Worthwhile Risks

Some say that diplomacy achieves too little and the United Nations nothing at all. The opposite is the case because the nuclear deal with Iran is genuinely historic. The nuclear deal helps to make an unstable region safer, and opens up political as well as economic options, which until now weren’t available. However, the elation about this agreement can’t be allowed to cloud our view of the dangers that could be created as a result of it. Politics is sometimes like hiking. When one reaches the top of a hill, visibility improves.

Tehran’s contractual agreement to abandon building nuclear weapons is the best thing about the treaty. For one thing, there will be no additional nuclear weapons in the Near and Middle East, a region that isn’t exactly lacking in weapons. In addition, no other state will feel the need to possess these weapons of mass destruction. A possible arms race has been stopped, before it even began.

And in response, the U.S.-led West will gradually ease the economic sanctions. The mullahs can modernize the economy step by step. The life of the Iranians might become easier if they get goods that at the moment are in short supply. And trading nations such as Germany will have access to a lucrative market of approximately 80 million people. But it remains to be seen if change can be brought about through trade.

It’s not quite so straightforward when it comes to the political advantages. Time will tell whether Iran’s progressive forces will use the deal to enlarge the scope for (humanitarian) development or whether conservative forces will prevail by saying that President Rouhani negotiated poorly and thereby indirectly exposed Iran’s intentions. That would enable the mullah regime to justify further repression.

There is even less to say about the hope that Iran, freed from its isolation, will peacefully intervene in the conflicts of the region. Western diplomats are, however, working on getting Tehran to use its influence on Syria to help end the civil war. The same thing applies for the conflict in Yemen. This hope is supported by the first localized cooperation between the West and Iran. For example, the Iranian Air Force is fighting alongside the U.S.-led alliance in Iraq against the terrorist militia of the Islamic State. On top of that, Tehran has used its influence in neighboring Afghanistan over the past few years and has had a lasting moderating impact there.

It could also be that the powerful Iranian mullah Ali Khamenei voted in favor of the negotiations in order to shake off the burdensome trade sanctions, and then with new impetus, to pursue Iran’s old goal: becoming a regional power. In this scenario, despite the nuclear deal, he wouldn’t be working together with the West in the region, but rather, independently pursuing Iranian interests.

With all this justified skepticism, it shouldn’t be forgotten that it was the nuclear agreement that first opened the way for progress in areas of domestic and peace policy. All the decades of sanctions didn’t really help in getting any closer to reaching these worthwhile goals. From this point of view, change through rapprochement could prove to be the more successful strategy, just like the policy of detente was with the then Soviet Union. In any case, a change in strategy was long overdue.

Possible successes don’t happen by themselves. The U.S. and the states of the European Union must engage further with the Near and Middle East. It is essential to dismantle the mutual distrust between Iran on one side, and Israel, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf States on the other. Without these states or in contradiction to them, there can be no lasting progress in the region. Above all, detente is absolutely necessary in the relationship between the two regional powers, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The dispute between the two facilitates or makes possible several conflicts in the region. In Syria, Tehran supports the Assad regime, in Riyadh and other Gulf States, the rebel militias. Also in Yemen, the two adversaries could, if not end the civil war, then pacify it. If it stays as it is, it will only get worse.

President Obama, therefore, has a lot of work ahead of him. He still has to push the nuclear deal through at home against opposition from Republicans and pro-Israel lobbyists. He will only achieve this if he can prove that Israel won’t be the loser in the agreement. In addition he must also persuade his own population because since the fall of the shah in 1979 and the kidnapping of 52 U.S. diplomats, the U.S. and Iran have been bitter enemies. It won’t be easy. The goal, however, is worth the effort.