The Russian-American Telemetry Differences

The negotiations on the new agreement regarding limiting the strategic weapons of Russia and the United States (START-I) are slowing down due to Russia’s unwillingness to keep American inspections at the leading Russian venture for the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Moscow also wants to stop having to provide the Americans with information on the technical character of its weapons. This information, which is supposed to remain confidential during the negotiations, was leaked on the blog of a famous American expert on non-proliferation.

Jeffrey Lewis, head of the initiative on nuclear strategy and non-proliferation fund, “New America,” detailed the problems encountered in the Russia-US talks on replacing the expiring START-I. They relate to regime of verification. The Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces, General Nikolay Makarov, said, “There is a number of problems, chief among them control over inspections and some numerical data,” (as quoted by BBC) giving extra weight to Lewis’ commentary.

According to Lewis, the main stumbling block is Russia’s efforts aimed at the abolition of provisions, which under START–I, allow Americans to monitor the Votkinsk factory. Additionally, Moscow is allegedly seeking exemptions from the new contract provisions that prohibit encryption of telemetry data transmitted to the checkpoints during missile tests. “The reason is mainly the fact that Russia is building new rockets “Topol-M” and “Bulava,” and the U.S. isn’t,” Lewis writes. “Therefore, monitoring measures are only burdensome to the United States.”

At the Votkinsk plant (Udmurtia), Russia produces Topol-M missiles as ICBMs with multiple independently targeted RS-24. Under START-I, American inspectors have the right to monitor the perimeter of the enterprise, while the Russians cannot be present at a compatible facility in the United States; America ceased production of the Peacekeeper missile, and Russia lost the right to monitor the plant in Utah. Meanwhile, 20 U.S. inspectors continuously monitor Votkinsk. At the exit of the plant, the output is monitored by American observers. Technical devices determine the dimensions of the cargo, and record and store the image, according to Interfax. Information is transmitted to the data collection center, where foreign personnel are on duty around the clock.

If the car passes, that is, its size is less than the length of the rocket, observers raise the barrier and a green light signal goes off. All large cars are subject to scrutiny. In addition, at least twice a day, in all weather conditions, inspectors walk around the facility’s perimeter.

Moscow, pointing out the unilateral nature of such monitoring, wants the American inspectors to pack their bags and go home when START-I expires on December 5th.

Disagreements also arose regarding technical information on the missiles, which Russia and the U.S. are in the process of testing. Russia is testing new missiles, such as Topol and Bulava, while the United States is conducting “relatively uninteresting tests of Millenium III Glory Trip, which are already stored in the warehouse,” according to Lewis.

At the request of the Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie to comment on the statements made by the American, Russia’s military expert, who wishes to remain anonymous due to the confidential status of the negotiations, said that the problems were described accurately. During their meeting in Singapore, when asked whether presidents Obama and Medvedev would be able to remove them by a strong-willed political solution, our interviewee suggested that this should be done by the experts, indicating the teams headed by the U.S. Undersecretary of State Rose Getemyuller and Director of the Department of Foreign Ministry of Russia Anatoly Antonov, who are negotiating in Geneva.

In turn, candidate of military sciences, Major General Vladimir Belous, who retired, noted in an interview with NVO, “The Americans want to keep the current system of verification to get intelligence on what’s happening in the area of missile and nuclear weapons of Russia. These inspections at Votkinsk plant would benefit only the United States.” The expert, however, looks differently at the affordability of tactical and technical characteristics of the missiles, which provide data telemetry. He notes, “The START Treaty provided for the exchange of data telemetry, which is transmitted to earth by the rocket during testing. It promotes greater transparency and trust. In the period of the preparation for new agreement it is hardly practical to depart from the measures of transparency.” In addition, the expert pointed out that Americans are testing anti-missile weapons and obtaining corresponding telemetry data that would be favorable to Russia.

Lewis points out the attitudes of a number of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency representatives, who are advocating for encrypting telemetry data transmitted by missiles. The agency uses the Minuteman II missiles as targets in missile defense tests, and the U.S. is obliged under the terms of START to give Russia all the telemetry data on the Minuteman II. In the end, this information may reveal the purpose of flight testing and missile characteristics. “I think some American officials fear that Russia may use unencrypted data sent by Minuteman II missiles during the missile tests to obtain information about the capabilities of interceptor missiles,” says Lewis.

The American specialist further revealed that Russians seek to increase on-site inspections, allowing conclusions to be drawn about the actual number of warheads on carriers (Re-entry Vehicle On Site Inspection – RVOSI). Back in May of this year, U.S. Congressional Research Service reported, “The U.S. Navy sends word that Russia’s demands for inspections of warheads on U.S. submarines carrying ballistic missiles may interfere with the operation plans and operations of the submarine … Restrictions on the number of warheads on strategic offensive arms, which can be removed from sea-based missiles Trident, can also disrupt the future plans for the deployment of the Navy.” According to Lewis, Moscow, insisting on such inspections tries to address the problem of American “retaliation potential.”

“The Russians cut their strategic nuclear forces, destroying the missiles, and the U.S. largely dismantled warheads and as result, have a significant quantitative advantage (in stockpiled warheads),” writes Lewis. Moscow fears that Washington could quickly reestablish stockpiled warheads on the carriers and, therefore, is seeking a substantial reduction in the number of nuclear delivery vehicles.

As previously reported by Washington Post, in late October, U.S. Assistant to the President for National Security James Jones may have brought to Moscow a compromise on the number of carriers – about 700 units. However, recently, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Ellen Tausher reported that Washington was very disappointed with Moscow’s response to Jones’ proposal. It seems that Votkinsk and telemetry, along with other unknown differences, still prevail. However, Moscow takes the position that nothing is settled until an agreement has been reached.