The growth of China’s military influence is obviously less than the rapid growth of its economic influence in the global arena.
The newly revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation was released on April 27. Not only does it reiterate that the Diaoyu Islands are part of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, it also clearly says that the two countries will strengthen maritime security in Southeast Asia. The new guidelines emphasized that the U.S.-Japan military relationship will be a “seamless” and “global” partnership. When U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry spoke at the joint press conference after the “two-plus-two” meeting, he hinted at China with his mention of those countries who covet and fantasize, and his tone was quite aggressive.
America and Japan seem to be hysterical in imagining a security challenge from China. China has only conducted some island construction within its sovereign rights in the South Sea, it has not acquired new islands under the Philippines’ and Vietnam’s control, nor did it imply any sort of conflict resolution by force. China is focused on “One Belt, One Road,” and most of its diplomatic strength is devoted to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). China has not tried to create a military alliance based on “hidden enemies”; the growth of China’s military influence is obviously less than the rapid growth of its economic influence in the global arena.
If China publicly created a military alliance in the area that America and Japan are sensitive about, or announced a targeted military plan, then how would America and Japan feel? It’s a good idea for these two countries to think about their actions.
If the security alliance was allowed to grow unchecked, it would become a very strategically challenging variable in East Asian territorial politics. More importantly, since it is not a by-product of economic growth, it would not be diluted and eased by forces of boosting economic growth. What it represents is simply naked military ambition; other than increasing regional tension, it is hard to tell what positive things it could bring.
Sea and air traffic over the South Sea are free, but America is not welcome to boast its military might in the region; Japan’s maritime security platoon is even less welcome. If Japan only wanted to protect against China in strengthening its security alliance, then it worries too much. China would not interfere in Japan and America’s repeated military exercises on the islands, but if Japan leads the way in American provocation of China in the South Sea, then without a doubt, it will be strongly rebuked.
If Japan feels that with America’s support and indulgence, it could receive approval from the international community and be the police and guard in the South Pacific, then it is mistaken. When the U.S.-Japan alliance is about showing aggression, Japan will not be safer as a result — rather, it will sustain extra risks with its game-playing.
China needs not be alarmed over the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance; this move is a purely military one and is completely against the current trend of partnership for prosperity in the region. It is quite limited in its daily efficacy. America’s use of Japan in East Asia, an unrepenting World War II criminal, really shows America’s lack of confidence in the area.
As China’s military strength naturally grows, there will be more and more American military strategic moves made around China. We need to realize that while foreign tactics will be robust during this time, as long as China is growing, the strategic initiative is with us, and the strategic period for China’s peaceful rise will not end because of these troubles.
China should have principles and be willing to fight, but it also needs to stay away from anxiety, and not be easily provoked by anger. China needs to develop some tactics toward the U.S.-Japan alliance and counteract with subtle moves; neither open confrontation nor retreating are the right solutions.
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