Legalizing the American Mandate in Iraq

Mr. Nouri al-Maliki and his supporting parliamentary coalition guaranteed another three years in power after the Iraqi parliament yesterday adopted the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) which regulates the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq. Without the presence of these forces, the present government might well find it difficult to remain in power.

Opposing the agreement, the Sadrist movement, whose members of parliament made their voices heard loudly during the voting process, found itself alone after other factions and blocs stopped opposing the agreement soon after the government responded to their demands; demands such as those represented in the list of reforms and the undertaking of a national referendum on SOFA in July.

Iraq is now under U.S. mandate for the next three years with a possibility for extension depending on the circumstances. Yet nobody can predict how Iraq will fare in the coming years, and whether the American forces can remain determined in the face of a possible decision by movements opposing the agreement, both Shiite and Sunni, to undertake military operations.

Those opposing SOFA have cast doubt on its legality, since the agreement was ratified by a government and parliament which does not enjoy sovereignty because the country is subject to an American occupation. Therefore, any agreement or pact is probably not binding for the Iraqi people or future governments, as stipulated in various articles of the Geneva Convention.

Many points in the agreement will be sources of tension in the future, particularly clauses pertaining to the immunity enjoyed by U.S. forces and the possibility of using American troops based in Iraq for military attacks on Syria and Iran. The agreement stipulates the protection of the Iraqi government against any internal or external dangers; internal ones such al-Qaeda and remaining Ba’ath loyalists and external ones such as those outside of the law. All of these expressions or categories may cover large parts of the population, if not the whole of the Iraqi people.

It is certain that the Bush administration has made a big achievement in the adoption of SOFA by the Iraqi parliament, since it includes a face-saving formula for the continued presence of a force whose human and financial costs have been exorbitant. The final withdrawal has now become nothing more than a question of time.

In other words, the U.S. forces will not be forced into withdrawal, defeated and confused, which is exactly that which happened in Vietnam. America can withdraw at any time, claiming that it is implementing the Security Agreement.

We doubt that the current Iraqi government and its allies can continue ruling for one day in the event of an American withdrawal, since the Iraqi army, which is supposed to assume the duties of the departing occupation army, is a sectarian force and nothing more than an expression of ethnic and sectarian cronyism amongst Kurds and Shiite Arabs.

Iraq is in need of a national army, representing all colors of the Iraqi spectrum. The Iraqi situation after the adoption of this agreement will probably not be any better than that which preceded it. Rather, it may worsen, since resistance is present and may well be aggravated. It will not be a surprise if we witness unified initiatives on the part of resisting Sunnis and Shiites against the agreement.

It remains possible to say that a change in the Iranian position or, more precisely, reducing the intensity of its opposition to the agreement, largely contributed to the Iraqi parliament’s adoption of it. Without that the ruling coalition would not have dared muster this support of it.

Is this the beginning of a U.S.-Iranian understanding, starting in Iraq? Or are the Iranian gambles in this context simply out of place?

The coming days will answer this and other questions.