Obama's Choice: Not To Attack or Overthrow al-Assad

Obama has two options with a clear strategic purpose: He either cancels the attack or overthrows the al-Assad regime; there is no middle option.

In the monumental movie “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly,” The Ugly shoots from a bath full of water at a burglar who tried to take him out, saying in between shots, “When you have to shoot, shoot! Don’t talk.” This also applies to America. Had it reacted immediately, even on a small scale, the reaction would have been a deterrent.

Someone once taught me, “Don’t go on an adventure if you have no idea how to get out of it,” and Obama is familiar with this lesson: a lesson learned in Iraq and in Afghanistan. Everything looks fine to begin with, but what follows is always bleak, painful and pointless. Obama cannot guarantee that this small match will not ignite the rest of the Middle East. He cannot promise a deterrent or that the attack will be considered a punishment. He therefore has only two options. He either drops the case or brings down the al-Assad regime. There is no middle option. Both options make sense.

Avoiding a “small scale” attack could prevent a large complication. Again, had he reacted immediately with a “small and quiet” attack, the Syrians wouldn’t bat an eyelid. However, after all this noise — attacking three buildings — even Malta could do that. On the other hand, it would also make sense for Obama to decide to take down al-Assad’s regime.

Why? Because apparently al-Assad has his back against the wall. The use of chemical weapons is in itself proof of this. Al-Assad is not stupid. He knows it is forbidden. He knows that such action could focus the attention of the entire West onto him. He knows it entails a huge risk. But he does it anyway. That is to say, he didn’t have a choice. It is his only way to survive — and if so, there is logic behind cutting off al-Assad’s “preparation” stage, which may result in unnecessary losses and potentially even ignite the entire area with intolerable acts of madness. It seems to be the most reasonable option. Therefore it is also advisable for Obama to wait, to build up the appropriate force. In al-Assad’s shoes, I would actually begin to panic upon the American president’s apparent hesitation.

One clear thing we can learn from this affair is this: Whether there is an attack or not, the leaking of unconventional weapons into the hands of terrorist organizations or the irresponsible use of such weapons by a country acting as a terrorist state, is the end of the line in America’s eyes. They will do anything to prevent this sort of situation.

To the same extent, the Americans understand that an unstable situation in the region can act as an invitation for trouble. They must therefore stabilize the area at almost any cost. That is to say, we Israelis are also involved in this big equation, though we are not currently standing in line for the American treatment.

Our reflection on the American concept of deterrence is not only in the context of Iran. We Israelis should also give the matter some thought and conclude that the Americans are serious when they press for some kind of political arrangement between us and the Palestinians. It is linked to the same leakage and gap in the fence that scares them so much — and rightly so, both for us and for them.