Crackdowns and Treats

The middle of June 2012 will mark a significant step forward in Russian-American relations. The annual Group of 20 Summit will take place in Mexico’s municipality of Los Cabos on June 18-19. The forum will include a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and American President Barack Obama.

Despite the event’s objective format, the groups intend to discuss a wide range of issues. Among these issues are the development of symbiotic trade relationships; regulation of humanitarian relations; war policy and disarmament dialogue; and the situation in the Near and Middle East.

The meetings in Los Cabos will be the first meeting between Obama and Putin since Putin’s appointment as president. Previously, the two met only once in June 2009, during Obama’s visit to Moscow.

During a frank discussion with the Russian leader, the White House’s main goal will be to gain Russia’s acceptance of America’s approach to a series of issues regarding their international agenda. Solving these issues will be impossible without Moscow’s approval, since Russia has the power to block actions on other matters concerning the U.N. Security Council.

Above all else, talks will address the crisis in Syria, as well as Iran’s nuclear program. In both situations, the U.S. can rely on its power without regard for the positions of other world powers. The approval of their North Atlantic Trade Organization allies will be enough for them. However, the Obama administration strives to uphold America’s reputation as a legitimate leader in the international community. Preserving and strengthening that reputation will be impossible if Washington adopts a new series of military interventions, disregarding U.N. members’ viewpoints.

Obama also places great importance on portraying the U.S. as a legitimate leader in consideration of the upcoming election. He uses the idea to mark the main difference between his policies and those of Republicans. During George W. Bush’s presidency, Republicans adopted a one-sided approach in the world arena.

Obama will try to make a number of concessions to gain Moscow’s involvement with his political team. Some of those will be made at the summit in Los Cabos. Similar “treats” should create and secure U.S. interest in continuing bilateral relations within a strained environment. What’s more, Americans will try in every way possible to emphasize that they positively regard Putin’s team, as they did with the Dmitry Medvedev administration.

Obama’s efforts to build a relationship of personal trust with Putin will become an important “treat.” The White House plans to charm Russian leaders as the first step on the path to influencing them. Such has been its approach with all Russian presidents, beginning with Boris Yeltsin.

Obama will begin establishing these necessary contacts at the meeting in Mexico. He’s already begun preparing for them. Putin received a personal letter from the American leader on May 2, which confirmed efforts to deepen cooperation. U.S. National Security Advisor Thomas Donilon visited Moscow on May 4 with the goal of assessing Putin’s reaction to the letter. Putin passed his written response to Obama through Russian Prime Minister Medvedev at the Group of 8’s summit at Camp David last May 18-19.

A similar scenario helped foster personal relations between the White House and the Kremlin at the beginning of 2009. Then, Obama established a relationship of trust with Medvedev.

Overall, the most meaningful “treat” will surely be the abolishment of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Regardless of the fact that every year the president makes special decisions to block the amendment’s efficacy, it formally remains on the books. The Kremlin views Jackson-Vanik as clear evidence the White House lacks the desire to develop a trade partnership. The process to eliminate the amendment will begin during June and July.

The White House has been energizing Democratic groups in Congress to initiate hearings to abolish Jackson-Vanik. Republican support of the Democrats isn’t officially guaranteed. However, after Russia joins the World Trade Organization on July 1, the amendment will be even further established as an outdated relic. Because of this, Congress will be unlikely to oppose the White House’s desire to fully terminate it.

Along with “treats,” the White House also has the means to apply pressure. These “crackdowns” encompass all the basic segments of political relations, defense and economic trade. Interestingly enough, these actions aren’t administered in reaction to Moscow’s resistance, but are sometimes synchronized with the offering of the “treats.” In other words, the effort to find a mutual understanding with Russia’s new government will be accompanied by unfriendly controls.

Using these, Obama’s team hopes to reduce Putin and his circle’s resistance regarding international issues where it is most important to gain Russia’s support – in the U.N. Security Council.

Most political pressure received by the Kremlin revolves around the “Magnitsky bill.” On June 7, the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee will vote on the bill, which would introduce visa bans for Russian officials connected to the death of a lawyer who worked for Hermitage Capital Management investment fund, Sergei Magnitsky. If ratified, the bill will be sent to the Senate for consideration.

The House of Representatives is expected to reach a verdict by the end of July; they will undoubtedly support the bill. In the hands of the Obama cabinet, the penalties related to the “Magnitsky bill” will discredit Russian law enforcement and the government as a whole. The White House is thus empowered to present the entire group of Russian executive departments to the world as criminals. Moreover, the nature of the bill allows the White House to expand its list of those prohibited entry into the U.S., depending on the political atmosphere.

Regarding defense policy, the “crackdowns” are administered by further expanding the anti-missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Despite the prospect of reviving Russian-American negotiations on the issue, Washington won’t give up the realization of its one-sided plans. The U.S. has already outlined concrete budget plans and has reached the necessary agreements with European countries.

The anti-missile defense project will become an instrument for “silent pressures.” The White House will publicly continue to insist the anti-missile defense system isn’t directed against Russia, but each of the system’s new components will demonstrate to Moscow its vulnerable position before Washington’s military force. In that context, the anti-missile defense system will repeat the U.S. and NATO’s 1979 “Double-Track Decision” regarding middle-range missiles.

That decision also implied implementing policies to scare the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by preventing a new kind of missile in Western Europe, while simultaneously preserving the conditions for negotiations on the given initiative.

Yet another method of applying pressure in the defense policy sphere will be expanding NATO in the East. The first sign of the expansion’s success was U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s announcement at the NATO summit in Chicago on May 21. Clinton openly declared that it is time the coalition widened. What’s more, she emphasized that the objective consideration of the issue would occur at the next NATO forum.

Considering the organization’s current workload, the event could take place in 2013, due to the U.S. presidential election. Expanding NATO could provoke Moscow’s harshest reaction, even on the public level; the White House is well aware of this.

However, Obama’s team concurrently believes expansion will provide the most convenient opportunity to help shift the Russian government’s political position, which would prove advantageous for the U.S. The Kremlin might face a simple decision: Either it gives up Syria and Iran, or Azerbaijan and Georgia join NATO.