More Machiavelli, Less Obama

The Middle East has been a playground for Western idealists and interventionists in the last few decades. In a strange consensus, American left-wing intellectuals and neoconservatives pushed for the toppling of the dictator Saddam Hussein; both saw the Iraq War as merely the beginning of a large-scale democratization of the region. President Bush’s “freedom agenda” drowned in the quagmire of Iraq’s civil war, but advocates of a foreign policy led more by values than interests were given a fresh boost by the “Arab Spring.”

In Washington, the contrite consensus is that the government got too close to authoritarian rulers like Mubarak and must now learn to respect the will of the citizens who protest. At the same time, the NATO intervention in Libya and the death of Gadhafi seemed to prove right those who had advocated military intervention in the name of human rights and international law. The West confidently thought of itself as doing what the world wanted. On the third anniversary of the Arab revolution, it must be conceded that this policy, despite rapprochement with Iran, has turned into a shambles. It has failed not least due to its own inherent contradictions. Nowhere has this become clearer than in Syria and Egypt.

Zigzagging

This failure can be attributed to one cause above all others: Barack Obama. With his slippery tactics, he is one of the main contributors to the current unsatisfactory situation. The lesson he took from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was simple and plausible: He wanted to draw a line under the policy which was originally supposed to be about “regime change” and women’s rights, but which ended up turning into a military adventure. This pragmatism derives from the uneasy thought that America is investing all its energy in one region, which is losing its significance, while new opportunities are emerging in Asia. So Washington stood idly by and watched the killing in Syria.

Under the impression of a poison gas attack, the White House performed a spectacular U-turn. It threatened to stage an intervention which, lacking a clear military objective, had the same effect as attempting regime change, only to call off the whole thing shortly afterward. As a result, the West lost any influence it had on the opposition fighters, Assad strengthened his authority, the anti-American Damascus-Tehran axis has been stabilized and Russia, America’s long-isolated perennial rival, finagled its way back into the chess game that is the Middle East.

The Obama administration initially praised the Islamists’ seizure of power in Egypt as a triumph for democracy, although it had entirely different foreign policy priorities. Washington did not welcome the coup d’état by the Egyptian generals either, who, out of self-interest, were pro-American to a certain extent. Instead, America condemned the violence used by the junta and stopped military aid. In another U-turn, it then carefully expressed a degree of understanding for the army. In this way, Washington lost its influence on the unfolding of events in Egypt as well. Western credibility, which should have been strengthened by its commitment to democratic change, suffered further damage. Russia is already offering itself as a reliable partner and weapons supplier for Cairo and its voice is now no longer ignored.

After these blunders, what is needed is a return to realpolitik based on what is feasible. Wars, particularly ones waged in the name of noble causes, are increasingly unpopular in the U.S. and Europe. As the age of big military interventions appears to be over, Washington must think more about classic diplomatic methods. Allies want treating with care, and recalcitrant forces must be made to feel economic pressure. Powerful nations can allow themselves to ignore a regional conflict like Syria, but as soon as they intervene they must leave no room for doubt that they will crush any resistance. What is needed is less Obama and more Machiavelli.

The U.S. cannot afford to turn its back on the Middle East and then shrug its shoulders and accept the way other states fill the vacuum. A country that claims to be a global stabilizing power must act globally. Weaknesses in other parts of the world undermine America’s stature in Asia, its new focus of attention. Intellectual games in the White House about wasting less time working on hopeless cases like Syria and unreliable parties like Egypt look purely academic.

The vague prospect of a lasting nuclear agreement with Tehran does not justify any backs being turned on longstanding allies. Peace between Cairo and Jerusalem is still the cornerstone of American Middle Eastern policy; consequently, Washington must fully commit itself to the guarantor of this policy, namely Israel, but also to the Egyptian military, despite the violence against the Muslim Brotherhood. This also applies to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf monarchies, which America equips with modern weapons on the one hand and leaves in the dark as to whether the old promises about security are still valid on the other hand.

Saudi Arabia in particular seems superfluous to requirements at the moment, given America’s advances toward Iran. This feeling is strengthened by the fact that whether the country is not too much of an unsuitable partner for the West is openly discussed in the U.S. and Europe. The human rights situation there is terrible, but sometimes diplomacy cannot afford to be choosy. A change of alliances would only be considered if Tehran is prepared to reach a compromise. This is doubtful, however, especially since Iran is not a model pupil when it comes to human rights.

Netanyahu’s Suggestions

Meanwhile, it has become fashionable on both sides of the Atlantic to dismiss Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as a troublemaker and reactionary who has not recognized the sign of the times. However, he is an experienced statesman and is undoubtedly right about one thing: A preliminary agreement with Iran is double-edged since it requires one side to merely suspend its nuclear program, but the other side to make irreversible concessions. The unfreezing of financial assets worth millions of dollars is one such permanent concession, since Iran can empty its bank accounts straight away and deal with its most acute money problems. Tehran can draw breath and go about achieving its goals in other ways.

It is right to explore opportunities for a lasting agreement and by so doing, to take an intermediate step on the road to building confidence. But two things should be out of the question: A preliminary agreement is not an end in itself, but rather one station on a long journey. At the same time, Western negotiators cannot not give the impression that they are existentially dependent on reaching an agreement. The threat of tightening sanctions and of military escalation, if necessary, must remain in place. It would be fatal if Washington gave the impression that it would be prepared to agree a disadvantageous deal, only so that it would be able to quickly shake the dust of the Middle East off its feet.