Do Not Avoid Worst-Case Scenario Predictions in Aftermath of Taiwan Elections — US Experts

As the results of Taiwan’s general election emerged, experts in the United States suggested that the Democratic Progressive Party’s victory could upset the fragile balance of current U.S.-China relations, and that, particularly to avoid a recurrence of the “historical rhymes” of World War I, one should not avoid making worst-case scenario predictions for U.S.-China relations and world peace.

Commenting on the election results in Taiwan, Mathew Burrows, Distinguished Fellow and Strategic Foresight Hub Program Lead at the Stimson Center, an American think tank, wrote that it will be months before we know what the Democratic Progressive Party victory means for U.S.-China relations and world peace, but that we should not shy away from anticipating the worst.

International conflicts have increased nine-fold since 2004, Burrows noted, with conflicts like those in Syria, Libya, Israel/Gaza and Ukraine becoming flashpoints between opposing external forces; he expressed concern that Taiwan could likewise become such a flashpoint.

Burrows, who served for many years in the U.S. State Department and U.S. intelligence community, analyzed [President-elect] Lai Ching-te’s campaign promise of “maintaining the status quo,”while noting that Lai’s strong desire for Taiwanese independence was well known. Prior to the election, both parties in the U.S. were united in their support for Taiwan — even if they stopped short of urging Taiwan to declare independence — and Joe Biden had pledged to protect the island, so the status quo that Lai wanted to maintain was already on increasingly shaky ground. Mainland China has dramatically increased its military displays, signaling that it will use force if necessary to prevent Taiwan’s independence, while many Taiwanese seem to fear becoming the victims of a conflict between the two great powers that are the U.S. and China.

Burrows argued that, whether in Washington or Beijing, discussion of war was no longer taboo, and that all the Cold War fears of conflict between the two nuclear powers had been forgotten by generations with little first-hand knowledge of the last world war. Many Americans believed that China would make concessions, while in China, many believed that the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 would convince Washington that China’s interests should be respected. “We know now that it was only because of the good judgment of a Soviet nuclear sub commander that nuclear war was avoided,” Burrows wrote. “Would we be so lucky again?”

Burrows pointed out that a number of leading historians have written about the uncanny similarities between the situation today and that leading up to the outbreak of World War I. In the more than 70 years since the end of World War II, the U.S., Russia, Europe and China have avoided direct conflict with each other — much like the nearly century-long period of peace that preceded the outbreak of World War I. A key factor in laying the groundwork for this was that everyone feared turmoil and losses on the homefront, yet the increasingly intense U.S.-China competition of today echoed pre-1914 Anglo-German rivalries.

At that critical juncture, Burrows wrote, cooler heads tried to “wind down” the rivalry, but British and German public opinion had shifted toward jingoism, exacerbating hostilities between the two sides. When the crisis erupted in July 1914, the German and Russian leaders thought twice about going to war for fear of losing face. Citing Mark Twain’s aphorism that “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes,” Burrows argued that such “historical rhymes” must be avoided.

Some American scholars content themselves with reminding us to learn history’s lessons, but still more American experts are busy analyzing the chain reaction that Lai’s election could trigger.

In their pre-election outlook on the top 10 global risks for 2024, Burrows and Robert A. Manning, another Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, listed the “Taiwan elections [disrupting] an uncertain Sino-U.S. balance” as a high-probability risk.

They pointed to growing support in the U.S. Congress for arming and protecting Taiwan, high-level visits, increased military aid, and pending legislation aimed at deepening U.S.-Taiwan relations as concerns in Beijing that Biden is pursuing a “One-China, One-Taiwan” policy. A Lai presidency would likely reinforce these trends and reignite U.S.-China confrontation, potentially triggering an action-reaction cycle that could send the modest gains of the recent China-U.S. summit back to square one. If the Legislative Yuan were to be won by an opposition party, however, then this could constrain Lai’s tenure.

Sun Yun, Senior Fellow and co-director of the Stimson Center’s East Asia Program, stated that it was well known that Lai was not Beijing’s preferred candidate, that based on his past record, he was and would be “presumed guilty” by Beijing of pursuing Taiwan independence, and that the question was how far and how fast he would go.

She pointed out that even though Lai was unlikely to pursue a constitutional revision or a referendum, the problem remained a serious one for China. As Lai said in an interview with Bloomberg during the elections, “Taiwan is already a sovereign, independent country called the Republic of China.” For mainland China, this meant that Lai has bypassed all steps toward independence because he believes that Taiwan is already independent. Now that he has been elected, if he reiterates this position, it will likely trigger a major reaction from China.

On the economic front, Sun anticipated a high probability that China would cancel more early-harvest programs under the cross-strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement. Militarily, mainland China’s main concerns this year would be with stability, prioritizing domestic affairs and eschewing military confrontation, she stated. However, China could be expected to maintain military pressure to deter what it fears are Lai’s potential attempts to alter Taiwan’s status. Any official contact between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait would therefore have to be based on a new political narrative, the creative solutions to which are yet to be seen.