On America’s Position Toward the Syrian Revolution

Four reasons can explain Washington’s hesitance to forcefully intervene on the front line of the Syrian revolution, in contrast to its policy toward the other Arab revolutions.

The first reason is domestic considerations concerning the opinion of the American public, who have tasted the bitter fruits of Iraq and Afghanistan and who have turned away from the idea of their country taking an active international role, instead preferring that priority be given to domestic problems. This is also directly related to the elections, as Obama is trying to guarantee that he will secure a second term without the complications that escalation could cause. Thus the White House is letting time pass until the page has turned on the elections, perhaps waiting for a more appropriate moment for an effective intervention in Syria.

Second: Israel’s interests and the weight of its decisions on American policy. Here, unfortunately, Israel is a powerful word when speaking of the future of a country bordering and partially occupied by it, a country which has remained secure and stable for many decades. This means that the impact of any changes in Syria on Israel’s security is the number one priority for Western positions, and especially on America’s ruling elite and the inclination of public opinion. We all remember, in past crises, how clear it was that Israel did not want regime change, just as we remember the shocking news that Ehud Barak had recently asked the American government to reduce pressure on the Syrian government and leave it alone. This situation has been supported by Israeli leaders’ realization that the trend of the Arab revolutions is inimical to its policies in Palestine and the region. Furthermore, when Israel and its interests are against regime change in Syria, even if some of its leaders state the opposite, it means that there is an American position which cannot overcome the concerns of its strategic ally.

The third reason relates to the particular nature of Syria’s circumstances, in its strategic position and its alliances with an axis of influence in the region which opposes American policy. At present, the White House lacks the power to assume the consequences of open battle with factions of this axis, which could broaden its reach and multiply its positions. Similarly, it doesn’t want to take on Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s serious warning that Iran would defend its allies in the region. If these statements are true, then Washington can bear scenes of oppression and torture in Syria no matter how bad they get. It can’t bear the consequences and costs of constructive intervention, not when viewing the matter in terms of the possible results, the impact on its interests and the material losses for that Syria, a country poor in oil wealth, cannot compensate them.

The final reason is worry about the character of the future government and the level of institutional stability in the event of Islamists gaining significant power, especially with regard to minorities in Syria. This concern doesn’t relate simply to minorities’ cultures and way of life as opposed to Islam, but also the possible burdens the West and America could be forced to bear should emigration from these communities increase. The egotistical and presumptuous behavior of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has exacerbated this worry, after they broke their promises — whether due the failure of one of their leaders being nominated for the presidency, or their position on civil society, they began to allow talk of applying Islamic law, which has harmed religious political movements’ roles in the Arab revolutions and damaged their credibility. Perhaps they need to lessen the damage and build trust with more than a “Commitment Charter,” which the Syrian branch of the Brotherhood recently published along with their campaign of positive and reassuring points.

It’s true that America’s position is different from those of other Western states, and this in itself will be a decisive factor in changing the course of events in Syria. It’s also true that substantial American intervention is not available upon command, and that the United States needed a significant amount of time to overcome their reservations in cases such as Bosnia’s. But what isn’t true is the claim that al-Qaida is infiltrating Syria, nor is it valid to mention terrorism as an enemy shared by Damascus and Washington as a justification for this final reason for hesitation, or the reliance on the state of the Syrian opposition, with its diverse parties and multiple coalitions, as a pretext to justify America’s reluctance and to free the most important and influential world power from responsibility.

Perhaps the revolution is fated to wait until the American elections are over to test the extent of Washington’s seriousness and determination and the role of the international community in its victory. Perhaps this issue relates to a desire among Americans to prolong the Syrian revolution and the political impact of their role, and not the difficulty or complexity of mounting an effective intervention. Perhaps they have an interest in a maintaining a policy of attrition against the regime and its Iranian ally for as long as possible. But perhaps the moral pressure against the terror and atrocities that are happening and the increasing Arab demands to take a serious stance will narrow the space for the White House’s equivocation. Democrats are aware that their weak position has begun to work against them and that they have lost some of their popularity before Republican candidates’ criticism of Obama for to his hesitation and lack of investment in the Syrian situation according to American interests and the obstruction by the two powers, Iran and Russia.

The fact is, if the above reasons aren’t overcome, then it’s likely that America’s position won’t meet the challenges of the Syrian revolution and the number of victims, but will be content to vacillate between announcements of increased economic pressure and penalties — which will not yield results in the near term — and oral support and encouragement for the Syrian people accompanied by sharp condemnations of the repression, which neither shame nor frighten the regime. The final evidence that this hesitation and evasion will continue is the support for the Kofi Annan plan, on the foundation of accepting Moscow’s role in the Syrian portfolio — which also means they will avoid entering a conflict with them and, before anything else, competition over their cooperation and the other participants in dealing with this portfolio.