Trump, Maduro, Bolsonaro, and Alberto’s Foreign Policy

At Washington’s request, Argentina would not leave the Lima Group. But it would reduce its involvement and would not recognize Juan Guaidó.

Alberto Fernández’s forthcoming dialogue with Mexican leader Andrés Manuel López Obrador will be his first such meeting as president-elect. His visit to meet with a leader who plays a significant role in the region’s rhetorically left-leaning sphere is an indicator of the general direction his foreign policy will take; however, at the same time, he will have to constantly negotiate and reach agreements with his all-powerful neighbor, the United States. AMLO, as the Mexican president is referred to by those who brag about their close relationship with him, has a big, complex agenda with Washington. He is still searching for a formula that will allow him to completely fulfill this and, at the same time, outwardly project a more distanced stance in relation to Washington.

Fernández, who, on Friday, received a welcome from Donald Trump, as well as the conventional promise of collaboration, faces the same dilemma. The task of efficiently resolving this dilemma for the country will be one of the big challenges of this historic transfer of power. The first sign that the decision about how to proceed is undergoing serious analysis is the fact that the proposed stopover in Houston, after Mexico, to speak with investors interested in the Vaca Muerta Formation has been canceled. Realism took precedence; the first U.S. visit could not exclude Washington and the tasks waiting there with regard to the International Monetary Fund.

The U.S. government requested two things: 1) that Argentina not break away from the Lima Group, which was formed to put pressure on Maduro; 2) that it repays its debt to the IMF in accordance with the new repayment plan that is to be negotiated.

The first matter will be discussed with López Obrador. Mexico is a member of the Lima Group but not an active participant. It fulfills its agreement with Washington on an official level, but, in practice, it is fostering a different strategy with Uruguay and the European Union. Fernández has praised this position, although he is alert to the possibility of an unfavorable outcome for the Broad Front in the electoral run-off. It is assumed that Fernández’s state department will follow López Obrador’s strategy—remain in the Lima Group with very little involvement. The matter of establishing a position on Maduro’s regime is yet to be resolved and will be discussed with the Mexican president.

Fernández has been congratulated by the authoritarian Venezuelan president and has issued a response. He received a similar reaction from Juan Guaidó, who has been declared acting president by the National Assembly. He has not responded to this, and is considered unlikely to do so. This means that Mauricio Macri’s decision to recognize Guaidó and his ambassador here will be reversed. This change could cause a great deal of friction with the Trump administration, which, on the other hand, could help to assuage the raging dispute between Jair Bolsonaro and Fernández. The Itamaraty Palace has forbidden the Brazilian ambassador in Buenos Aires from communicating with emissaries of the future government.

Venezuela will be one of the topics raised at the upcoming Puebla Group forum here. This meeting of the region’s center-left leaders has been organized by Marcos Enriquez Ominami, who is a friend of the president-elect and is (or was) responsible for his travel schedule.

The turmoil in South America is changing the president-elect’s original plans: He was to visit Chile first as a gesture of friendship. Now, everything has changed.