides with heavy pressure, helped them overcome remaining differences of opinion. The two sides had had difficulty conceding to one other on the issues but apparently found a way to make those concessions for the president of the United States.

This was the case after Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization reached groundbreaking mutual recognition at Oslo, while still struggling with a few topics. Then, and only then, President Bill Clinton invited both sides to the White House, where the remaining questions were resolved and concluded. This was also the case in the matter of the peace agreement with Jordan, which was essentially reached between King Hussein and Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin; President Clinton only gave his blessing. In this context, we’re talking about situations in which the groups involved initiated the processes themselves — whether it’s Sadat visiting Jerusalem and Begin responding to him or Israel and the PLO at Oslo — while the United States served as patron or catalyst when agreement was in the interest of both sides and entirely within reach.

When these two contexts do not exist, however — neither actual war that poses a regional threat nor active negotiations progressing between the two sides — the United States is unable to bring the sides to an agreement. Sometimes, it can’t even bring them to meaningful negotiations. Throughout the years, there have been countless U.S. plans for peace in the Middle East — from the efforts of Secretary of State William Rogers [under Nixon] and the Annapolis Conference of George W. Bush’s days, to the steps taken by Obama during his first term. Also included among these failed undertakings is the 2000 Camp David Summit, when Clinton attempted to bring Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat, the head of the Palestinian Authority, to an agreement. This bore much similarity to Clinton’s previous unsuccessful attempt to compel a compromise between Israel and Syria at the Shepherdstown Summit.

We are used to focusing on the question of who is “guilty” for these failures, but the issue is more essential and fundamental. When there is no political desire to forge new ground — from one side or both — it is not within the power of the U.S. to force an agreement upon them. In other words, a forced arrangement is not an option.

It isn’t difficult to perceive the reasons for this. Even if the U.S. president is able to encourage the sides to come to the negotiating table and even if he succeeds in bringing them to sign some document or another, the process of imposing peace is complicated and consists of many stages and many years — as the peace treaty with Egypt and the Oslo Accords have both proven. The U.S. president can clear his schedule for a week or 10 days in order to deal with the Middle East, but he can’t preside over the realization of an agreement over the course of several years. And if he leaves it in the hands of some ambassador — as illustrated by the case of Dennis Ross — there will be a lack of the executive power necessary to bring the two quarrelling sides to do what neither of them want to do.

The Madrid Conference, in which brutal pressure was applied to Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, is also proof of the limits of U.S. power. While it was possible to bring Israel to the negotiation table against the wishes of Shamir’s government, in the end, despite a few photo ops and impressive speeches and all kinds of meetings and conferences in all corners of the Earth, the Madrid Conference was a failure because at least one of the sides was not willing to move forward.

As has been stated, this is the situation in other, similar conflicts. Eventually, the key rests in the hands of the two sides. In the Israeli context, it lies in the hands of the Israeli political system. As long as the Palestinians are unable to unify their ranks behind moderate leadership, and the Israeli Left continues to lose elections while the Israeli voter brings rightist governments to power time and again, no U.S. president will be able to change these fundamental facts.

In the end, no one can free Israelis or Palestinians from responsibility for our own future. President Obama’s visit and his impressive speech at the International Convention Center highlighted this fact. In essence, Obama told the Israelis: The key is in your hands. You can potentially change your policies, but don’t fall prey to the delusion that someone else is able to do the right thing for you.