Support for Taiwan Reduced to an Anti-China Tool for the US

Following the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s approval of the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, President Biden said on Sept. 18 that if China were to attack Taiwan, the United States would send troops to the island’s defense. The legislative and executive branches are working in concert, and Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party has been imbued with a renewed sense of vigor; yet the Taiwan Policy Act is fraught with uncertainties and is unlikely to be fully passed into law during this session alone. For his part, Biden has spoken out four times in defense of Taiwan, and each of his statements has been retracted by the White House. These high-profile actions in support of Taiwan are like double-edged swords, ostensibly enhancing U.S.-Taiwan relations while at the same time getting under Beijing’s skin – but they are not necessarily in Taiwan’s best security interests. The oblivious DPP government, however, is willing to be a tool of the United States’ anti-China policy.

In a meeting with former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in New York on Sept. 20, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi cited House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan, the Senate’s deliberation of the Taiwan Policy Act, and comments relating to the defense of Taiwan as serious challenges to the U.S.-China Joint Communiques and undermining the political foundation of U.S.-China relations. Wang’s targeted remarks were a clear demonstration of how the United States’ actions in support of Taiwan and against China could be the brewing of a storm which, if not clarified and de-escalated in time, would reignite the furor over Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan.

President Biden’s four statements on deploying troops to assist with Taiwan’s defense were all passive responses to questions from the media: They have been interpreted as a move toward greater clarity on U.S. strategic ambiguity, but no major change in U.S. policy would be announced so rashly during a press conference. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan noted that Biden has “specifically and emphatically and unequivocally reinforced and reiterated the One-China policy.”

In remarks addressed to the United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 21, Biden himself made a fleeting reference to upholding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, reaffirming the One-China policy and seeking neither conflict nor cold war with China, thus sending the right message to both sides of the Taiwan Strait and to the international community. While Biden’s decision to send troops to Taiwan’s defense may come from the heart, the fact remains that the United States is keeping to its established One-China policy and strategic ambiguity, and that U.S. foreign policy is consistent and predictable, while the DPP administration has always been selectively biased and refuses to face reality.

In an assessment by CIA Deputy Director David Cohen, by 2027 the Chinese Communist Party will be militarily capable of seizing Taiwan by force. Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy has pointed out in her Foreign Affairs article “Time Is Running Out to Defend Taiwan” that 2024 to 2027 will be a vulnerable period for Taiwan, and that the United States must not just help modernize Taiwan’s military and enhance its self-defense capabilities, but also strengthen its own ability to deter the Chinese Communist Party. These authoritative observations suggest that while American commitments are important, they are no longer the sole determinant of security in the Taiwan Strait. The key, rather, lies in whether the United States and Taiwan can effectively deter and defeat the CCP’s military operations.

U.S. military experts generally believe that Taiwan’s most pressing security problem is its long-standing neglect of the importance of national defense, resulting in it being inadequately prepared to respond to the military challenges and threats posed by the CCP. Even though the defense budget is now being increased and purchases of weapons and ammunition are being stepped up, there is still a long delivery backlog and the crowding-out effect of the war in Ukraine to contend with. Procurement of the M109A6 self-propelled artillery gun has been suspended, and the timely delivery of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, shoulder-launched FIM-92 Stingers and HIMARS rocket launchers is therefore critical; but the 2020 U.S. arms sale to Taiwan has been postponed to 2025, and the last batch will not be completed until 2028, going beyond the critical 2027 deadline.

The latest poll conducted by the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation reflected this same fact: Roughly 52% of respondents had no confidence in the DPP government’s ability to defend Taiwan, with 30% of them reporting an extreme lack of confidence. This lack of a strong foundation for national defense is Taiwanese security’s “elephant in the room.”

When the Taiwan Policy Act was under consideration with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it drew bipartisan opposition, with five senators arguing that the bill was a move toward strategic clarity and potentially changing the One-China policy, which in turn could bring regional instability and be detrimental to Taiwan. On the other hand, the heavyweight Sen. Mitt Romney frankly admitted that one of the reasons he voted for the bill was that it would be difficult to pass it into law, thus reflecting the complexities of Washington politics. While anti-China, pro-Taiwan consensus certainly exists, it has been added to the politicians’ toolbox of cheap talk, when what Taiwan really needs is concrete support and assistance.

The author is a veteran correspondent.