What Can America Do to Putin? This Is a Strange War That No One Will Win*

Professor Krzysztof Jasiewicz, political sociologist, on what America can do to Putin and where the “red lines” are for NATO in the war between Russia and Ukraine.

Jacek Żakowski: After President Joe Biden’s trip to Europe, do we know what America is fighting for in this war?

Krzysztof Jasiewicz: America didn’t want this war and doesn’t want to fight in it. It’s acting reactively.

What does that mean?

The U.S. continues to react to Russia’s moves. In this sense, it doesn’t have a main goal. Its goals are changing. During a speech at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, though, a new goal appeared, which is the removal of Vladimir Putin. The words “This man cannot remain in power” will always remain in the collective memory, just like Reagan’s “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall” and Kennedy’s “I am a Berliner.” The White House clarification that followed immediately after the speech formally denied that Biden was seeking regime change in Russia, but in reality, it reinforced the message.

What kind of result will be satisfactory for the U.S.?

I’m not sure if the American leaders themselves know this. The end of fighting — certainly. There is a consensus between the parties that the war must end as soon as possible. And America’s long-term goal is always the same: that its adversaries are predictable. Now it is about Russia and China.

Not that they are weaker? For instance, exhausted by a long war?

The U.S. is powerful enough that it is not concerned about the strength of the enemy. Rather, it is concerned when faced with unpredictability. George H.W. Bush gave a famous speech in 1991 in Kyiv, known as Chicken Kyiv, in which he asked the Soviet Union not to dissolve itself. It was a demand that arose precisely from America’s desire to have predictable partners.

The Americans knew Mikhail Gorbachev, understood his way of thinking, who was responsible for what under his rule, and knew how to talk to him. Even a difficult status quo is easier for a superpower than uncertainty. And when the Soviets did not listen to them, the Americans hoped that Russia, the main USSR successor, would have predictable leaders. But they miscalculated.

Do you think Putin was right when he said that the USSR collapse was the worst tragedy of the 20th century?

Absolutely not. But there are always two sides to every coin. The American side of the coin is that it is easier for a superpower to function better, keep the international peace and protect its interests when others are predictable. Now that the status quo is no longer certain, the U.S. will seek to recreate the predictability of its rivals, so that they will at least know who is worth talking to, about what, and what the effects of these talks may be.

Everyone is talking to Putin. We know what to talk to him about: his expectations for a stronger position in Europe. And about the fact that he doesn’t want Ukraine to exist.

I wouldn’t focus too much on guessing what Putin might want. But the question of whether one can talk to him has become more serious.

President Emmanuel Macron talks to Putin frequently. Outside France, this is not very well received.

Multiple conversations are taking place. The major role is played by Turkey. But the effect is poor.

Putin let go of the notion of government change in Kyiv and — according to Andrii Deshchytsia — he is ready to retreat to his position on Feb. 24.

So then what would “de-Nazifying” look like? The devil will be in the details. But for now, the elementary questions remain. Who are the parties to the future agreement? What agreement will be binding? In any case, it is Ukraine that should come to an understanding with Russia. But after all the lies and everything that has happened, is anyone ready to trust Putin?

Will Biden trust him?

The more important question for Biden and his administration is how to preserve the unity of the West, especially NATO and the European Union. The U.S. is not a member of the EU, but this administration takes it very seriously.

It will not be easy because EU countries have very different political traditions, ambitions and interests.

That is what Biden attempts to control. From his point of view, maintaining unity is by far more important than making specific decisions. He prefers to do less, but in a larger group. This is the fundamental difference between the policies of Biden and his predecessor — because Donald Trump was actually implementing Putin’s disintegration program for the West.

John Bolton, Trump’s security adviser, recently said Trump had planned to withdraw America from NATO in his second term.

Trump said all kinds of different things that he didn’t get attached to. Not all of them were thought through and not all of them were implemented. He would be pleased if NATO were to disappear, but I’m not keen on guessing the true intentions of the people who operate on the edge of democracy. We will never know what politicians like Trump, Jaroslaw Kaczynski or Putin really want. Guessing is too risky. Unless someone believes in crystal ball readings. I do not think that the U.S. establishment would allow Trump to remove it from NATO. And a president himself does not possess the power to do so.

Trump is doing whatever he pleases with the Republican Party.

They treat him as a likely future candidate in the presidential election. But among the Republicans, there is a very strong group of so-called hawks who wouldn’t allow the destruction of NATO. But this is just guessing.

Hence the question, what does America want, not just Biden. Trump is criticizing his successor for not acting radically enough against Putin. What could this mean?

It’s not worth getting too attached to what Trump says. After all, after the war broke out, he started by praising Putin’s genius and strong leadership.

As president, Trump said he trusted Putin more than the U.S. intelligence community. What does his criticism of Biden’s “delicate” politics reflect?

Mainly his desire to defeat Biden in the next presidential election. But some Republicans, and also Democrats, think tougher decisions are needed. Jonathan Karl, a respected ABC News star and author of a book about the final days of Trump’s presidency, states, for example, that most senators and representatives supported the decision to hand over Polish jets to Ukraine through the U.S. military. But the Biden administration says the costs would outweigh the benefits. You are asking what America wants to accomplish in terms of the Russian aggression on Ukraine, but equally important is the question of what the Americans want to avoid. Certainly, there is no desire in the U.S. to send American soldiers to Ukraine and drag America into this war militarily. And that’s the main problem.

This, in your opinion, is a problem?

For Ukrainians, definitely. Because they want more help and it’s evident that they need it. But when these Ukrainian requests begin to resound strongly, comments appear that Ukraine is adopting a demanding attitude, that it had wasted 30 years of transformation and failed to do for itself what Poland has succeeded in doing. These comparisons take on meaning. And there is some truth to them, but it’s worth noting that Ukraine started from a completely different place. And it is objectively difficult to call Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s desperate pleas for help a demanding attitude. It is rather a scream: “Help us, we are in a terrible situation.”

Do you hear growing irritation at these expectations?

It shows up, but doesn’t dominate. However, interest is declining. Three weeks after the outbreak of the war, the media opened with different news for the first time. A tornado in the south of the U.S. has pushed out Ukraine.

Could this be a problem?

It doesn’t have to be. Opening the news for three weeks is an amazing result in the U.S. because for Americans, local news is the most important. When the enormous interest in the war in Ukraine weakens slightly, local issues return to their place. But Biden’s Warsaw speech was broadcast live by all the major TV networks. And it was given on a Saturday at noon, when most Americans love to watch golf.

Apart from holding Russia accountable and strengthening the Western community, is there any other vision of a post-war order emerging in the U.S.?

It’s doubtful. Since the Obama administration, the U.S. has increasingly focused on rivalry with China. Russia seemed to be less of a problem, at least in perspective. That is, until Putin reminded us about him on Feb. 24. Or rather, earlier, when he started gathering troops on the border, and everyone suddenly remembered that Russia had all this nuclear arsenal. Thinking about the future now, including in the U.S., must be subject to sound verification. Recreating the Cold War system is certainly not an option.

Because no one wants that?

Yes, and because there are at least three main players now — the U.S., China and Russia. Or even four, because Europe plays alongside the U.S., although maybe that won’t last forever. It may also be that all the European countries will choose their own paths. For now, Americans are attempting to restore a little bit of predictability by trying to understand what Putin wants.

And what are their conclusions?

Americans depart from the logic imposed by economists — on the one hand, Marxist economists, who are convinced that behind every action there is an economic interest of the dominant classes, and on the other, those from the Chicago School, who believe that “money is the most important.” It’s apparent now that politics is about something else — because from a purely economic point of view, this war is a catastrophe for Russia. This is the destruction of all that the Russians have achieved and the end of all hopes for what they wanted to achieve economically for many years. Not to mention the destruction of Ukraine, for which someone will also have to pay. If someone is willing to pay such costs, he must have important reasons.

How do Americans view these reasons?

In general, on a basic level — in the longing for this mythical empire, about which Russian experts wrote earlier. But it is only now that most Americans are finally beginning to believe that these are not eggheads’ tales, but that they constitute an important policy factor. The situation has forced them to go beyond the previously dominant neo-Marxist and neoliberal paradigm, and opened up a field of thinking previously practiced by few experts.

Richard Pipes, Timothy Snyder, Andrzej Walicki, Samuel Huntington …

… and before them Feliks Koneczny or Arnold Toynbee. Now the original sources are returning to the debate, in which Russian thinkers such as Nikolai Trubetzkoy or Lev Gumilyov point to the separateness of Russia as a civilization and the distinctiveness of Russian culture from the West. Their idea of Eurasianism was turned into a propaganda weapon by Alexander Dugin in the 21st century. The U.S. is beginning to understand that the Russian mentality, or even identity, sees the West as the main source of dangers posed by Western-derived ideas — communism, fascism and liberalism. The narrative of Putin, which is shared by many educated Russians, is that the West has been bringing destruction to Russia since the dawn of time. Putin specifically wrote this in an essay published last summer.

It appeared to be insanity.

That is why so many people disregarded it. But it was gravely serious and written from the depth, or, if you like, the darkness of anti-Western Russian identity. In such cases, the words of dictators should be taken seriously. Americans are just beginning to see that when Putin wrote it, there was one Russian nation composed of Great Russians, Lesser Russians and Belarusians, while Ukrainians are its lost members; it was not propaganda, but a product of Russian thought developed at least from the beginning of the 20th century and popularized after 1990. If you consider this, the war in Ukraine takes on a different meaning. It is easier to understand why Putin and so many Russians are willing to sacrifice so much to win it.

Because for them, it’s a war of national liberation?

This is what Americans are starting to see. But Jarosław Hrycak of the Ukrainian Catholic University commented in The New York Times that Putin missed something very important. Namely that, unlike Russians, Ukrainians created their identity under strong Polish influences, and in my opinion, also Austrian, at least in Galicia. The Ukrainian culture was open to influences from the West, while Russia, except for a narrow elite, defended itself against them. Ukraine’s culture is much more Western.

Therefore, we should not be surprised that the Ukrainians are fighting to enter the EU, while there are no such suggestions in Russia. According to Hrycak, Ukrainians and Russians are connected by similarities in language, history, geography, and, to a large extent, religion, but the Ukrainian identity is much more influenced by the West. The Ukrainians know they would not function well in Russia. Until recently, this identity dominated only in western Ukraine, but now, against the wishes of the invader, it has encompassed the entire country. This is what this war is about. It reminds Americans that culture is key in politics, not only the economy.

So Huntington’s logic of the collision of civilizations reappears, except that the border, as it turns out, runs not on the Bug River, along the Curzon Line, but between Ukraine and Russia. Is there any idea emerging from this new awareness of what to do next? What to do with this revival of the supposed Russian empire, which, with Ukraine or without, will come out of this war in ruins?

There are no ideas so far. For now, there are current reactions and the attempt to defend peace in Europe. The Yalta order was significantly redrawn on maps in 1989 and 1991, but its rules still stand. Among other things, the inviolability of borders in Europe seemed to be a certainty, at least until the occupation of Crimea in 2014. Then the uncertainty began. From the point of view of traditional rationality in politics, Russia’s behavior is irrational. And when dealing with an actor who is perceived as irrational, it is difficult to plan the game and create a vision for the future.

There will be no such vision?

Someday there will be. But until we unravel Putin’s rationality, playing with Russia will be like playing with nature as described by game theory. Nature does not wish to win or lose. It is not aiming for anything. It makes movements, not caring about the results. Does the volcano wonder what will happen after it erupts? If it were wondering, it could be persuaded or bribed to keep from exploding. And because it does not contemplate, we can only react and protect ourselves.

Putin contemplates and is very vocal about it.

But we do not understand the logic which is guiding him, so we do not know when he’s serious and when he’s trying to scare us. We can only explain his actions ex-post facto. We can see that he did this, did that, and that those were preparations for the war. But when he was doing them, it was not clear to us that it was about the invasion. Putin was clearly doing a lot of things contrary to Western rationality, so different explanations were likely.

For instance, that he’s a fool.

This approach provokes mistakes. And now we can see that our mistakes, which we underestimated, encouraged him. Firstly, the unfortunate Barack Obama “red line” pertaining to Bashar Assad’s use of chemical weapons. The U.S. did nothing when it was crossed. After that, Trump continued to be friends with Putin and met him face to face after the capture of Crimea. And finally, the way Biden implemented Trump’s earlier decision to leave Afghanistan. After all, Putin had a right to conclude that America had lost its teeth and claws, so he would be safe, whatever he did. That’s why he’s invading now. Here we probably come to America’s most important goal in this war.

Which is?

Convincing Putin and his friends that America not only has strong teeth and claws but also knows how to use them skillfully. There’s been talk of reaffirming American leadership. Biden must show that it is strong and effective.

After Obama’s mishap, there won’t be Biden’s “red line.”

The term became troublesome, but Biden clearly stated what was unacceptable to the U.S.: a breach of even a square inch of NATO territory. Territorial aggression seems to be Biden’s “red line.” But when three prime ministers and one deputy minister from NATO countries get on a train and go to Kyiv, and some stray rocket hits the train, then what?

Then what?

Should NATO then enter this war? After all, three and a half premiers is more than an inch of territory. This shows the irresponsibility of this mission, which the U.S. is not addressing because, for Biden, the unity of the West is important. But here you can see how delicate a situation each “red line” creates. In any case, they are always borderline situations. The Russians would surely claim that it was the Ukrainian rocket that hit the train with the prime ministers. What if a stray drone appears over Bulgaria or Poland? Allegedly there was one already. What if there are two? Or 200? What if one of them shoots something? Will this convince the Americans to send soldiers to Ukraine? And what if 10 drones fire and the Russians say that the Ukrainians are responsible? The world is too complex to rely on any harsh lines.

That is why The New York Times recently recalled the cautionary tale of the Nobel Prize winner Thomas Schelling, who wrote that the edges of the abyss over which we stand from time to time are not sharp, so if you get too close, you can slide unnoticed and fall, for example, into a war you did not want. How ready is the U.S. to get close to that edge?

Americans do not want to put their soldiers at risk.

If a rocket near Kyiv crashed into a train with prime ministers …?

No one is smart here. NATO tanks would not go there. But we don’t know what would happen because this is not a game of two chess players. It’s not that one plays chess and the other plays checkers or that one plays chess and the other plays mixed martial arts. The point is, we don’t know what they’re playing at all. Putin surprises us and is also surprised by what’s happening on the other side.

Suppose the second month of the war has passed. Ukrainians get a lot of weapons. The Russians raise the “young army” of 17-year-olds. Ukrainian cities will look like Warsaw in 1944 while millions more refugees will reach Poland. The front will still stand. What will America do?

The administration works out such scenarios. The weapons will probably keep flowing. Money for refugees will be raised. I doubt if there is much more in these scenarios. Even if news comes that Ukrainians were forcibly deported to Russia to be re-educated and to become fully Russian. Biden needs to be careful because he has low approval ratings.

After 9/11, Bush gained overwhelming popular support. After the Russian aggression against Ukraine, Biden did not gain such support because the decisive factor here is polarization. Republicans are critical of everything that the president does. Political independents are rather skeptical, while Biden is mostly backed by Democrats. Sanctions and the shipment of weapons have public support but sending the troops and the no-fly zone do not. Biden takes this into account. But both sides may be surprised by their own reactions. And it has also been said that Russia will not be able to maintain such a significant military presence in Ukraine for a long time. So maybe there will be a kind of trench warfare to the last Russian or Ukrainian soldier.

And how do we react to that?

This is not a war that the West chose to fight, so it is not up to America or Europe to decide how it ends. But that might mean it won’t end soon. And it probably won’t end the way anybody imagines it now. Because this is a strange war that no one will win, and most certainly not Russia. Only, Russia cannot lose it in the traditional sense, because it has thousands of nuclear warheads.

*Editor’s note: This article is available in its original language with a paid subscription.