The Nationalist Drift of World Powers

When neoconservatism failed to take roots in the U.S., it generated a double sense of insecurity typical of great powers in decline. This insecurity masks domestic struggles (the U.S. economic and cultural domination is slowly fading, while military supremacy cannot attain peace because of the absence of military success). It also masks the increasingly frequent external threats (in the midst of a global war against the terrorists who stand in opposition to the world order that America wants to impose, the nation is psychologically reminiscent of a citadel under siege, while the society whose dynamism was once fueled by immigration is closing its frontiers to newcomers).

Consequently, the American people are trying to muster their strength from nationalism, an archaic means of socializing and a source of metaphysical certainty. Although this is a nation which went through a process of globalization before globalization itself even existed, the U.S. is now ever more nationalist. Conversely, the other countries are following the example of the U.S. and forming unions. The democratic background of the U.S. means that it is more likely to revert to isolationism, in spite of the fact that nationalism generally leads to war. Emerging powers can steer toward nationalism as well. First, there is China.

With a record-high economic growth and demographic advantages consisting of a large, patient and disciplined population that is content with its elites, China may appear to some as more and more confident. This newly acquired confidence provides the country with excessive courage and decisiveness in its international relations.

Others, however, interpret China’s stubborn refusal to cooperate in order to clarify certain issues (such as the Yuan evaluation, the growth of domestic consumption, compliance with trademark regulations and the freedom of internet communications) as the manifestation of the lack of confidence in its own powers. This insecurity could stem from domestic socio-economic discrepancies, or the social threats that cannot be avoided when a market economy meets an authoritarian political regime.

Both the people who are afraid of this new superpower and the ones who point out its weaknesses often consider that the security of traditional powers would increase if the rise of China came to a stop. For this purpose, human rights have become a means to an aim. The global competitiveness of the country would diminish if the Chinese society became less cohesive. And one way to achieve that is by convincing Chinese citizens that the only happiness they can obtain lies in the division of power between the individual and the state, as found in the Western notion of human rights. A notion that the Chinese have not become acquainted with and have therefore been unable to miss.

If faced with a cultural and political humiliation of such caliber, China will surely choose the path of nationalism. And this path will change the relationship between the leaders and the people, and will affect not only its domestic development, but the security of the entire world.

The European Union is interested in a Chinese superpower that can contribute to global equilibrium, that opts for universalism, with its archetypal myths, instead of nationalism, with its tribal myths; the universalism that makes it possible for the Chinese to be part of a peaceful world order, instead of the nationalism that triggers exclusion and confrontations. The EU must not let this interest slip from view when it formulates its policies towards Beijing.