The US Uses Sensitive Issues as Bargaining Chips in Dealing with Brazil

International relations scholars are well aware of a negotiation strategy that links different issues together and establishes concessions in certain areas in order to advance the discussion of other subjects. The issue linkage strategy assumes that the simultaneous discussion of more than one subject allows the establishment of a bargaining game that increases the odds of the United States reaching a consensus, and motivates the parties to remain committed to an agreement.

However, in the case of relations between countries with asymmetric capacities — like the United States and Brazil — this strategy can become an instrument of political subordination. This seems to be the case once again.

The American ambassador in Brasilia, Todd Chapman, gathered with a select group in a virtual meeting a few days ago. Brazilian diplomats, politicians and entrepreneurs attended the meeting. Former state ministers such as Joaquim Levy and Sergio Moro were in the audience, as well as Rubens Barbosa, the former Brazilian ambassador to Washington, D.C., and Luiz Fernando Furlan, the current chairman of the board of the LIDE Group of Business Leaders.

Chapman said that issues such as a possible free trade agreement between the two countries and the United States’ support for Brazil’s entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development will depend on the commitments to be presented by Brazil at the Climate Leaders Summit, organized by Joe Biden on April 22 and 23. When asked about the destination of the COVID-19 vaccine surplus, he only said that there are ongoing conversations. Nevertheless, several who attended the meeting speculate that a change in the Brazilian government’s attitude may be required in order for vaccines to be sent to the country.

The ambassador was emphatic about the U.S. government’s concern about the increase in illegal deforestation in the Amazon, and refuted the government’s thesis that this is a “communication problem.” The intention is that the external pressure will lead Brazil to commit to zeroing this practice by 2030 and that Jair Bolsonaro’s government will assume a leadership role in the area, mobilizing joint efforts by the public and private sectors to preserve the biome.

Aside from the environmental issue, the ambassador also highlighted the importance of advancing tax reform in Brazil and the issue of 5G technology as other sensitive issues for the United States. The American business community is pushing for an agreement to deal with double taxation in both markets. Regarding 5G, the intention is to restrict the participation of the Chinese company Huawei in Brazil’s frequency auction process. The Americans’ argument revolves around the commitment to data protection and the possible risks of passing on confidential information to the Chinese government.

None of this is new. For instance, during the Bolsonaro government, Brazil has already agreed to make a series of concessions in support of joining the OECD. In the first year of Bolsonaro’s term, Brazil exempted U.S. citizens from the visa requirement to enter the country without applying the policy of reciprocity. Complying with the request for access control by the United States, the Brazilian government also yielded part of the Alcântara Base.

More importantly, Brazil’s administration considered giving up special treatment as a developing country in the World Trade Organization. Relinquishing this status would mean giving up specific prerogatives in trade agreements and advantages such as lower costs and longer terms in the search for international credit.

All this is not to mention other aspects of an automatic alignment to Trumpism, the changes in voting patterns in the United Nations Human Rights Council and the approximation of the policies proposed by the United States for Cuba and Venezuela.

In this new juncture, it seems clear that increasing the flow of trade and investments, ensuring priority in receiving vaccines or the access to the desired OECD seal will depend on the Brazilian government and its willingness to do its homework according to American expectations.

It is a well known fact that international politics relies on the defense of national interests and that this implies constantly equating costs and benefits. In a negotiation, the natural thing to do is to look for mutual adjustments. Therefore, compromising is not necessarily a problem. The point is to recognize that one’s stock in power, associated with its reputation, leaves much room for alternative movement. In these circumstances, we are primarily responsible for being behind the eight-ball.