'Bad' Terrorist Tsarnaev, 'Good' Terrorist Basaev

The 2004 Beslan tragedy found me in America. On the plane from D.C. to LA, I remember reading the article by Richard Pipes, a well-known expert on Russian government, and shaking with rage. In his opus “Give the Chechens a Land of Their Own,” Pipes stated that mass slaughter in North Ossetia was a logical reaction to Moscow’s refusal to grant independence to Ichkeria.

He said, “But to say this is not necessarily to agree with those — including President Bush and President Vladimir Putin of Russia — who would equate the massacre with the 9/11 attacks and Islamic terrorism in general … This history makes clear how the events in Russia differ from 9/11. The attacks on New York and the Pentagon were unprovoked and had no specific objective. Rather, they were part of a general assault of Islamic extremists bent on destroying non-Islamic civilizations. As such, America’s war with al-Qaida is non-negotiable. But the Chechens do not seek to destroy Russia — thus there is always an opportunity for compromise … Russia, the largest country on earth, can surely afford to let go of a tiny colonial dependency and ought to do so without delay.”

I’m wondering what Professor Pipes thinks today? Is he still dedicated to the idea that Chechen terrorists and al-Qaida have essentially different goals? How does he place the motivation of the “historic blame” of the city of Boston over “Chechnya’s fight for independence”?

Obviously, the tragedy in Boston is not a reason for malicious joy. Statements like “We told you, you didn’t believe us, now you get what you deserve” are the lot of arrogant and emotionally defective people, which Mr. Pipes proved to be eight years ago.

The tragedy is not another reason to create pseudo-intellectual recipes for amazingly easy and simple ways to win the war against terrorism forever; however, these recipes will now appear — and a lot of them. The momentum of tragedy always has a sharp and gloomy dignity. But then the pain changes its pitch. The wave of mandatory and, as a rule, not-too-smart comments about the tragedy floods everything in a somewhat desperate sea of platitude and absurdity.

In the English language, there is a term that perfectly describes the current situation. The “blame game” is a quest for the guilty one or, to be more specific, a game with the goal of finding someone to blame.

Who created the terrorists, the brothers Tsarnaev? Who is to blame? Despite some of the alarming information that the FBI possessed, they let the outrageous intentions come true? To what extent is the FBI guilty? Did Russian security services neglect something? And what can be said about so many American people who confused Chechnya with the Czech Republic and addressed their righteous anger to Prague? Soon there will be so much news and finger-poking that it will all become dully annoying.

By the way, it annoys me already. This is the only subject, to be honest with you, that occupies my mind at the moment. Back in 1932, thinking about the upcoming war, the former and future prime minister of Great Britain, Stanley Baldwin, in his speech to the House of Commons claimed: “The bomber will always break through.”

To me, the Boston Marathon bombing proves that the bomber will always break through. In the 21st century, people’s lives in developed countries — among such I include the U.S., Europe and Russia — are undoubtedly more secure than two or three centuries ago. But the “anti-bomber vaccination” or a kind of magic panacea does not exist. For any of us it can suddenly come to an end — anytime, anywhere.

As Jason Burke, well-known reporter and traveler to the most dangerous regions of the world, wrote for British newspaper The Observer: “We are left with a chaotic and dynamic terrorist threat that combines the local and the global in continually evolving ways, flipping between the two [modes].”

There is no better way to describe the situation, both in general and in specific relation to the Tsarnaev brothers. Makhachkala, Kyrgyzstan and Boston are three completely different regions of the world. It appears, however, that different worlds may clash sometimes, despite the lack of cause and effect relationships.

Some members of Congress suggested calling the surviving terrorist Tsarnaev “A participant in war operation against the U.S.”* It makes sense symbolically, but why “against the U.S.” alone? I shudder to imagine what kind of people the terrorist communicated with during his trip to Russia last year. What do those people have in mind?

There is no such thing as a positive outcome of a terrorist act, but every powerful act of terrorism gives us good reason to think and draw conclusions. The tragedy in Boston is a reason to think about the following:

In every war, it is crucial to understand who your friends are and who your enemies are. Among your enemies, who is more of a competitor with whom you can come to an agreement? And who will not stop until he cuts your throat?

The lack of this very understanding between the USSR and the U.S. during their global confrontation in the late 1970s created the kind of terrorism we see today. Al-Qaida is a child that was born of the deployment of Russian troops in Afghanistan in 1979. Moscow made that move because it feared that Afghanistan would enter the zone of American influence. Washington, on the other hand, pushed the Soviet Union into the intervention, hoping that their geopolitical rival would drown in the swamp of a war that was impossible to win.

In trying to hurt each other, we hurt ourselves. The Boston Bombing is not the first and, unfortunately, not the last echo of the decisions made by Brezhnev, Ford and Carter.

Ironically, at that time, Richard Pipes was the head of “Team B,” the group of experts created by the CIA to assess the realistic threat the Soviet Union presented. It is believed that Mr. Pipes and his colleagues extremely exaggerated the degree of the potential threat. In the atmosphere of artificially created paranoia, Washington went extreme and provoked the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

That’s why, after the tragedy in Boston, I’m asking myself: Will Russian-American relations improve? Will the American leaders finally get rid of “Pipes syndrome” — that is, the belief that we here fight “bad” terrorism, and they in Russia fight “good” terrorism? Or are some prejudices so strong that they can’t be washed away, even with the blood of citizens?

*Editor’s Note: This quote, accurately translated, cannot be verified.