America, the Brotherhood and Their Followers

Before the Brotherhood’s arrival in the Egyptian government, the West had three set visions to evaluate the rise of what is called the “Islamic revival” movement — especially regarding the movement as an international one that encroaches on the borders of the countries that grew in its soil. It flowed in numerous areas on the surface of the Earth. It spread over nearly five continents. It is devoted to defying the United States on the level of extending values into politics, from daily behavior to long-range strategies.

The first vision, pioneered by Noam Chomsky, looks at this government as a reaction to Washington politics that are strongly supportive of Israel. The second describes this revivification as representing the essence of a “clash of civilizations” between Muslims and the West. It guided Samuel Huntington, who held to this view. As for the third, it deals with Islamic life as a cultural-personal response touching on broader political, social and economic services of “modernity” that carry the standard of the West. The residual tendency to look to the past in our country shakes them. Paul Berman defends this understanding of the tense situation between the violent wing of the Islamic revival and the Western world.

This vision was built, in its essence, on analysis of the speeches made by the leaders of al-Qaida before and after Sept. 11, although it converges in some aspects with old Western narratives that have struggled with interpreting the reasons for the rise of the Islamist government’s moderate, as well as extremist, wings. However, it fails to provide an exhaustive answer in that regard. Really, the “shock of modernity,” the “clash of civilizations” and the “revenge of America” are not sufficient entry points to discover the truth of what pushed the extremist Islamists to the path of confrontation with America. Bin Laden was a visible ally to Washington during the “jihad” movement against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. As for al-Zawahiri, after several decades busy fighting the “near enemy,” which means the governing regime in Egypt, his attitude toward the United States did not exceed the limits of the psychological tension caused by its blatant support for Israel and its standing, at that time, behind Mubarak.

Yes, the United States’ politics with bias toward Israel fueled the angry condition in a lot of Islamist groups, radical and conservative among them, and contributed, along with the suppression of the ruling regimes and their domination, to turning some factions of the Islamist movement to violence and transforming it from “internal” to “external,” whether on the level of occurrence or setting goals. In other words, a more accurate determination of the enemy. However, there is talk about aspects of these factions becoming bigger than the Islamist movement, especially those that take on an international dimension. They themselves raise a “strategic alternative” to what is prevalent, whether on the individual level of all Arab and Islamic countries or as a global alternative based on the interpretation of Islam as a global religion.

This structural nature found in the current global conditions is what drew al-Qaida to fight the “far off enemy” — that is, the United States. However, it does not in and of itself produce random or organized violence, as some researchers and decision-makers in the West imagine. The nature itself is rooted in the minds and souls of Muslims, except that they do not all walk on the same path as al-Qaida and the extremist groups and organizations that take their slogans and politics from Islam. Thus, proposals such as the “clash of civilizations,” concerned with putting the entire Islamic world, without any support, truth or justification, in the position of “enemy” will not present an effective solution to the terrorism problem. It will not result in security for Washington or permit it to convince the world that it is the “leader of globalization.” As for the new face of America — it supported the Brotherhood to contain the extremist and terrorist movements. This will not do any good. Some of the movements intersect with the Brotherhood, especially after it has been dominated by the polarizing elements of society in many thoughts and actions. Some of them or most of them have basically left the cloak of the parent organization. As for the group realizing that Washington used the Brotherhood as a strategic alternative to Mubarak to serve American interests, none of the jihadists will obey the organization when it asks them to settle their disputes with the Americans.

The effective solution could be in an integrated package of measures. The first is for the United States to renounce support for Israeli aggression against the Palestinian people. The second is Washington’s abstention from supporting fascist and authoritarian regimes, including the powers in Egypt now. This would allow for political change and the rebuilding of true society, ending the condition of tension in that system. Here originates the path to contain the Islamic movement. Excluding it or condemning it, as is the case now, is not the way to a complete abandonment of violence both internally and externally or the way to governance by civil rules based on the exchange of power and respect for freedom of expression. As for the third action, it is in the “deepening of understanding of the Islamic religion.” It is not in eliminating, sequestering or fighting it. This way is not possible, and it will be answered with fierce resistance. This deepening must be entrusted to moderate jurists among the Muslims, those who are accepted by the people, who are aware of the developments of the times and who are not imposed upon from the outside in the form of demands forcing padded amendments to the religious education curriculum. Thus, the foreign hand that makes any attempt at reform, while looking at it democratically in a big way, is what hurts the interests of hardline groups.