According to statistics by Chinese media and research institutes with regard to media from 21 countries, U.S. media has ranked first so far this year in covering the South China Sea issue, issuing a total of 60,076 reports. Among them, 4,674 pieces were on the South China Sea arbitration, accounting for 7.8 percent of the reports. Corresponding figures from the Philippine media, which ranked fourth in its coverage, included 2,764 reports; 660 pieces were on the arbitration, accounting for 23.8 percent of its reporting. The Philippine coverage was understandable, but why has there been such large-scale coverage by the U.S. media of the South Sea issue and arbitration?
Some people believe that under peaceful circumstances, such a topic with multiple newsworthy elements combining contests between big nations, the rise of China, military clashes, international arbitration, East Asia affairs, etc., is hard to come by. Enthusiastic reporting by the U.S. media is not unusual. But is it really like this? As this author, a scholar who has closely followed the South Sea issue for many years, has realized, in covering many South Sea issues, the U.S. media have made strong assumptions; so-called objective reporting is missing, the frequently used balanced reporting model has disappeared, and inappropriate lapses of knowledge have also appeared in many reports. The overall reporting standards have had an obvious “quality reduction.”
Where is the problem? In fact, U.S. media strongly emphasize “political correctness.” In their usual coverage, U.S. media appear capable of criticizing the government and mocking politicians, but on major issues, they tend to use “their own ways” to cooperate with the government. The U.S. media have been very “enthusiastic” about South Sea issues, and they have taken sides when it comes to reporting. This is because fundamentally, the U.S. government is like this.
Take the South China Sea arbitration, for example. Many diplomats from host countries informed their Chinese counterparts that American diplomats asked them to express support for the arbitration results. This indicates that the arbitration was first a political affair, and secondly a regulatory affair. Furthermore, it was a so-called regulatory affair with systemic errors and severe flaws. When it came to any mistakes, the U.S. was guiding the development of the arbitration and it didn’t hesitate to complain directly.
U.S. diplomats and scholars in touch with this author also have not denied the facts mentioned above. However, they insisted that the U.S. approach helped to maintain impartiality, South Sea stability and freedom of navigation. But is it so? This author’s view on South Sea issues is considered to be relatively neutral by both local and international counterparts. However, I realized that by October 2015, the U.S. had become the key factor in the continuous escalation of tension in the South China Sea. U.S. behavior in the South China Sea has been mixed with obvious selfish intentions, and evidently the U.S. has been siding with one party.
For example, the typical freedom of navigation mentioned by countries involves commercial freedom of navigation. However, the U.S. version of freedom of navigation also includes military freedom of navigation, which is the freedom of movement for naval ships in the exclusive economic zone and territorial waters of other countries. In addition, the U.S. version of freedom of navigation includes implementation of freedom of navigation operations to ensure such freedom.
There is additional evidence of bias besides the actions mentioned above, including at least the following: using multilateral mechanisms such as the European Union or Group of Seven leading industrial nations, etc., to put pressure on China; directly pressuring countries within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations group which does not want to be very involved in South China Sea affairs; providing technical support, manpower and favorable public opinion to the Philippines in order to initiate arbitration; making one-sided accusations against China’s land reclamation and defense arrangement surrounding the South Sea island reefs; and the freedom of navigation declaratory action which only targeted island reefs controlled by China being expanded from Nasha to Xisha.
U.S. activities in the South China Sea region in recent years originated from the strategic need to hasten the pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, and to this end, the U.S. has undertaken strategic planning on a macro-level and operations on a micro-level.
On the macro-level, in the context of global strategic contraction, but also to strengthen its military presence in East Asia, the U.S., it was confirmed, will deploy 60 percent of its navy ships and 60 percent of its overseas air force to the Asia-Pacific region before 2020. At the same time that it is strengthening military deployment in the second island chain, the U.S. is increasing military cooperation with allies such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and increasing military support to partner countries such as Singapore and Vietnam. The U.S. has published four strategic documents including one titled “Asia Pacific Maritime Security Strategy,” describing affairs in the South China Sea, and declaring that it will make China pay the price.
On the micro-level, the orientation of the U.S. military operation against China has become more apparent, which is consistent with U.S. policy adjustments. Various deterrence tactics and provocative actions have become more frequent. In February 2014, when Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel testified before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, he accused China of advocating the “nine-dash line” which, he said, “lacked apparent basis under international law.”* Secretary of State John Kerry openly made a “three-terminations” demand during the ministerial meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Naypyidaw, Burma.** The U.S. also began to flex its muscle more frequently against China as close military aircraft reconnaissance missions against China in the South Sea increased from more than 260 sorties in 2009 to more than 1,200 sorties in 2014 and military vessels even entered China’s territorial waters in a declaration of the so-called freedom of navigation.
With Ashton Carter as U.S. secretary of defense, the military went further on this issue. When, for example, military aircraft passed through the surrounding areas of Huangyan Island, they executed some very provocative maneuvers. Even more critically, two destroyers separately came 12 nautical miles into the territorial waters surrounding Triton Island and the Yongshu reef. When the U.S. Navy enters into the 12 nautical mile area of coastal China, it typically must act in accordance with Chinese law, but the Navy did not obtain permission in these two high-profile moves. This was clearly in violation of Chinese regulatory rights and interests, and completely disregarded the minimum respect due between great nations. The U.S. action caused the tension in the South Sea to spiral upward.
Evidently, this situation was due to the U.S. “strategic formation and deployment” in and surrounding the South Sea region which has fostered further regional tensions, in addition to causing the position of the South China Sea dispute to be exaggerated in the context of the global strategic layout. The substantial adjustment to the U.S. South Sea policy has led the U.S. to increasingly disregard the façade of “justice.” That the U.S. media went along with these actions, adding fuel to the flames, is no longer considered surprising.
The author is director of strategic research at the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
*Translator’s note: The “nine-dash line” refers to the demarcation line used by several countries in the South China Sea region to denote their territorial claims there.
**Translator’s note: A “three-terminations” demand refers to the demand by the U.S. that China cease all land reclamation, all construction and all militarization actions.
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