The U.S. Is Missing the “Turkish Spring”

American elites agree that they failed to predict the most recent liberal wave of rebellion in the Arab world.

The astonishing attitude of Washington recently about how to approach the Arab Spring is the most important evidence of this lack of foresight. In fact, lately there have been some parallels between America’s astonishment at the Arab Spring and the reactions to the Turkish Spring. In fact, some reactions to Turkey by foreign policy makers in Washington have been caused mainly due to them missing the quiet, democratic revolution occurring against the institutional order.

Unlike the battle against current Arab regimes, the Turkish Spring has manifested over a longer period and did not occur suddenly and violently. This complicated the United States’ ability to diagnose the changes. The institutional establishment has deep roots in Turkey, which has caused the liquidation process to take place very gradually, with two steps forward and one step back. For example, after the 1980 military coup, the progressive movements, led by the now deceased Turgut Ozal, were limited by the institutional order, especially in the late 1990s. Attempts in the last decade to prevent reform from occurring under Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership have been obvious as well — it is enough just to glance at the evidence files for trials against groups that attempted coups such as Ergenekon and Balyoz, the AK Party closure case and the e-memorandum of April 27, 2007.

For a long time before and after the Cold War, Turkey was one of the Islamic ally countries whose defects, military coups and massive human rights violations were covered by the U.S. for the sake of American strategic interests — just like any other American ally in the Middle East whose situations are manipulated. The Turkish military, which is under the control of NATO, was a valuable strategic tool, much like oil. However, Washington has supported Turkey’s democratic reforms in front of the European Union, avoiding a major intervention that could cause anxiety among the military and civil titans of the institutional order, on whom America depends. In this regard, America’s share of credit in the Turkish Spring is slightly higher than in the Arab Spring, although it is still not considered very high.

A fake democrat is secular and a true democrat is religious, right?

The coalition of secular liberals and religionists in the Arab world has been playing a crucial role in the movements against the status quo. In fact, the picture looks a lot like Turkey. Having more enabled liberals involved in the process has relieved Americans. They are, however, anxious about the influence of religious elements on the Arab and Turkish Springs because they cannot rid their subconscious of the fear that Sharia law may be the result of a democratic election. Americans cannot gain the complete trust of democratic religionists, who are capable of playing a crucial role in the future of Islamic countries, because Americans have already given the impression of being biased. Indeed, it is perceived that American and Western media already embrace secular prejudices regarding the AK Party’s publications and support by the “Fetullah Gulen Movement.” A democratic religious believer, who has a mark of faith on his forehead, though he is skillful, does not deserve to be considered more than a fake, secular democrat who has relationships with Westerners. It would be unavoidable for the U.S. to miss the opportunities of the Arab and Turkish revolutions not just in the spring, but also through the summer, unless they can close the cultural gap.

On the other hand, U.S. foreign policy elites, who try to spread democracy throughout the world, should be quite happy that Muslims are increasingly embracing democracy. So why are they anxious? Because democratization will give Muslims the authority to say no to the U.S. on behalf of the Muslim people and their national interests, making it complicated to make a deal with only the upper class, as they have in the past. One of the most courageous outputs of the Turkish Spring, despite the pressure by the executive branch in Washington, came in saying no to the March 1, 2003 Memorandum, which was a response unexpected by the Turkish people. The decision initiated an argument in Washington over “who lost Turkey?” But wouldn’t it be more appropriate if America considered this action by Turkey to be a gain of a country that is independent and democratic? Instead, complaints spilled out of some U.S. politicians’ lips about “traditional allies in Turkey.” They were referencing generals who did not pressure civil authorities enough in favor of the memorandum.

Excited by the new CHP!

“Traditional allies” of the U.S. in the Arab world have been generals at the top of the stinking, repressive regimes, privileged families and business groups. Turkey was not so different from this profile of traditional allies. Coalitions with the institutional order, although they brought some heat in the international community, usually brought the desired outcome for the U.S. The habit of working with the institutional order turned into a habit over time and thus became a part of their genes. Therefore, it can be said that, at least psychologically, U.S. foreign policy makers worked more closely with the secular members of the institutional order rather than with reformist religionists. In this case, the institution’s inability to predict change and develop successful control strategies upsets Americans as well. As a result, CHP, Turkey’s Republican People’s Party, which embraces more reasonable strategies, has brought new excitement in Washington. At this point, I’ll let you figure out who would have been the winner if we had set up an election booth in Washington.

There is one subject that Americans and Europeans always talk about. It is said that the formula for stabilizing and preventing the AK Party from becoming more autocratic is to strengthen the CHP as an alternative. But isn’t one of the reasons for the AK Party’s success their implementation of a gradual liquidation of the autocratic institutional order through democratic means and backbreaking policies over the last eight years? Indeed, the AKP, which also has some former CHP officials on its list of founders, still has the support of more than half of the population. Do not be surprised if the Turkish Spring causes stomachaches to Americans and Westerners on June 12, just as the September 12, 2010 referendum did.