China and US Must Persist in Progressive Military Cooperation

Within the next 20 years, China and the U.S. must persist in positive [military] cooperation, avoid negative competition and ultimately form conscious behaviors that will bilaterally and multilaterally stabilize the Asia-Pacific region.

Last week, when Chinese Minister of Defense Chang Wanquan visited the U.S., he spoke with U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. In this meeting, Chang proposed the establishment of a bilateral task force. This task force would use dialogue to eliminate three major obstacles that for years have prevented normal relations between these two nations’ militaries: U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the U.S. Congress’ setup of legal barriers that hinder regular military contact between the U.S. and China, and U.S. planes and warships’ frequent reconnaissance near China. Chang also indicated that if the U.S. stopped its arms sales to Taiwan, China also would consider adjusting its military deployment.

This being said, the views of the U.S. and China differ. It is reported that the U.S. military actively approves China’s proposal of separately setting up task forces. However, the U.S. military has not yet responded to the Chinese proposal that the U.S. cease arms sales to Taiwan in exchange for an adjustment to Chinese military deployment. According to another report, during the June 2013 Annenberg talks between the Chinese and U.S. heads of state, Chinese leaders made these same proposals to the U.S. leadership, but President Obama did not reply.

The Taiwanese are somewhat uneasy. Taiwanese authorities believe that if this information is true, it will alter [former President Ronald] Reagan’s Six Assurances of the 1980s, one of which was that the U.S. would not have prior discussions with mainland China regarding arms sales to Taiwan. The Taiwanese are urgently seeking confirmation from America; all levels of Taiwanese society are nervous.

I think that the time will come when the U.S. will stop arms sales to Taiwan. When? That end will come when the Taiwanese don’t need U.S. weapons and America’s continuing arms sales to Taiwan do the U.S. more harm than good. For the Taiwanese not to need U.S. weapons, cross-strait [Chinese-Taiwanese] cooperation is required. For U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to do the U.S. more harm than good, the Chinese mainland needs to carry out retaliatory measures and lessen American influence.

For example, most U.S. arms companies also produce civilian products. Boeing is such a company. Boeing not only sells large quantities of civilian products to China, but also sells military arms to Taiwan. When China is able to manufacture civilian products similar to Boeing’s, Boeing will have to earnestly consider curbing arms sales to Taiwan. When mainland China is qualified to develop and produce large commercial aircraft, China will no longer need to import Boeing or Airbus aircraft and Boeing will have to weigh the pros and cons in the interests of its business. At this point, Boeing will be more likely to consciously decline Taiwanese orders for military products. If Boeing makes this kind of choice, in a market-oriented country, the Pentagon can do nothing.

To be frank, that day isn’t near, but it’s not too far off. Last year, the U.S. National Intelligence Council published the “2030 Global Trends” report, which claimed that in 2030, the U.S. would no longer be the only superpower. The report’s touting of China is not without objective self-awareness based on growing trends. In any case, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will become difficult after 2030.

Of course, this implies neither that forming a bilateral military task force will be smooth sailing nor that establishing a task force would naturally eliminate the aforementioned three obstacles. It is reported that as early as the Crawford Ranch talks in 2002, U.S. and Chinese leaders brought up ideas that related U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to China’s adjusting its short-range missile deployment, but the U.S. showed no interest and has still not followed up. Even a future bilateral task force would not necessarily overcome the aforementioned three obstacles quickly.

However, the Chinese have always been willing to talk with the U.S. to control conflicting views and lessen differences while increasing win-win cooperation. This [willingness to talk] will not change. As long as both sides adhere to the One China Policy, China’s baseline territorial integrity will not be compromised and China will develop cooperation with the U.S. despite competition. In the process of cooperation, China will guide that competition to a peaceful area. And in the wake of China’s rapid and continued development, that area will continue to expand. The U.S. Department of Defense’s willingness to grow alongside the Chinese military and work within the framework of a task force to progressively eliminate obstacles and achieve more equal military relations and new relationships between the two major powers is not accidental.

I would like to add something about the last of the aforementioned three obstacles. Theoretically, America’s continued close surveillance of China does not limit China’s authority to enter the United States’ exclusive economic zone to conduct military activities. According to reports, at this June’s Asian Security Conference (the Shangri-La Dialogue), China informed the U.S. of Chinese warships’ entering the United States’ exclusive economic zone. Although the U.S. Pacific Commander [Adm. Samuel J. Locklear] welcomed them, his successors may find this kind of situation troublesome.

The U.S. military’s opening of NORAD and the command center’s nuclear bunker to Minister Chang and inviting the Chinese North Sea Fleet to carry out joint search-and-rescue exercises in the waters near Hawaii and to attend next year’s multinational Pacific Rim naval exercises exemplify progress by the U.S. and China in military cooperation, with positive implications. Within the next 20 years, China and the U.S. must persist in such positive cooperation, avoid negative competition and ultimately form conscious behaviors that will bilaterally and multilaterally stabilize the Asia-Pacific region.

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