The United States and Its Allies against China

Unlike its Cold War with the Soviet Union, Washington is confronting China without knowing for sure who it has on its side.

Donald Trump’s presidency brought with it a profound disarticulation of American alliances. Richard Hass coined the notion of “abdication doctrine” to refer to the process of militant national selfishness and disinterest vis-à-vis global interests that characterized that period (“America and the Great Abdication,” The Atlantic, Dec. 28, 2017).

Among the expressions of this phenomenon were the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership; the imposition of steel and aluminum tariffs on its main trading partners; the renunciation of the Paris Agreement on climate; the advantageous renegotiation of NAFTA; the threat to withdraw the United States from NATO; the reference to Germany as a “captive of Russia”; the labeling of NATO partners as “criminals”; the pro-Brexit statements; the designation of the European Union as an “economic enemy” and the threat to impose tariffs on it; turning its back on the Group of Seven partners, causing the fracture of this grouping; and so on. Unsurprisingly, the rejection of U.S. policies became the common denominator that united that country’s traditional allies. From Justin Trudeau to Angela Merkel, passing through Emmanuel Macron and Donald Tusk, the approach was the same: Washington was no longer a reliable partner.

This was just a few years after George W. Bush’s high-handed unilateralism had already deeply eroded the U.S. alliance system. Moreover, it was part of a deep societal fracture in the United States with profound foreign policy implications. Democrats and Republicans, in effect, had come to inhabit different planets in this matter: How could they continue to trust a country marked by an erratic foreign policy, immersed in polarization and captured by extremist populism?

Surprisingly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine revived a transatlantic alliance that, according to Macron, was “brain-dead.” The consistency of this revitalization, however, is still being tested. The costs and duration of such a war, as well as the results of the next U.S. presidential election, will determine what happens. Trump’s very possible return to the White House would return NATO to the intensive care unit.

But beyond U.S. alliances on European soil, one might wonder about their consistency in relation to the cold war the U.S. is waging with China. Here things are even more tenuous in relation to European allies. The economic opportunities that China offers to its allies are another matter entirely. In 2020, the European Union’s trade with China reached $709 billion, compared to $671 billion for its trade with the United States. This gap will only widen with each passing year. It is not for nothing that Europeans have claimed the right to maintain strategic autonomy vis-à-vis China, independent of Washington’s policies. In fact, as early as Barack Obama’s time, American allies, and not only those in Europe, ignored calls from the United States to boycott the Asian Investment and Infrastructure Bank sponsored by Beijing.

It would not be an exaggeration to say, therefore, that the United States’ true allies against China are few. They would be integrated into a group of overlapping mini-coalitions: the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Five Eyes intelligence alliance and AUKUS. In all, we would be talking about five countries that feel equally threatened by China or that maintain common Anglo-Saxon roots with the United States: Japan, Australia, India, New Zealand and Canada.

Of these, India’s consistency of purpose remains to be seen. Although it is true that New Delhi feels deeply threatened by China’s aggressive stance on the Askai Chin border dispute, as well as by the projection of the Chinese Navy into the Indian Ocean, India’s proverbial autonomy of action must also be accounted for. This has always made it reluctant to enter into alliances. In fact, despite its membership in the Quad, India has refused to apply sanctions against Moscow and has increased its purchases of Russian oil.

But even among the other four allies, the strength of their commitment seems to be relative in light of previous experiences. They either refused to join Washington’s boycott of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank or refused to do so in the face of the U.S. blockade of the Chinese company Huawei. In both cases, economic opportunities prevailed over geopolitics.

Unlike during its Cold War with the Soviet Union, Washington is confronting China without knowing for sure who it has on its side.