Ariel Cohen: The U.S. Must Stand Against the Eurasian Empire

Federal weekly “Russian News” published an article “The Crisis of Obama’s policy on post-Soviet space.” Ariel Cohen, a leading expert on Russian issues for the Heritage Foundation, especially in Eurasian and international energy policy, wrote specifically for the publication. Here is the text in full:

For many years, Russian diplomats have openly declared that the former Soviet republics which make up the Commonwealth of Independent States, are not truly sovereign countries. Such statements have been constantly heard from the beginning of the previous decade, following on from the anti-terrorism cooperation undertaken with the U.S. after the attack by al-Qaida on America, and should have been offset by the recognition of the Russian spheres of influence in the “near abroad.” At least, so thought the emissaries sent to Washington from time to time for informal consultations and missions, in which I had to participate.

During the Bush administration such a position was unacceptable, but, according to many observers, Barack Obama’s administration’s has recognized the CIS as a de facto sphere of dominance, but not of exclusive influence, of Russia, through the policy of “reset.” To date, this policy has virtually abandoned the promotion of important American interests in Eurasia. This includes the issue of preserving a military and political balance, equal access to markets and natural resources of the former Soviet Union, as well as the development of transparency, democracy and free markets on the basis of the rule of law in those countries.

This is because the administration’s foreign policy is based on a combination of functional priorities (disarmament and withdrawal from Afghanistan), and institutional approaches (through the UN and the International Criminal Court). The president and his closest associates have neither the experience nor the education to traditional geopolitics and geo-economics, which makes it difficult and weakens the strategic direction of their foreign policy.

The post-Soviet space is a good example of this weakness (as well as in the Middle East). Since the beginning of the “reset,” President Obama has lowered the profile of his meetings with the heads of the former Soviet Union, a clear message of the reduction of U.S. involvement and interest in this region. For example, Presidents Ilham Aliyev, Islam Karimov, Mikhail Saakashvili and Viktor Yanukovych have expressed, at different stages, frustration at how hard it was to get even a brief audience with Obama.

Vice President Joe Biden received a “portfolio” of the CIS. It is clear that the benefits of the “reset” policy for the U.S. is limited support from the CIS for Afghanistan and the Russian arms control treaty START-III. For Obama this is a lot, because START is the foundation of its policy of nuclear disarmament and withdrawal from Afghanistan — the main component of the U.S.’ geopolitical foreign policy. However, many in Washington believe that Russia would support Afghanistan and enter a treaty of strategic arms without concessions to the United States in Eurasia.

Historically, the old elite and the pro-Russian groups in the post-Soviet states are wary of the United States. Such an attitude, and the media companies’ exaggerated misinformation helps Moscow to ensure that the “reset” policy essentially reduces U.S. influence in Eurasia, as well as — to a lesser extent — in Central and Eastern Europe.

Russia is now expanding and strengthening its military bases and key military and industrial targets in Moldova, Ukraine, Abkhazia, Armenia, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In addition, Moscow is making efforts toward regime change in Georgia, uses economic pressure to take control of gas company pipelines and Belarus as a step towards possibly incoporating countries to the Russian Federation.

The policy of Moscow is still to preserve Russia’s influence in the politics and economics of their neighbors. At the same time, despite official statements to the contrary, Moscow is working tirelessly to remove the United States from Central Asia, although countries in the region help the U.S. and NATO with their actions in Afghanistan. This corresponds with the interests of Russia and its Central Asian allies, but they do not have the resources for a protracted conflict with the Taliban and other radical Islamic organisations.

Whilst both the Obama administration and NATO have carried out their efforts in a most commendable manner, their efforts to strengthen the defence of the Baltic states and their actions in the CIS are clearly insufficient. In the absence of a coherent U.S. policy in the CIS this vast region may well suffer from instability.

Obviously, given the strategic importance of the post-Soviet countries, Washington needs a new approach to its foreign policy in Eurasia. The United States should intensify its efforts in the post-Soviet space and pursue its national interests. The administration must realise that it is in the interests of the U.S. to develop a coherent and consistent policy to strengthen the sovereignty and security of the CIS countries, without entering a tough confrontation with Moscow.

The reduction of the U.S. military and diplomatic budget will reconfigure U.S. foreign policy in general and in the post-Soviet space in particular. The United States should increase diplomatic and economic relations with the sovereign states of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, and above all, with Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Georgia, as well as Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

Washington should support comprehensive reforms aimed at reducing corruption, strengthening state institutions and civil society and creating conditions for economic growth and investment. This benefits all. In addition to political assistance, energy diversification and integration into the global energy markets and the construction of pipelines from east to west in the Caspian region should be provided. It is in the interest of the U.S. to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the states under international law — and at the same time play an active mediating role in the disputes in Transnistria and the South Caucasus.

Of course, the primary geopolitical objective of the U.S. is still to avoid the return of an Eurasian empire, whether under the auspices of Russia or China, and the revision of the international machinery of Eurasia which has arisen since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, if the necessary resources are not invested now, in the event of another crisis, the costs to surmount the crisis will surely be higher than the investment that America can make right now.

Prevention is always cheaper than a cure.