Resolution in Syria: Assad or Arms

The “Group of Friends of the Syrian People,” which was founded after Syrian decisions had been held up by the Russian-Chinese veto in the United Nations, held its fifth meeting in Rome. The previous four meetings offered the Syrian opposition forces rhetoric support, not-yet-politically-empowered diplomatic recognition and “consolatory” financial support. For about two years, the opposition has been fighting against the military and paramilitary forces of the “Group of Enemies of the Syrian People,” who are fully equipped and wanting in war ethics. The opposition cancelled the decision to boycott the Rome meeting after new U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry’s message that “the support will be more concrete.”

Although they did go to the Rome meeting after Kerry’s message, the opposition has actually been hard put to adopt an attitude toward the international community since the beginning of the revolution. The real reason for this is the ambiguous position of the international community, in particular of the U.S., toward the opposition forces. For example, not only has the U.S. not helped the opposition forces in any concrete way so far, it has also often prevented the Gulf countries that are willing to do so.

The Only Concrete Things Are Arms and Intelligence

The picture that emerges from this brings into clear view the situation in Syria: The Ba’ath regime receives military and financial support from outside, while the opposition forces are subjected to military embargo. This naturally causes the balance in the area to remain unchanged and the bloodshed to continue. Therefore, what the opposition understands from the word “concrete” and would be satisfied with at this point is support in arms and intelligence.

The most “concrete” result from the Rome meeting was the $60 million support the U.S. pledged to the opposition forces. While the U.S. repeated Hilary Clinton’s promise of “non-military support,” it has been revealed that there is still a yawning gap between what the U.S. and the opposition understand from the word “concrete.” Still, it can be said that the U.S. is in the course of revising its approach to Syria.

Neither With Nor Without Assad!

Kerry, who met with his Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov, in Berlin last week, is trying to find the lowest common denominator on the Syrian crisis with Russia. With the Syrian issue, which broke out after the Libya issue, Russia once more let itself into the Middle East region as a critical actor and shares the apprehension of the U.S. about an “Islamic government after Ba’ath.” Owing to this opinion fed by the Islamic elements strengthening in the area, calls of “if a solution, even if bad, is not found immediately, we will face a new Afghanistan” are being considered in both Russia and the U.S. Therefore, both countries are looking for a political solution formula that will work with or without Assad. The U.S. thinks it will increase its influence on the opposition with financial support, while Russia thinks that it will bring the Ba’ath regime to the table with its UN card.

It goes without saying that the U.S. and Russia are key actors. However, these two countries cannot possibly resolve the crisis in Syria alone. They have both lost their chance to be the ultimate decision-makers: The U.S. has played an ineffective role to date, while Russia has shown unreturned support to the regime. Under the current circumstances, even with support from both countries, a permanent political solution is very unlikely. This is because the current balance in the area and the regime’s air superiority do not render a resolution without Assad that is acceptable to the regime and the “Group of Enemies of the Syrian People.” A resolution with Assad, on the other hand, is the red line for both the political and military opposition. Even if the U.S. thought that it could convince the political opposition, which it previously criticized for “not being in dialogue with the regime,” to sit down at the table, it is impossible at this point that the U.S. could sell this idea not only within the military opposition, but also within the political opposition.

If we are to talk about a military or political solution in Syria from the current point at which we stand, such a solution would only be possible after the opposition forces absolutely have the upper-hand in the area. The regime will neither stop fighting nor be interested in a political solution unless it understands that it has been defeated in the area. For this reason, the key to military or political solution in Syria lies in strengthening the opposition or breaking the military power of the regime. The resolution with Assad in Syria will be with arms; the resolution without Assad will be without arms.