OPD 9 Dec 2024, edited by Helaine Schweitzer, proofing in progress

Can Interest Rate Cuts Prevent Risk of US Recession?

Published in Huanqiu
(China) on 9 March 2020
by He Weiwen (link to originallink to original)
Translated from by Liza Roberts. Edited by Elizabeth Cosgriff.
After the U.S. stock market crashed, the Federal Reserve hurriedly announced a 0.5% reduction in the federal interest rate. There is widespread doubt as to whether or not the Fed’s efforts to rescue the market will help the U.S. economy escape the impact of the spread of COVID-19 and lower the risk of an economic recession.*

This interest rate reduction is worth paying attention to because it has already exceeded the usual threshold for federal intervention. In the past, the criteria for interest rate cuts included increasing unemployment and the prospect of economic deflation. In January 2020, the U.S. unemployment rate remained low at 3.6%, and the core consumer price index has risen 2.5% compared to last year. Neither of these are reasons to cut interest rates, but rather are reasons to raise interest rates. This demonstrates that the Fed has already realized that the potential economic risks of the COVID-19 epidemic are very high, which stands in stark contrast with the estimations of the U.S. government.

Goldman Sachs recently estimated that U.S. gross domestic product growth would decrease to 1.2% in the first quarter of 2020 (compared to 2.1% in the fourth quarter of 2019 and 3.1% in the first quarter). Former Fed Chair Janet Yellen said that if the new coronavirus breaks out in the U.S., the economy may fall into a recession. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell also said COVID-19 may become “the third major crisis of the post–Cold War period, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the financial collapse of 2008.”

The Fed chose to announce this interest rate cut immediately following the Wall Street stock market crash. The direct effects of this decision are supposed to reduce capitalized costs and increase liquidity, but its effect on the real economy is easily overlooked. Moreover, the Fed’s flooding of the market is likely to backfire because the United States’ economic problems actually stem from excess liquidity, where a large amount of funds flow into the stock market but not into the real economy, resulting in a stock market bubble and depressed real investment. In the 11 years since the 2008 financial crisis, the three major indices, the Dow Jones Industrial Average, S&P 500 and the Nasdaq composite, have risen by 359%, 677% and 409% respectively, while the GDP has risen 45.6% in the same period.

Whether considering the aftermath of 9/11 or the 2008 financial crisis, the facts demonstrate that when the real economy declines, the stock market will inevitably collapse. Presently, the basis of the U.S. economy is weakening, and the ability to mitigate risks is lacking. It is very likely that this epidemic will lead to a real economic recession.**

Although the U.S. GDP grew by 2.3% in 2019, looking only at this number is not enough; it depends on the fundamentals that contribute to the GDP. The four drivers that make up American GDP are private consumer spending, domestic private investment, net exports and government spending. According to data released by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, in 2019, private consumer spending and private investment together accounted for 84.6% of total GDP. They constitute the basis of the U.S. economy, and this base is clearly deteriorating.

Private consumption is decreasing. It increased 2.6% in 2019, contributing 1.76 percentage points to GDP growth, a decrease from 3.0% in 2018. Looking at each quarter of 2019, in the first quarter private consumption only grew 1.1%, rebounded to 4.6% in the second quarter, then slowed down in subsequent quarters. In the third quarter it grew 3.2%, and in the fourth quarter it grew 1.8%. The private investment situation is even worse: In 2019 it grew 1.8%, much less than the 5.1% growth seen in 2018, and also lower than the 4.4% growth in 2017. Among private investments, investment in fixed assets increased only 1.3% while equipment investment increased 1.4%. In 2019, private consumption and private investment in fixed assets together constituted 1.99% of GDP. If stock sales are included in the sum of private consumption and investment, then in the second quarter of 2019 this number grew 1.87%, in the third quarter it grew 1.95%, but in the fourth quarter it only grew 0.12%. This is closer to the real U.S. economic situation. Based on such fundamentals, it will be difficult for the U.S. to withstand the impact of this epidemic. Once the outbreak is widespread, the probability of a recession is high.

Additionally, facing the impacts of the new coronavirus, the forward-looking U.S. economic indicators are already seeing a downward trend. In February, the Markit Purchasing Managers’ Index was 49.60 − a marked decrease from 53.30 in January. This is the first time in six years that there has been a decrease in overall output. The industrial composite index in January was 109.2 (in 2012 it was 100.0), a 0.3% decrease from December and a 0.8% decrease from last year. Of this composite index, the manufacturing industry decreased 0.1% from December and 0.8% from last year. In January alone, factory orders decreased 0.5%.

Along with the development of the global epidemic, the global supply chain has been harmed, and the U.S. has also been deeply impacted. According to relevant reports, the epidemic has led to a 2% decrease in Chinese exports of cars, mobile phones and other important components in February alone, and this has resulted in a $5.8 billion loss for U.S. companies. According to CNBC, the COVID-19 epidemic has reduced Chinese consumer demand, resulting in short-term challenges for the U.S. agricultural, energy and electronic sectors in their exports to China; orders may continue to decline. J.P. Morgan’s chief U.S. equity strategist, Toby Levkovich, estimates that as the global supply chain is disrupted and demand decreases, staple commodity prices will fall and U.S. corporate profits will fall by 25%. He estimates that similar declines will occur in the stock market.

Fundamentally speaking, the impact that the novel coronavirus will have on the U.S. economy largely depends on the extent and timing of the spread of the virus in the U.S. As the epidemic spreads and downward economic pressure accumulates, the risk of an economic recession in the U.S. will further increase. Although it remains difficult to determine whether the U.S. economy will enter a recession, it is almost certain that if the Fed continues its current line of thinking and cuts interest rates, it will be difficult to avoid a recession. This strategy will only postpone the inevitable and bring increased harm to the post-recession U.S. economic structure.

*Editor’s update: On March 15, the Federal Reserve further cut its benchmark by a full percentage point to zero.

**Editor’s update: The World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, two days after this article was published.


美股暴跌之后,美联储急忙宣布降低联邦基金利率50个基点。美联储如此大手笔救市,能否帮助美国经济摆脱新冠肺炎疫情扩散带来的影响,降低经济衰退的风险,其效用深受怀疑。

美联储此次降息值得关注,因为它已经超出美联储调整利率的通常触发门槛。过去历次调整降息的尺度是失业上升和面临通缩时。2020年1月份美国失业率依然保持在3.6%的低位,核心消费物 价指数同比上升2.5%。二者都没有降息理由,相反倒有升息理由。由此可见,美联储已经意识到新冠肺炎疫情影响经济的潜在风险非常高,这跟美国政府的估计刚好是相反的。高盛最近估计2020年一季度美国GDP增速将下降到1.2%(2019年四季度为2.1%,一季度为3.1%)。美联储前主席耶伦称,如果新冠肺炎疫情在美暴发,美国经济可能陷入衰退。美国前助理国务卿库尔特·坎贝尔也表示,美国可能出现继“911事件”和金融危机后的“第三次危机”。

美联储选择在华尔街股市大跌后紧急宣布降息,直接作用是降低资金成本,增加流动性,但它对实体经济的作用甚至可以忽略。而且,美联储这样搞大水漫灌,很有可能适得其反,因为美国经济的问题恰恰是流动性过剩,大量资金流入股市,没有流入实体经济,造成股市泡沫和实体投资不振。2008-09年金融危机后11年来,道指、标普和纳斯达克三大指数累计分别上涨359%、677%和409%,而同期名义GDP累计增长45.6%。

无论2001年“911事件”后还是2008年金融危机后的事实都证明,一旦实体经济衰退,股市也必然崩跌。而目前的美国经济基本面走弱,缺乏抗击风险的能力,疫情导致实体经济衰退的可能性非常大。

2019年美国GDP虽然增长2.3%,但光看这个数字是不够的,要看构成GDP增长的基本面好不好。构成美国GDP增长的“四驾马车”是私人消费开支、国内私人投资、净出口和政府开支。据美国经济分析局公布的数据,2019年私人消费开支和私人投资二者共占GDP总量的84.6%。它们构成美国经济基本面,而这一基本面正在明显恶化。

私人消费正在走弱。2019年增长了2.6%,为GDP增长贡献1.76个百分点,比2018年的3.0%有所降低。从各季看,一季度只增长1.1%,二季度反弹至4.6%,而后逐季放慢,三季度增长3.2%,四季度增长1.8%。私人投资情况更差。2019年增长1.8%,大大低于2018年的5.1%,也低于2017年的4.4%。其中固定资产投资只增长1.3%,设备投资增长1.4%。2019年私人消费和私人固定资产投资合计为GDP贡献1.99%,如果包括库存出清,计算私人消费和私人投资之和,则2019年二季度增长1.87%、三季度增长1.95%,四季度只增长0.12%。这比较接近美国经济的真实情况。按照这样的基本面,美国经济很难承受疫情冲击。一旦疫情大范围暴发,发生衰退的概率非常大。

此外,在新冠肺炎疫情打击下,今年以来美国前瞻性经济指标已见趋弱。2月份玛吉特PMI综合指数为49.60,比1月份53.30明显下降,并且是6年来首次出现总体产出下降的趋势。1月份工业综合指数为109.2(2012年为100.0),环比下降0.3%,同比下降0.8%。其中制造业环比下降0.1%,同比下降0.8%。同月工厂订单下降0.5%。

随着全球疫情的发展,全球供应链受到冲击,美国也深受影响。据有关报道,因疫情导致2月中国汽车、手机等重要零部件出口减少2%,使美国企业损失了58亿美元。又据美国消费者新闻与商业频道(CNBC)称,新冠肺炎疫情令中国消费需求减少,美国农业、能源和电子产品对华出口正遭遇短期挑战,订单可能进一步下滑。摩根大通首席美国股票策略师托拜厄斯·莱夫科维奇估计,由于全球供应链被扰乱,需求下降,大宗商品价格下跌,美国公司利润将平均减少25%,股市也会出现类似下跌。

从根本上来讲,疫情对美国经济影响在很大程度上将取决于新冠肺炎疫情在美蔓延的规模和时间。随着疫情蔓延和经济下行压力积聚,美国经济衰退风险将进一步增加。虽然目前尚难判断美国经济会否进入衰退,但几乎可以肯定的是,如果美联储降息仍按这个思路走,很难避免衰退发生,只会使之推迟,并给衰退后的美国经济结构造成重大创伤。
This post appeared on the front page as a direct link to the original article with the above link .

Hot this week

Brazil: Perplexity, Skepticism, Desperation

Russia: Obama Has Escaped a False START

Russia: ‘Have Fun’*

Taiwan: 2021: A New World, A New Asia and New US-China Relations?

Topics

Poland: Meloni in the White House. Has Trump Forgotten Poland?*

Germany: US Companies in Tariff Crisis: Planning Impossible, Price Increases Necessary

Japan: US Administration Losing Credibility 3 Months into Policy of Threats

Mauritius: Could Trump Be Leading the World into Recession?

India: World in Flux: India Must See Bigger Trade Picture

Palestine: US vs. Ansarallah: Will Trump Launch a Ground War in Yemen for Israel?

Ukraine: Trump Faces Uneasy Choices on Russia’s War as His ‘Compromise Strategy’ Is Failing

Related Articles

Taiwan: Why Does Cross-Strait Peace Require US Protection of Taiwan?

Taiwan: Effects of Tariffs Need Attention

China: US Appropriately Handling Taiwan Question Might Be Watershed Moment for Relationship

France: Tariffs: Trump’s Poker Move

Austria: Donald Trump’s Tariff Plans Only Follow His Own Will and Not Any Strategy