Washington or Baghdad: Who Has the PMUs’ Loyalty?

The anticipated strategic agreement between the United States and Iraq is described as being between two phases. However, it is Iran who has limited this critical procedure, not America or Iraq. Whatever people say about renewed goals to fix the relationship between the two countries, they will not be able to ignore the fact that it was the pressure of Tehran’s militias that placed the U.S. withdrawal on the agenda of the previous two Baghdad governments, especially the current one headed by Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Attacks on military bases that host U.S. forces, on Baghdad airport and the green zone, were an implementation of a long-standing Iranian strategy but came as a fulfillment of Leader Ali Khamenei’s threats to “expel the Americans from the region” as revenge for the assassination of Gen. Qassem Soleimani.

This threat was only expected to actualize in Iraq, where there is contact on the ground between the two sides, but Tehran considered targeting Saudi territory and oil installations, with Houthi cover, as part of the campaign itself. Mobilization from Syria against the Americans or against Israel is not permitted without Russian consent. But mobilization from Lebanon against Israel is permitted by “the Party of Iran/Hezbollah,” though its risks have been amplified by Lebanon’s internal collapse. For this reason, the Iranians are focused on managing political instability by colluding with the regime of Bashar Assad and controlling Lebanon’s decisions, steadily thwarting any U.S. or Saudi initiative to end the war in Yemen. Of course, they wanted the Baghdad government to request an immediate U.S. withdrawal, but they didn’t get it in the past from Adel Abdul-Mahdi, nor later from al-Kadhimi. On the contrary, the latter followed a complex and winding approach, based on two things: a bilateral U.S. withdrawal that guaranteed Iraqi military or economic interests, and any withdrawal that would strengthen the state’s standing at the expense of pro-Iranian militias.

Since the start of strategic talks last year, the Americans have been responsive and willing to withdraw on their own terms, but they have redeployed their forces inside Iraq or reduced their numbers by transferring parts to Kurdistan and neighboring countries. The Iraqis did not have fixed choices, as they had to make an accurate assessment of their needs, especially as the confrontation with Islamic State continues. Additionally, the Baghdad government cannot ignore the fact that the Sunni and Kurdish constituency and an important part of the Shiite constituency prefer the Americans to remain as a balance against Iranian influence. Despite relatively strong confidence in the Iraqi army and its equipment, everyone fears a repeat of the experience after the 2011 U.S. withdrawal and the destabilization that spread throughout military and security sectors, leading to the fall of Mosul into the hands of the Islamic State group in a scenario that, from the moment it happened, seemed suspicious and premeditated.

Washington preempted the results of the strategic talks with its determination to withdraw combat forces, which al-Kadhimi explained by saying, “Our forces are ready and capable,” but relies on air and intelligence support from “the international coalition.” The initial consensus on this withdrawal contributed to a “pacification” that was temporary and conditional upon the outcome of the talks being in line with Iran’s expectations and those of its militias — i.e., a complete and scheduled “U.S. withdrawal.” Iran’s wishes will not be fulfilled. Al-Kadhimi and his Kurdish foreign minister, Fuad Hussein, stressed that Iraqi forces still need broad cooperation with the United States, including training, the provision of arms and equipment, capacity-building and intelligence-sharing. The Baghdad government also wants to ensure that the United States remains committed to economic and investment support and cooperation in various fields, in accordance with the 2008 agreement that paved the way for the 2011 U.S. withdrawal.

Tehran realizes that these technical details will not lead to the withdrawal that they had in mind, so the so-called “resistance factions” (which are “outlawed” by the Baghdad government) will continue their activities against the “American occupation.” The Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia did not wait for the outcome of the talks but announced two things: that it “does not trust al-Kadhimi to handle the talks” and that it is “not concerned with its results.” Therein is an indication of the truth of Iranian directives and a warning that “pacification” is a formality. What really upsets Tehran is that the U.S. presence in Iraq, regardless of how diminished it may be, allows for the strengthening of the military’s capabilities and the position of the state, and contributes to the development of domestic thinking that counteracts its influence and is an existential threat to its militias. On the other hand, the U.S. does not hide that its presence in Iraq is a deterrent to Iran and its militias—although the Biden administration does not highlight this goal—and it is also linked to its presence, although symbolically, in Syria, where frictions are heating up with militias on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border

Militias (such as the Popular Mobilization Units and the “resistance factions”) must be a key feature of the U.S.-Iraqi dialogue, as the facts on the ground have shown that it is difficult to distinguish between them. The al-Hashd PMU is a force that is “legally” supposed to be part of the armed forces, but realistically does not show full loyalty to the state but is considered an Iranian infiltration that is impossible to trust. Therefore, its function, motives and justifications for being funded and armed should be redefined as long as its practices effectively serve the regional Iranian project and favor “illegal” factions, such as the Hezbollah Brigades and the Sayyid of Martyrs Battalions. When U.N. representative Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert recently spoke about “the need to identify armed factions operating outside the government’s control and hold them responsible for the attacks they carry out,”* the (official) leader of the PMU, Faleh al-Fayyad, was outraged and accused her of “going beyond her professional role and becoming a pawn in the Iraqi political playing field.”

Washington continues to offer the fight against the Islamic State group as a crucial imperative for its remaining in Iraq, while Tehran challenges this pretext as an “American fabrication.” Americans, especially military personnel, continue to list “Iran’s support for terrorism” as one of the most important disagreements with it. Donald Trump’s administration cast a new light on the harboring of al-Qaida leaders and cadres in Iran, but it did not go into Iran’s role in the rise and spread of the Islamic State group. However, the U.S. government has information on this matter, as well as the testimony of one of Barack Obama’s aides, Ben Rhodes, who said that the president knew (in 2014) that Iran controlled the Islamic State group, but was only interested in completing the nuclear deal.

*Editor’s note: This quote, although accurately translated, could not be sourced.