Learning To Share Power Is a Wise Move for the US
Published in View China
(China) on 7 May 2014
by Hu Bo (link to original)
(China) on 7 May 2014
by Hu Bo (link to original)
Translated from
by Jing Littlejohn.
Edited by Kyrstie Lane.
During a recent trip to Asia, Obama did his best to use his diplomatic skills to pacify his allies and show power to China. However, things didn’t go favorably for the U.S.; actual results were not as expected.
Considering economy and commerce, efforts were made without making progress. Though Obama made every effort to support Japan on the Diaoyu Islands issue, Abe just chimed in and agreed to speed up the negotiation progress of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Regarding security cooperation, Obama’s avoidance and awkwardness when asked by the media, “What is the role of the U.S. in conflicts China has with Japan and the Philippines?” showed that the current U.S. government is suffering: The U.S. has to build close relationships with its allies by virtue of maritime disputes and move “rebalancing” strategies forward in the Asia-Pacific, while minimizing provocation of China.
How can the U.S. act as China’s friend, yet repress China at the same time? This doesn’t work in the real world. The U.S. policy of “repressing while engaging” China, of “cozying up while being alert” against its allies is getting more and more difficult to maintain, and meanwhile, more dangerous.
First, ongoing significant changes regarding China and the United States' strength in the Asia-Pacific need to be noticed. The U.S. is unable to take responsibility for securing the Asia-Pacific, as they very much want to do. The gap between China and the United Staes' overall military power won’t have a qualitative change. However, the gap is declining rapidly in the Asia-Pacific, especially in East Asia. The mainstream opinion among the U.S. military and in think tanks is that U.S. allies such as Taiwan and Japan won’t be able to fight against China in about 10 years, and the U.S. must be ready to come forward.
Considering these facts, the U.S. is taking precautions before it’s too late. However, it might be very difficult for the U.S. to win this military competition with China in the future due to limitations [that stem] from the differences between the two countries in geographic traits, technical conditions and budget allocation. Moreover, considering the Taiwan issue and China-related maritime disputes, the U.S. doesn’t have as strong a will and determination as China.
Second, the U.S. can’t have its cake and eat it too. Keeping the balance between engaging and keeping a lookout is getting more difficult. A strong system of allies is the backbone for the global hegemony of the U.S. Support from allies seems to be more important as U.S. strength is declining.
To build a close relationship with allies, the U.S. would like to write a blank check to some countries like Japan and the Philippines, and show power to China. Certainly, in order to avoid situations getting out of control and breaking up the China-U.S. relationship, all commitments made by the U.S. have reservations, and their attitude toward allies is to keep them close, yet remain wary of them. However, based on intensifying maritime disputes, the ability for the U.S. to benefit both from China and its East Asian allies is shrinking.
Lastly, there is high interdependence between the interests of China and the U.S. The U.S. is lacking the desire and capital to fully contain China. China’s pursuit of external goals is rather limited, and China has no desire to fight for global hegemony with the U.S. All China wants is to seek a position of power that matches its strength. Particularly in East Asia, a position of power means territorial sovereignty and legitimate interests. Aside from intense competition for power in East Asia, China and the U.S. have mutual interests on many global issues, such as nonproliferation, safeguarding freedom and security of maritime navigation, promoting prosperity of economy, and anti-terrorism.
The major contradiction between China and the U.S. focuses on China’s periphery. If the U.S. pursues the policy of being against China on issues in these areas, a strong rival will be created by the U.S. itself. On the contrary, giving enough space to China and sharing partial power will create a helpful assistant for the U.S. in maintaining world order. Thus, considering overall interests and a global strategic plan, the U.S. should start afresh and share part of its power.
Considering economy and commerce, efforts were made without making progress. Though Obama made every effort to support Japan on the Diaoyu Islands issue, Abe just chimed in and agreed to speed up the negotiation progress of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Regarding security cooperation, Obama’s avoidance and awkwardness when asked by the media, “What is the role of the U.S. in conflicts China has with Japan and the Philippines?” showed that the current U.S. government is suffering: The U.S. has to build close relationships with its allies by virtue of maritime disputes and move “rebalancing” strategies forward in the Asia-Pacific, while minimizing provocation of China.
How can the U.S. act as China’s friend, yet repress China at the same time? This doesn’t work in the real world. The U.S. policy of “repressing while engaging” China, of “cozying up while being alert” against its allies is getting more and more difficult to maintain, and meanwhile, more dangerous.
First, ongoing significant changes regarding China and the United States' strength in the Asia-Pacific need to be noticed. The U.S. is unable to take responsibility for securing the Asia-Pacific, as they very much want to do. The gap between China and the United Staes' overall military power won’t have a qualitative change. However, the gap is declining rapidly in the Asia-Pacific, especially in East Asia. The mainstream opinion among the U.S. military and in think tanks is that U.S. allies such as Taiwan and Japan won’t be able to fight against China in about 10 years, and the U.S. must be ready to come forward.
Considering these facts, the U.S. is taking precautions before it’s too late. However, it might be very difficult for the U.S. to win this military competition with China in the future due to limitations [that stem] from the differences between the two countries in geographic traits, technical conditions and budget allocation. Moreover, considering the Taiwan issue and China-related maritime disputes, the U.S. doesn’t have as strong a will and determination as China.
Second, the U.S. can’t have its cake and eat it too. Keeping the balance between engaging and keeping a lookout is getting more difficult. A strong system of allies is the backbone for the global hegemony of the U.S. Support from allies seems to be more important as U.S. strength is declining.
To build a close relationship with allies, the U.S. would like to write a blank check to some countries like Japan and the Philippines, and show power to China. Certainly, in order to avoid situations getting out of control and breaking up the China-U.S. relationship, all commitments made by the U.S. have reservations, and their attitude toward allies is to keep them close, yet remain wary of them. However, based on intensifying maritime disputes, the ability for the U.S. to benefit both from China and its East Asian allies is shrinking.
Lastly, there is high interdependence between the interests of China and the U.S. The U.S. is lacking the desire and capital to fully contain China. China’s pursuit of external goals is rather limited, and China has no desire to fight for global hegemony with the U.S. All China wants is to seek a position of power that matches its strength. Particularly in East Asia, a position of power means territorial sovereignty and legitimate interests. Aside from intense competition for power in East Asia, China and the U.S. have mutual interests on many global issues, such as nonproliferation, safeguarding freedom and security of maritime navigation, promoting prosperity of economy, and anti-terrorism.
The major contradiction between China and the U.S. focuses on China’s periphery. If the U.S. pursues the policy of being against China on issues in these areas, a strong rival will be created by the U.S. itself. On the contrary, giving enough space to China and sharing partial power will create a helpful assistant for the U.S. in maintaining world order. Thus, considering overall interests and a global strategic plan, the U.S. should start afresh and share part of its power.