Ukraine: The Great Victim

The war in Ukraine is widely considered a proxy war between the Western bloc and Russia. The Russians believe it is a “special military operation,” but the West and the Ukrainian people see it as an invasion.

Under Vladimir Putin’s rule, Russia’s income has increased and its former power has been reconstructed, but before this war Russians still found themselves facing the exact situation faced by Adolf Hitler after World War I: having lost much of its territory, with a growing sense of nationalism and facing humiliation at the hands of the world’s great powers.

This was definitely no longer Boris Yeltsin’s Russia of the last century. In spirit, Putin resembles Hitler in many ways; he has always striven to accomplish his own personal goals by any means necessary. Even if that means lying about his intentions to attack Ukraine or behaving arrogantly toward his own guests.

But for many experts, the question is: why Ukraine?

Most people know that Ukraine was the jewel of the USSR, boasting the highest literacy rate and best health care services. In sports the Soviet national soccer team came entirely from Dynamo Kyiv; Soviet gymnasts, the glory of the nation, were mostly Ukrainian; and many Soviet bases and atomic weapons were kept in Ukraine. Ukrainians like to say that when Moscow was still just a city made up of villagers, Kyiv was the shining jewel of the region. Even today Russians still hold a grudge against Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, who separated the Republic of Ukraine from Russia because of his Ukrainian origins. The history of this region tells a clear story.

In 1994, Ukraine’s nuclear weapons arsenal was transferred to Russia with security guarantees by the U.S. and the U.K., as Russia took over the USSR’s commitments to the former Soviet nations. In the years that followed, particularly after the collapse of the Russian-aligned government in Ukraine and the rise to power of Western-aligned figures, Russia tried to flex its power over Ukraine. It easily annexed Crimea into its own territory, but in so doing also played into the hands of the West. Ukraine, fearing further threats, requested NATO membership. So Russia, already nervous about the NATO membership of the three Baltic states and the fact that St. Petersburg was within striking range, suddenly created the excuse of Russians being abused in the Donbas region and attacked Ukraine (or conducted a “special operation”).

So the question is: Why didn’t Russia pick one of the Baltic republics, which are smaller and weaker, as the target of its greed? In this writer’s opinion, a large part of the attack on Ukraine is personal, meaning the personality of Putin himself and Russian nationalism. With the exception of the president of Lithuania, who was also an artist, no figure in the region has stood out like Volodymyr Zelenskyy, while the Baltic republics have tended to pursue their own interests without much flair. It was Ukraine, with its population of 50 million, that had the real claim to be the leading nation of civilized Slavs.

The liberal breeze of Western democracies was beginning to blow from Ukraine into Belarus, Putin’s historical ally. The nuclear power plant at Chernobyl, with all its memories and risks, is also in Ukraine, and the grain production of the Chernihiv region of Ukraine was a rival for Russia’s production. Putin is particularly sensitive about two other Soviet satellite nations as well: first, Belarus, because of its genetic proximity to Russia and the gradual fusion of its government with Russia’s. Second, Kazakhstan, which is the largest land-locked nation on earth and is home to a number of Russian space program sites. In truth, Putin has fought tooth and nail to keep these countries under his control, and he knows better than anyone that a Yeltsin-like gamble on either of those nations would be waving goodbye to Russia’s superpower status. But does this gamble have a definitive winner?

In this writer’s opinion, ultimately the only winner in this crisis is China. The main victims are the people of Ukraine, who have lost $600 billion so far, which could reach up to $1 trillion by the end of the war. Thousands of Ukrainians have been killed, children have been orphaned and many more are leaving as refugees, all because of this terrible war.

The second largest victim is Europe, which has had the financial burden of supporting Ukraine imposed on it while also dealing with its own security threats from the Russian superpower. Add to that soaring fuel prices, a new wave of immigration and the consequences therein, protests over the increasing prices and so on. All of it is the result of this battle for a united Europe.

Then there are losses in the U.S., due to increased energy prices — not as severe as Europe’s, but a large part of the financial burden does fall on the U.S. Some nations’ frustration over the swift aid from the U.S. and the West to Ukraine could cause a headache for the U.S. (The behavior of the sheikhs in the Persian Gulf already proves this; but of course the sheikhs quickly changed course, and after being disappointed by the U.S., they have since taken refuge with the Zionists.)

Russia and Ukraine are centers of grain and cereal production, so weaker countries like Egypt and Lebanon that receive more than half of their grain from those two countries are suffering. The current conditions have led to widespread famine, which could, in itself, lead to expressions of discontent there.

But this conflict does not only have losers; some observers of the fight could reap significant benefits. Many experts believe China could come out as the big winner. Why is that?

First, China is the world’s largest consumer of energy, so the sanctions against Russia bring a blessing for the Chinese energy market, allowing them to purchase cheap energy from Russia. China has long become a kind of “sanctions buzzard” that jumps on the corpse of a country as soon as it has been sanctioned, just as it has done with Cuba, Venezuela, Myanmar and even our own nation.

Second, because of the increased animosity between the West and Russia, the Chinese can more easily purchase strategic weapons from Putin, like the Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jet.

Third, the Western world’s response to Russia has been a lesson for China on how the West might respond in the future on the issue of Taiwan.

Fourth, as a superpower, China tested its colonial power in a few countries, like Pakistan. Now, with Russia out of the picture, it will be easier for China to unlock the colonial potential of these countries.

Of course, it goes without saying that the U.S. has experienced some benefits from this war. The U.S. has always seen Europe and Japan as friendly rivals, and now that those nations are struggling for fuel supplies, their American competitors are not unhappy about the potential bottleneck it could cause. Additionally, don’t forget that Russia is a part of Europe, and with this war there will be no strong, united Europe to face off against the U.S., nor to move collectively toward the final match-up with China. But let us not forget that the consequences of this war for Russia are also not insignificant.

Normally the effects of sanctions are seen in the months after their implementation; the psychological effects lead to the emigration of investors and the elite. This so-called “special operation” by the Russians will also push neutral countries, such as those in Scandinavia, toward NATO membership for their own security. At the same time, Putin’s massive lies about Ukraine have made it more difficult to believe his statements. The Russians were taken off guard by two things: first, the startling resistance of the Ukrainian people. It is only natural that public opinion tends toward the defender, and this war has shown that the seemingly powerful Russian military was actually not very up-to-date when put to the test. It seems that their weapons are fit only for military parades, not for actual battlefields.

Second, the severe defeat in public opinion was the first sanction to hit Russian media. By now Russia has lost the chance to defend itself, leading only to further discontent within the country. The Russians have shown that they are actually not very adept in psychological warfare and media management, while the modern Western propaganda apparatus is experienced and easily capable of overwhelming the Russians.