America Is Hot and Cold at G-20; It Cannot Avoid New, Rising Countries

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 7 September 2013
by Wang Jingtao (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Renee Loeffler. Edited by Gillian Palmer.
The eighth G-20 summit has begun, this one perhaps a bit more “lively.” To avoid an awkward situation, Putin and Obama sat far from each other, Japan's Abe “stood ground” with Xi Jinping to have cordial talks despite tension and Brazil's Rousseff delayed Obama before dinner to ask him about spying. This summit was originally held to talk about “economic growth and employment rates,” but it was overshadowed by Obama's desire to take military action on Syria.

Even though this is a summit with powerful countries participating, it's hard to reverse history; the history of the summit is reflected in the present. The G-20 was originally held to deal with economic crisis. That year America was dealing with its own economic crisis and ready to meet with many new countries and potential allies and, therefore, willing to “expand” the original seven-country G-7 to 20. The G-20 summit stage represents a sign that there is more balance of opinion.

Although America has since regained economic confidence, it now can possibly contradict this concept of “equality” of opinion as well as change its attitude toward the G-20. The U.S. tends to present a resilient image of strength at the G-20, making it difficult for countries new to the G-20 that desire to gain influential power. America’s strategy in foreign policy is to use ideology, only needing a strong U.S. economy as backup. However, perhaps now if the U.S. receives restrictions from the G-20, it will go from taking a cautious attitude to taking a completely disregarding one.

The entire world is experiencing a building shift of power structure, full of indecisiveness with conflict and friction. This uncertainty has capacity for hazard and risk. These days, underlying strategic competitiveness between larger powers influences the present international setup of cooperation. After World War II, America carefully schemed, led and worked to put in place a backbone for the U.S. dollar and military affairs by forming alliances at the U.N. and on other international stages, building the framework for these organizations. Even now the U.S. still benefits from these stable frameworks. To ensure a long-term “superiority benefit,” America sometimes can “change its mind” at will, breaking systems the U.S. itself cultivated. If the U.S. decided to, it could push the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) to disintegrate the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The world is changing as it moves from a Western-governed world to one that is governed with the balance of many ideas. Working to balance different opinions is a general trend, but what “general” consists of has some limits. How and at what speed these changes occur and subtle differences between countries, these changes mean big differences in benefits to China, the U.S. or any country. China has to actively take the initiative to push for a balanced stage; it especially needs to make good use of the G-20 stage, although doing so is difficult and a constant uphill battle.

Right now the crucial problem is a fair world without Western influence. In 1990 the G-7 world economic outlook was at about 80 percent; nowadays it doesn’t reach 60 percent. This change has two implications: One, new countries are growing abruptly, which is why G-7 became G-20; two, new countries and the G-7 still have big differences, which is why the G-20 rate of effectiveness is not quite ideal.

With regard to all this, the G-20 is still the most effective and fair international economic governing platform, so its existence has special value. However, the G-20 contains the G-7 and the G-7 already has established effective coordination. If the G-20 is to be truly fair, another “wheel” should be formed without the Western influence of the G-7. For China, Russia and other larger powers, one possibility is to use the BRIC alliance as a second “wheel” driving the G-20 to gain effectiveness.

America is powerful; if it doesn't attach great importance to which international stage it's using, its influence from that stage will decrease. America was once in charge at the top, but now, if someday Washington snubs the G-20, the U.S. might not necessarily be able to act at will. New powerful countries need the G-20. South Korea, Australia and other not so influential countries also need the G-20; this is where the G-20’s life comes from.

At this G-20 summit, China's Xi Jinping is the most unhurried official, his confidence noted many times in foreign media. The even more confident China is behind Xi Jinping. Looking at modern Chinese history, it seems like a lifetime ago compared to the role China plays in the world today. Chinese citizens' confidence in their country is perhaps slow to accumulate, but it will come eventually. A powerfully confident China will surely have its stage, no matter if it is at the G-20 summit, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) or at the U.N. China's feeling of “home advantage” is growing larger and larger.


美国对G20冷热,都绕不开新兴国家
2013-09-07 02:35
环球时报  
责任编辑:王京涛

G20峰会开了8次,这一次可能是最“热闹”的。普京与奥巴马为避免尴尬调远了座位,日本为安倍“站着”跟习近平搭上话而欣欣然,奥巴马因为对巴西总统解释为何长期监听她而迟到宴会,此届峰会原本“增长与就业”的主题也被美国要打叙利亚的事冲歪冲淡。

  即使大国峰会,也很难扭转历史的演进,但它是历史演进脉络的集中体现。G20峰会本是金融危机的产物。当年美国遭金融危机冲击,很愿意多同新兴国家对话,将七国集团(G7)“扩充”为G20。G20峰会登上舞台被普遍认为是世界多极化的标志。

  随着美国自信心稍有恢复,它对世界多极化的抵触有可能会抬头。它对G20的态度同样可能会变化。它在G20上的表现或许会趋于强硬,阻止新兴国家影响的进一步扩大。美国的对外战略奉行实用主义,只要它的经济复苏能够实现,它对从G20上受到的制约就有可能从比较谨慎变成满不在乎的态度。

-  世界正经历力量格局变化的积累,矛盾和摩擦多,充满不确定性,这种不确定性表现为不确定的风险和机会。当前大国之间的核心战略竞争是建构新国际体系的竞争。二战后,美国精心谋划,主导构建了以美元霸权和政治军事结盟为支柱、联合国等多边国际机制为框架的国际体系,时至今日,美国仍从这个体系中获得稳定的收益。为保证长期获得“优势位置红利”,美国有时会“革自己的命”,打碎自己亲手培植的东西。如美国正强力推动TPP(跨太平洋伙伴关系协议)和TTIP(跨大西洋贸易与投资伙伴关系协定)来瓦解WTO。

  世界的变化方向是单极向多极变、西方中心向多中心变。多极化是大势所趋,但这里的“多”也一定是有限的,是屈指可数的。怎么变,以什么速度变,每一个细微的不同,对中国、美国、任何国家都意味着巨大利益差别。中国必须积极主动推动多极化,尤其需要用好G20这个平台,而这个过程犹如逆水行舟,不进则退。

  现在问题的关键是非西方世界如何平衡西方世界。1990年G7的经济总量占世界近8成,如今不到6成。这个变化有两方面含义:第一,新兴国家在崛起,这是G7变成G20的根本原因;第二,新兴国家与G7仍有大差距,这则是G20效率不够理想的根本原因。

  总体而言,G20仍是当前效率和合法性平衡最好的国际经济治理平台,它有着特殊的存在价值。但G20里包着一个G7,G7大且有成熟有效的协调机制。要想在G20内部搞好平衡,就要在G7之外,形成另一个非西方的轮子。对中国、俄罗斯等新兴大国来说,一个现实的选择是做实金砖机制,转动两个轮子推动G20的机制化,有效化。

  美国很强大,它不重视哪一个国际平台,这个平台的影响力就会下降。但美国毕竟过了一家说了算的巅峰期,即使华盛顿有一天想冷落G20,但它绕不开新兴国家的力量,只要其他国家仍然看重、珍惜并努力经营G20,美国未必就能拗得过。新兴大国需要G20,韩国、澳大利亚等中等强国也需要G20,这些都是G20生命力的来源。

  在本届G20峰会上,中国国家主席习近平是最从容的大国领导人,他的自信也多次被外媒提及。在习近平的身后,是更加自信的中国。回望中国的近现代史,今天中国扮演的全球性角色让人恍若隔世。只要国力强大,国人的自信可能会迟到,但一定会到。强大自信的中国一定会有自己的舞台,无论在G20,还是APEC,或者联合国,中国的“主场”感觉都会越来越多。▲

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