What Is Behind the 'Non-Aggression' Proposal with North Korea?

The direction of guideline revisions for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation was the subject of the Oct. 3 Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2). At the press conference following the negotiations, however, I could not ignore U.S. Secretary of State Kerry’s comments, though their context diverged from the subject. Secretary Kerry stated that if North Korea decides to denuclearize, “we are prepared to sign a non-aggression agreement” between the U.S. and North Korea. This statement was virtually ignored in Japan, but all of South Korea’s major newspapers covered it unanimously.

Where Are the Concerned Parties of the “Agreement”?

I read the coverage in South Korea and, despite myself, I could not believe my eyes. Kerry’s remarks were reported by many of those newspapers as a proposal for a “U.S.-North Korea non-aggression agreement.” I recall the beginning of the current nuclear crisis when, in the fall of 2002, suspicions emerged of North Korea’s highly enriched uranium; North Korea proposed a “U.S.-North Korea non-aggression pact” to the Bush administration, which advocated a “pre-emptive strike doctrine.”

Masashi Nishihara, who at that time was president of the National Defense Academy of Japan, as if sounding an alarm, stated in the Washington Post that if North Korea were to attack Japan, under the “U.S.-North Korea non-aggression pact,” America’s hands would be bound and it would be unable to retaliate. Deputy Secretary of State Armitage also dismissed any possibility that the pact would pass the U.S. Congress. If it’s true that Secretary Kerry proposed a “U.S.-North Korea non-aggression agreement” after negotiations for strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance, it’s the same as issuing statements that could disempower that alliance.

After checking English articles, coverage in South Korea seemed to be “over-reaching.” There remains ambiguity, but the concerned parties of the “non-aggression agreement” with North Korea Secretary Kerry spoke of, is not the U.S.; rather, it is a syntax that can be read as “members of the Six Party Talks.” It doesn’t mean that Secretary Kerry’s intentions are incomprehensible. It likely refers to raising a multilateral “non-aggression agreement” with stronger restraint and pressing for the denuclearization of North Korea, which is making its “nuclear capability” a fait accompli. If South Korea joins in, it means that the 1991 North-South agreement that includes non-aggression, which North Korea “abrogated” this spring, will also be resuscitated.

Direct Threat to U.S. Mainland in the Background

Nevertheless, Kerry’s words shouldn’t be overlooked. To begin with, in the joint statement of the Six Party Talks on Sept. 16, 2005, North Korea promised to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs,” and the U.S. swore an oath that it “has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.” This oath takes the form of the so-called “security guarantee,” a vow countries with nuclear weapons provide to denuclearized nations, equivalent to the U.S. promising with this multilateral document not to use unilateral military force as a condition of North Korea’s denuclearization. This vow has not been reaffirmed since North Korea enforced nuclear testing, but if North Korea takes denuclearization measures, it can once again enjoy the “security guarantee.” What is the context of Secretary Kerry’s remarks, which seem to gild the lily of the “joint statement”?

I recall the National Defense Commission spokesman’s “critical discourse” sent out by North Korea, which shifted from provisional military offensive to “peace offensive.” The content suggests “high-level talks” to discuss the changeover to a military cease-fire peace agreement with the U.S. However, we should pay close attention to the sentence that states that if there is genuine interest in the guarantee of security and peace in regions including the U.S. mainland, “the U.S. should no longer talk about dialogue and improvement of relations with preconditions.”

With the success of ballistic missile testing at the end of last year, North Korea’s confidence in holding the “security and peace of U.S. mainland” hostage comes and goes. But now the “non-aggression” regarding U.S.-North Korea relations, unlike a decade ago, does not just prohibit the use of military force on North Korea by the U.S. It’s asymmetrical, but it has a meaning close to “mutual non-aggression,” which forbids direct attack on the U.S. mainland by North Korea. One may consider the basis of Kerry’s remarks to be the hidden threat of ballistic missiles from North Korea.

To North Korea, Kerry’s Remarks an Underhanded Threat

North Korea, which shows a desire for negotiations with the U.S., couldn’t have let Kerry’s remarks pass. On the 12, the National Defense Commission spokesman issued a statement criticizing Kerry’s proposal. This statement distorts Kerry’s remarks and proposal of a U.S.-North Korea bilateral “non-aggression agreement,” and points out North Korea’s adherence to bilateral negotiations with the U.S. However, we should take seriously the manner in which the spokesman turns Kerry’s words on their head, criticizing the promise of “non-aggression” that “calls on the DPRK to lay down arms and remain bare-handed” and demanding that the U.S. “halt at once all the provocations against the DPRK including war exercises.”

It says here “all provocations … including war exercises,” which mainly indicates U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises, but the statement calls for the U.S. side to “make a policy switchover by withdrawing all the measures it has taken to isolate and stifle the DPRK” and demands conversion to a military ceasefire peace agreement and withdrawal of U.S. forces. Furthermore, the statement asserts that doing so is a “guarantee” of “peace and security of U.S. mainland,” and to not forget that North Korea poses a threat to the U.S. as well.

A U.S.-North Korea bilateral “non-aggression agreement” is out of the question, but the U.S. mustn’t contribute to the disempowerment of the U.S.-South Korea alliance in its dealings for denuclearization. In the past, after re-election, the U.S. administration had taken on a “forward-leaning posture of defense” toward North Korea, but I wonder if Kerry’s remark is also an indication of that. I want to believe it will prove to be an unfounded fear, but all the same, I cannot get rid of that fear.