Obama’s Policy toward Syria is a Scandal!

Foreign Policy Magazine considers the apparent weakness of the Obama administration toward Syria a national scandal for the United States. Because it reflects a moral failure, the strategic interests of America will pay a heavy price. The publication pointed out that Obama’s motivation seems to be the love of appearing different than his predecessor, George W. Bush, whom he considers “uncouth and ignorant of international politics.”*

The magazine has developed a road map to help the administration restructure its policy toward Syria and develop international diplomatic alliances involving France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United States so as to facilitate the transformation of the current Syrian government and establish a post-Assad regime.

According to today’s article by John Hannah, just as others have openly said before, the U.S. administration is becoming weak in its dealings with Syria. This is quickly becoming a national scandal, representing a failure on both a moral and strategic level. The situation is due, unfortunately, to Obama’s vulnerability in his insistence that he maintain the typical strategy for interactions with Syria over a prolonged period of time. His strategy is led by an “addiction” to ideology and selfishness: “Obama seemed determined to show himself, evidence to the contrary be damned, the un-Bush — sophisticated, nuanced, worldly-wise to the gray areas of world affairs inhabited by true statesmen like the one he fancied himself to be, in contrast to the boorish, black-and-white cowboy-ism of his dim-witted predecessor.” { http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/11/obama_and_syria_courting_disaster}

He added: “With all the carnage of the past two months, one hopes that the president and his advisors prove capable of realizing that the chance of converting Assad into a viable strategic partner, if it ever existed, has long since passed.” { http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/11/obama_and_syria_courting_disaster}

In order to change this policy, Hannah stressed that the U.S. administration should quickly focus on marginal issues, declare its firm support of the Syrian people’s aspirations, and develop a serious strategy to accelerate the fall of Assad’s regime and achieve a peaceful transition to a new, more democratic government.

He warned that if this does not occur, Syria will assume one of two undesirable paths: either one in which oppression and repression of the revolution continue or one which leads to a sectarian civil war in which the Sunni forces confront the smaller Alawi forces, who are more heavily armed and are trained in special and security forces, and the Alawi regime survives.

To get out of this mess safely, the author laid out a road map for initializing the fragmentation of the regime, particularly through persuading prominent figures within the Alawi sect and the army. The interests of the two groups do not lie with supporting Assad and his family, who continue their crimes against the Syrian people, but with rejecting them and supporting the people’s movement for peaceful change. He added that this step requires the formation of a diplomatic coalition of governments to influence Syrian affairs. Involved parties would include the governments of the United States, France, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and possibly Egypt, as well as the office of the Secretary General of the United Nations.

Hannah pointed out the necessity of utilizing political, military and intelligence communication networks owned by these countries. Incentives — whether they are financial, political, or otherwise — must also be provided, in addition to safeguards such as a promise to provide protection to the Alawi community and other minorities. He also referenced the importance of threatening to impose sanctions on the officials in the current regime, either in the form of economic sanctions, travel bans, or the introduction of international trials. Perhaps these measures should already be underway, as this may be the only way to force Assad to accept change.

He addressed the fact that such commitments at the international level can be applied to supporting groups represented by Syrians who can speak credibly on behalf of the Syrian people and the protest movement. This most likely means supporting the Trade Council in a place outside Syria, either in Europe or another Middle Eastern country.

The article’s author concluded that the application of this strategy would certainly present a significant challenge and require a lot of effort. “The bitter fact is that the administration’s current non-policy almost certainly has us on a path that ends in national shame for the United States, national disaster for Syria, and a festering sore of instability and violence in the heart of a region vital to U.S. interests. We can, we must, try to do better.” { http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/05/11/obama_and_syria_courting_disaster}

*Editor’s Note: Quote, accurately translated, could not be verified.

Read the original article in Foreign Policy: “Obama and Syria: Courting Disaster”