Thawing US-Iran Relations Is Easier Said than Done

Since Hassan Rouhani’s rise to office as president of Iran, both his nation and the U.S. have offered a series of goodwill overtures to the other, and Obama and Rouhani have even engaged in a sort of “letter diplomacy.” During an exclusive interview with CNN, Rouhani suggested that the correspondence between himself and Obama “could be subtle and tiny steps for a very important future.”*

According to a report by German news magazine der Spiegel, Iran may allow international inspectors to enter its nuclear facility at Fordo to oversee the dismantling of centrifuges there on the condition that U.S. and European sanctions on Iran be lifted. In mid-July, the U.S. Treasury Department also relaxed restrictions on exports of basic medical supplies and equipment to Iran. With this prelude, many in the media have speculated that Obama and Rouhani will have their first “encounter” when the United Nations convenes in New York at the end of September.

In international politics, there are no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, only eternal and perpetual interests. The truth is that the U.S. and Iran both have their own internal calculus underlying the sudden détente between these old adversaries.

For Iran, oil revenues have experienced a steep decline due to two years of Western sanctions, and the country hangs in a state of perpetual stagflation. During his campaign, Rouhani vowed to place priority on resolving Iran’s economic difficulties and easing tensions with the West. And after winning the election by a wide margin, he has hastened to make good on that promise, seeking to relieve Iran of pressure from sanctions through improved relations with the U.S. Meanwhile, having been plagued by all manner of problems, the U.S. is clearly on its heels in the Middle East, and it is all it can do to preserve its current holdings and influence in the region. Iran has the right to voice its opinions regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, the war on terror and other issues of U.S. interest, and as a consequence, the U.S. has no choice but to maintain contact, or even cooperate, with Iran while seeking to contain it.

Many in the media debate whether the U.S. and Iran will ultimately be able to pave a path to reconciliation similar to the ping pong diplomacy between the U.S. and China, or even reach a more significant agreement on strategic cooperation. However, historical analogues cannot be applied so simply. At least, from the present circumstances, it would appear that the chances of such are remote. To apply a line from a movie, the problem is not arranging a meeting, but rather whether or not an agreeable price can be negotiated. For now, both sides still lack the objective conditions and subjective concerns necessary to facilitate a deal.

On one hand, getting Rouhani to make any sort of substantial compromises will not be easy. Iran has consistently vowed to become an independent and autonomous regional power, and has taken anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli dogma as one of the ideological cornerstones of its Islamic authority. These political ambitions and strictures have already seeped through every pore of the policy-making strata in Iran, and adjustments of a structural nature will be practically impossible to achieve. Additionally, when weighing political power in Iran, conservative forces within the country retain their clout despite the strength of pro-Western Iranians having been bolstered by Rouhani’s election, and Rouhani will certainly face a multitude of hurdles as he moves closer to the United States. Under these circumstances, the Iranian president must walk a fine line in executing that policy.

On the other hand, getting the U.S. to make larger concessions to Iran will be even more difficult. The United States’ foremost objectives in the Middle East are to check the rise of regional powers and ensure the security of Israel. In the past, the foundation of U.S. Middle Eastern policy was designed around the containment of Iran. The ramifications of changing this policy framework will be enormous, and it will be particularly difficult for the United States’ staunchest Middle Eastern allies, Israel and Saudi Arabia, to accept.

And on a technical level, the amount of urgency for improving relations differs vastly between the U.S. and Iran. The Iranians are impatient to rid themselves of the hardships of sanctions and will be extremely amenable to talks. But as those same sanctions have only just begun to bear fruit for the U.S., it is in no great hurry to negotiate and will not give ground easily. Obama has previously stated that “if you have both a credible threat of force, combined with a rigorous diplomatic effort … you can strike a deal,” and issued a clear warning that Iranians “shouldn’t draw a lesson that we haven’t struck [Syria] to think we won’t strike Iran.”

As the saying in the West goes, Rome wasn’t built in a day. The U.S. and Iran have not had official relations in 34 years, and despite the current willingness of both countries to seek reconciliation, they still lack the objective conditions and subjective concerns necessary to navigate through their fundamental differences and become friends. And if both sides desire a true thawing in tensions, they will still need to demonstrate the requisite patience, sincerity and political courage.

The author is an associate research fellow at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations and a columnist on the People’s Daily overseas edition website.

* Translator’s Note: This quote is from an interview with NBC, not CNN.