The Moderate Standing in the Middle of the System
Published in Sin Chew
(Malaysia) on 2 October 2013
by Cao Jianting (link to original)
(Malaysia) on 2 October 2013
by Cao Jianting (link to original)
Translated from
by Daniel Chow.
Edited by Gillian Palmer.
In 2003, Iran suggested beginning negotiations with the U.S. to resolve their differences. The Iranian president at the time was Iran’s first reformist president, Khatami. In the end, the U.S. secretary of state felt that Khatami did not have any real power in Iran and was all talk and no action, while the hardliners and the White House, who had just won a major victory in Iraq, all felt that there was no need to negotiate with Iran. This was how the U.S. and Iran lost the chance to resolve their differences.
Besides promoting “constructive diplomacy” during Khatami’s term, the media and women, among others, all had greater freedom and Iran’s economy improved. But he was being suppressed by a system with the Supreme Leader as its head and had difficulty in implementing his reforms, not only offending local conservatives, but also causing the reformists to be disappointed in him. Average citizens were being attracted to the narodnik* Ahmadinejad’s “social righteousness,” anti-corruption and other, more powerful slogans.
In 2005, Ahmadinejad, who was closer to the grassroots than Khatami, won the election; after he assumed office he was indifferent to human rights and shut down the media, and the economy deteriorated. As a narodnik*, he was happy to build a “courageous speaker” image, purposely making hate speeches against the West and bringing more serious sanctions to Iran.
Khatami, who had silently stepped down, discovered that the “social freedom” championed by the reformists was nowhere near as good as the economic improvement, elimination of social unfairness and corruption proclaimed by the conservatives in the eyes of the people. In the 2009 election, ex-Prime Minister Mousavi, whom Khatami supported, purposely avoided using the reformists’ slogans, facing off against Ahmadinejad directly on the platform of economy and social righteousness issues.
In the 2013 Iranian presidential election, the reformists were banned from participating. Khatami called on the people to support the “moderate” Rouhani. Rouhani won by a landslide. As a leader acceptable to both conservatives and reformists, Rouhani eventually made a breakthrough in U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, ending more than 30 years of stalemate. A shoe was thrown at him by a conservative after he returned home, and the U.S. and Iran may very well be unable to compromise on Iran’s nuclear program, but it’s a good start.
After Rouhani won, Khatami told a group of university students: “We would rather have the reformists’ argument triumph, even though the reformists themselves did not win.” He stressed that a successful Iranian president must be able to coordinate with the Supreme Leader, the latter assisting the president in fulfilling his promises to the people.
It sounds helpless and compromising. But the thinking that one can rely on either the “people” or the “Leader” alone to carry out reforms is equal to dismissing the complexity of the social structure. This is the essence of democratic reforms. When neither side is willing to have discourse and both are on the verge of colliding with each other like two trains, we all need a moderate who does not fear death to stand in the way.
*Editor’s note: A supporter of the rights and power of the people; a populist.
Besides promoting “constructive diplomacy” during Khatami’s term, the media and women, among others, all had greater freedom and Iran’s economy improved. But he was being suppressed by a system with the Supreme Leader as its head and had difficulty in implementing his reforms, not only offending local conservatives, but also causing the reformists to be disappointed in him. Average citizens were being attracted to the narodnik* Ahmadinejad’s “social righteousness,” anti-corruption and other, more powerful slogans.
In 2005, Ahmadinejad, who was closer to the grassroots than Khatami, won the election; after he assumed office he was indifferent to human rights and shut down the media, and the economy deteriorated. As a narodnik*, he was happy to build a “courageous speaker” image, purposely making hate speeches against the West and bringing more serious sanctions to Iran.
Khatami, who had silently stepped down, discovered that the “social freedom” championed by the reformists was nowhere near as good as the economic improvement, elimination of social unfairness and corruption proclaimed by the conservatives in the eyes of the people. In the 2009 election, ex-Prime Minister Mousavi, whom Khatami supported, purposely avoided using the reformists’ slogans, facing off against Ahmadinejad directly on the platform of economy and social righteousness issues.
In the 2013 Iranian presidential election, the reformists were banned from participating. Khatami called on the people to support the “moderate” Rouhani. Rouhani won by a landslide. As a leader acceptable to both conservatives and reformists, Rouhani eventually made a breakthrough in U.S.-Iran diplomatic relations, ending more than 30 years of stalemate. A shoe was thrown at him by a conservative after he returned home, and the U.S. and Iran may very well be unable to compromise on Iran’s nuclear program, but it’s a good start.
After Rouhani won, Khatami told a group of university students: “We would rather have the reformists’ argument triumph, even though the reformists themselves did not win.” He stressed that a successful Iranian president must be able to coordinate with the Supreme Leader, the latter assisting the president in fulfilling his promises to the people.
It sounds helpless and compromising. But the thinking that one can rely on either the “people” or the “Leader” alone to carry out reforms is equal to dismissing the complexity of the social structure. This is the essence of democratic reforms. When neither side is willing to have discourse and both are on the verge of colliding with each other like two trains, we all need a moderate who does not fear death to stand in the way.
*Editor’s note: A supporter of the rights and power of the people; a populist.