Syria: 'Libya II,' not 'Geneva II'

So Barack Obama has surprised us: He changed his position and adopted an aggressive policy that is just short of a declaration of war. Despite those who say that his decision came too late, it is better late than never.

Since the White House acknowledged that al-Assad’s regime had crossed the “red line” by using chemical weapons — and that it will punish him for doing so — we have drifted farther from “Geneva II” and closer to “Libya II.”

Now the objective is the regime’s downfall, to be achieved through a combination of foreign intervention and support for the Syrian rebels on the ground.

Until we know the outcome of this state of affairs, it is up to us to put the Syrian crisis into perspective. One year ago, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was quickly approaching military defeat at the hands of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), which had seized more than half of the country’s border crossings. Many thought that he would fall within months. Yet he convinced the Russians and the Iranians to increase both the volume and the quality of their aid, thereby greatly reinforcing his troops, which had fallen into a state of disarray. Thus the balance of power was reversed: The Free Syrian Army’s weakness became apparent as it suffered defeats in Homs, and even in Damascus, since last December. Subsequently, the FSA received extensive support from several nations — the most prominent being Saudi Arabia, which decided to take the lead. The Jordanian front was opened to provide humanitarian aid and crucial logistics, and large quantities of weapons were delivered. All of this quickly resulted in victories for the FSA. Al-Assad’s allies then discovered that his forces had viciously bombed cities, but that they had failed to win any battles and had lost several in succession. They also realized that they were incapable of helping al-Assad’s defeated forces, either morally or militarily, simply with better capabilities; therefore they decided to wage war with their own troops. This was a bold decision by the Iranians, who believed that the Americans lacked the appetite for battle. Throughout the past two months, there have been regular eyewitness reports of Iranian troops and Hezbollah and Iraqi militias that are fighting of their own accord. The battle at al-Qusayr was decisive, though not strategic; still it served as propaganda for both sides. It is indisputable that thousands of Hezbollah troops fought in person and that they captured al-Qusayr and the neighboring towns. Now the war is no longer just among Syrians: Al-Assad’s army is against the Free Syrian Army, and Iran is engaged directly through its allies against the Free Syrian Army, which has fewer numbers and less equipment. The balance has shifted, and al-Assad’s victory is likely for the first time since the revolution broke out 27 months ago.

Al-Qusayr was a critical battle that awakened everyone. The Gulf’s position, alongside the support of Britain and France, sounded the alarms in Washington as they announced that an Iranian occupation of a large regional state — i.e. Syria — would shift the balance of power throughout the region. The Geneva II peace conference was held, based on an idea that Iran has championed for over a year and that Russia has embraced: There is a new reality in the disrupted Middle East, one in which Tehran is the key player. So the question is: How can we accept the geographic expansion of a besieged Iran, with its sphere of influence extending throughout Iraq, Syria and Lebanon?

Despite important indicators of change in Washington, we still cannot say that the battle has been resolved as it remains complicated and full of surprises. Perhaps it will be resolved by August, though it is more likely that it will need another two years. Yet it is certain that the recent shift in international positions is an important political and military development that will cast its shadow in the coming days. More than likely, the establishment of an internationally protected region will be achieved — one that is secured by NATO in cooperation with the Gulf states. Support for the Free Syrian Army with quality weapons will be conducted publicly, as will important information concerning the war’s resolution. Unless there is political progress by the Syrian regime — such as a call for early elections by year’s end instead of next summer — and unless there is proof that Iran and its allies have withdrawn from Syria, which is unlikely, then we are heading toward the Libyan solution. That is, when NATO forces overthrew Gadhafi’s regime, after the rebels had failed to do so.