The Third Cold War in Latin America

Russia’s decision to annex Crimea, part of Russian territory for two centuries, has produced the rebirth of the cold war between the United States and Russia, and provides us with the perfect opportunity to divest international relations of the ideologies and rhetoric that tend to conceal the intentions of both sides.

Now that both countries are capitalist powers and the intentions behind the rhetoric can be made out through the tight-fitting democratic guise, both Washington’s promotion of the defense of the free world and Moscow’s corresponding defense of socialism sound like a geopolitical struggle for world influence.

Such is the virtue of great crises and transitions: They show realities which, in periods of calm, tend to be concealed behind ideological arguments and, more often than not, embellished with rhetoric. In Egypt, 529 people have been condemned to death, and violence against demonstrators has produced hundreds or thousands of fatalities. Yet not a single Western power has raised its voice in protest, proving that geopolitical interests prevail over human rights.

José Luis Fiori, a lecturer in international economic policy at the Universidad Federal Río de Janeiro and coordinator of the research group Global Power and the Geopolitics of Capitalism, has written a series of journalistic articles which revive the thinking of Nicholas Spykman (1893-1943), a geostrategist and influential architect of United States foreign policy in the 20th century.

Spykman’s view was that the Caribbean countries, including Colombia and Venezuela, formed part of a sphere of influence within which United States supremacy was beyond question. He considered them a “closed sea,” controlled by the United States, to remain in a position of absolute dependence forever.

According to Fiori, this perceived view explains the 15 military bases in Central America and the Caribbean, the region that played a decisive role in the second cold war of Ronald Reagan’s presidency. He also thinks that, “beyond the ‘dissidence’ of Cuba and Venezuela,” this situation of domination will be very difficult to alter.

Fiori depicts Mexico as a United States military enclave and, among the larger Latin American countries, the only one where poverty is actually on the increase, with over half the population living in poverty.

In South America, beyond the immediate zone of United States hegemony, Spykman considered the Southern Cone countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile the most important. He referred to these countries as the ABC region, which by a common effort could attempt to alter the balance of power. If they were to do so, the threat posed to U.S. hegemony would elicit a military response.

In short, the United States aims to prevent the formation of Southern Cone alliances that could call United States dominance into question. According to Fiori, the success of the new alliance between Brazil and Argentina will always be considered a red line as far as United States interests are concerned. With the exceptions of Colombia, Perú and Chile, therefore, all the governments of South America are currently considered threats to North American interests that must be contained and eradicated.

That is not to say that each country is considered equally dangerous, nor even that they should be treated the same way. Following the earthquake in Haiti in January 2010, the response was immediate, brutal and militarized. During moments of intense confusion, huge numbers of U.S. troops were deployed to the Caribbean, where they quickly occupied key areas of the devastated country before any other power could do the same.

Unlike previous periods of the region’s history, when intervals of healthy economic growth in Argentina and Brazil were stimulated by world powers — first by England, then the United States — we are currently facing a revolution in the history of the Southern Cone. Fiori maintains that plans to create a co-prosperity zone and a South American power bloc, along the same lines as UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) or MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) but larger, are moving in a direction that the United States and its allies in each country will not tolerate.

He thinks that the United States will act as the main counter to Brazilian foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere during the 21st century. The problem is that, while Washington’s position is clear, the same cannot be said for most of the progressive governments in the region.

Fiori’s analysis would be flawless with the addition of two central elements: The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) factor, and the emergence of the new bourgeoisies that are the product of the progressive government model.

China’s presence in South America is already significant, particularly in the area of commerce, while Asian investments are growing steadily. Russia’s presence is also looming larger, particularly in the military sphere. Both of these are significant influences that establish priorities. China’s economic presence, the military alliance with Russia, and political and trade ties with Iran are all concentrated in Venezuela. Spykman and Henry Kissinger would not have tolerated anything like as much.

The second element is much more complex. The emergence of new bourgeoisies is an inevitable correlation of leftist and progressive governments, as evidenced in Brazil and Venezuela. The new middle classes could be a force conducive to a multipolar world, working against American domination. Equally, they could clash with popular empowerment movements that reduce their scope for action and be willing instead to side with others of their kind against the lower classes.