The ‘Young Americans’ Are Returning to Tehran

Since the mullahs seized power in Tehran nearly 35 years ago, their perspective on the United States has remained one of fantasy and fear. This mix plays a pivotal role in the ongoing power conflict inside the Khomeini camp since then. The impact of that mixture seems clear at this present time, now that the faction led by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani has tried to regain the position it lost during the presidency of [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad.

Indications of the mullahs’ admiration for the United States, which Khomeini called “the Great Satan,” have been present since the earliest days of the regime. The first government formed by Khomeini and headed by Mehdi Bazargan included five ministers with American citizenship. Bazargan was later prosecuted as an agent of the CIA.

A short time after forming his government, Bazargan met U.S. National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in Algeria to develop a joint strategic plan against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. To bring down Bazargan, a rival faction [in Iran] played on America’s fears and supported the hostage-taking of American diplomats.

Mohammad Beheshti, the ambitious mullah who led the primary anti-Bazargan faction, held a secret meeting with American agents to form an alliance. Beheshti even sent one the members of this entourage, the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, to the occupied embassy to improve the condition of the imprisoned diplomats. The video published on the Internet shows Khamenei preparing the American hostages for their release and saying that the Islamic Republic would resume buying weapons from the United States.

Prime Minister Mir Hosseini Mousavi, who concluded the negotiations for the release of the hostages, was leading the opposition faction at that time. To support his position, Mousavi started a channel of communication with Washington led by his senior aide Abbas Mohassan Kengharlo.

Following the killing of Beheshti the aides of Khamenei and Rafsanjani united to bring down Mousavi, and Rafsanjani became Washington’s first negotiator in Tehran. Over time, he took advantage of America’s money to appoint Khamenei as “highest guide” while he assumed the presidency of the country.

Khomeini’s passion for the Great Satan was so great that even many leaders in the regime were secretly sending their sons to the United States to study there. Today the sons of the mullahs and their aides who study in the United States occupy a high position in the Khomeini regime. In 2011, one of the members of the Iranian Majlis gathered a list of names of more than 300 individuals who held permanent residency in the United States.

It is not surprising that the United States is the second destination for hundreds of advisers in the Khomeini regime, the Revolutionary Guard and the corporate managers that the mullahs control. Many of them went to the United States on education grants given to them by unknown American sources.

It seems from the first impression that the United States’ investment in the remainder of its network of contacts in the Islamic Republic will pay dividends later. There are many members of that network who currently occupy important positions in the administration of President Hassan Rouhani. As such, many return from their temporary stays in the United States with the intention of working to strengthen this network.

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said once that he would strengthen Rouhani’s position in Iran until the faction supporting his movement can move against the “radical” factions still trapped in antiquated ideas of anti-Americanism.

For their part, Rouhani and his group of young Americans say that they can provide American support for the regime. That is what will help, according to their calculations, to improve the outlook of the Khomeini regime for the future of Iran. Rouhani’s message to Washington seems simple: Let us govern Iran, and we will include your interests! It is a so-called “win-win.”

However, a closer look at the truth of the situation in Iran today might give us a different picture. In comparison with 1979, we find that the Iranian society has become more complex. Where it once seemed that there were many powers that contributed to forming foreign and domestic policies [to improve Iran], it is now done by several hundred people embedded in sensitive positions in the country. Rafsanjani, Khomeini, Ahmadinejad and many high-level players in Iranian policy are still hunting in the waters of the revolution, which are getting shallower every day. The best estimates, which consider participation rates in the elections organized by the regime, indicate that Khomeini’s ideology remains capable of rallying the support of 10 to 15 percent of Iranians. Because the rest of society remains divided between different policies and ideologies, that remaining 10 to 15 percent represents a powerful voting bloc to be reckoned with. The problem is that hatred of America forms a principal component of the Khomeini ideology. Therefore, when the time comes to discuss a real change in Tehran’s hostile position with regard to the United States, the faction that moves toward agreement with America will not be able to keep its promises.

Rouhani and his group of “young Americans” will not be able to keep the promises that they themselves make with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry unless they get rid of the anti-American component that makes up the principal part of their deadly ideological mixture. It is clear that Rouhani and his group will not be able to do that without losing the Khomeini voting bloc.

Of course, Rouhani says that he can rally a wider voting bloc than the Khomeini ideological supporters, as the majority of Iranians have a positive opinion of the United States and they want to develop strong relations with Washington. However, the urgent question is: If the opportunity does not become available to Iran to return to its traditional alliance with the United States, then why would Tehran entrust the rapprochement of the United States to individuals born and bred with a hatred of everything American?

During their presidencies in Iran, Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami (another mullah courted by America) showed that even when things go sour, they could not abandon the most important rules of the game — namely, anti-Americanism. From there, it seems impossible to further an alliance with one of the powers that [Iran] sees as an ideological enemy. It seems impossible that Rouhani and his group of “young Americans” will be able to realize anything more than what Bazargan, Mousavi, Rafsanjani and Khatami accomplished. Despite his real and multifaceted naivete, Kerry would do well to remember that Iran’s problem today is not with America. It is an internal and foundational problem: It is a problem of split personalities in a people wherein the majority welcome an alliance with the United States and the minority possess an ideology whose lifeblood is hatred of America.