During the Korea-U.S. defense leaders’ meeting, held two days ago at the Pentagon, South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-goo requested the transfer of four key technologies necessary for the development of KF-X indigenous Korean fighter jets, but U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter denied the request. Minister Han proposed the condition that Korea will prevent the transfer of the technologies to third powers, but even that condition was denied. He had sent a letter last August requesting cooperation on the technology transfer, but Secretary Carter sent a reply denying the request only a day before the meeting, according to sources. Since the United States’ official refusal to transfer the technology last April, it has announced its refusal three times so far.
It was a well-foreseen situation. The four key technologies are AESA (active electronically scanned array) radar, IRST (infra-red search and track), EOTGP (electro-optical targeting pod), and RF (radio frequency) jammer. They work as the eyes and ears for fighter jets, making them essential for the development of high-performance fighter jets. Citing the International Arms Trade Treaty, which contains provisions for protecting American technologies, the U.S. stated that it cannot transfer the technologies. Despite the challenges, the Korean Ministry of Defense forcibly opened negotiations for the sake of appearances. Korean military diplomacy deserves to be criticized for beating a dead horse. It ran all over the place, acting as if it will convince the U.S. to change its position, but it instead committed diplomatic blunders and caused embarrassment. The negotiations may even dilute the progress made by President Park Geun-hye’s U.S. visit.
The KF-X project is at an important crossroads. It is a government project that will receive 18 trillion won (about $15 million) of taxpayers’ precious money, an astronomical sum, but it is full of holes. The Defense Acquisition Program Administration and the Agency for Defense Development is assuring that it will acquire the four key technologies by working with third powers in Europe or through domestic development, but we have to wait and see whether their development efforts will be successful. Even if Korea manages to bring in technologies from a third power, it has to turn them into Korean technologies to be able to integrate them with American technologies. Forecasts predict that, beside the four key technologies, the remaining 21 technologies will also have limited option for transfers. The target year for the development of KF-X is 2025. Considering the current rate of progress, not much time remains. But that does not allow for a postponement of the project. Doing so would be a waste of budget and cause a serious gap in the air force’s military strength.
The government should not be focusing on covering up its problems. It has to first assess how it negotiated for offsets with Lockheed Martin, as a part of acquiring technologies for developing KF-X, when Lockheed Martin proposed F-35A as the next-generation fighter in 2013. The government then needs to hold people accountable. If there are problems with securing necessary technologies for the KF-X project, the government must quickly find realistic solutions. It should not run the project irresponsibly and turn the indigenous Korean fighter jet into an empty shell.
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