The Key to Resolving the Diaoyu Islands Issue

The present conflict between China and Japan over the Diaoyu Islands — sparked by the detention of a Chinese fishing boat — touched the tense nerve between China and Japan right from the start. The public focus was immediately on whether the captain of the boat, Captain Zhan, would be released and when. The two governments’ diplomatic confrontation has also grown in intensity and is becoming unstoppable. This has quickly turned the emotions of the two nations’ people toward an intense confrontation. After Captain Zhan was released, the focus quickly shifted to whether the Japanese would apologize.

To resolve the conflict on the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan is not simply a military issue. Neither is it simply a diplomatic issue. It is certainly not a simple economic issue. It is a major strategic issue bound by the geopolitical structure in Southeast Asia between China, Japan and the U.S. To determine victory on the Diaoyu Islands conflict simply by the determination of military might, the toughness of diplomatic methods or the losses and gains of economic interests helps neither in gaining a grasp on the nature of things nor finding the key to resolving the issue.

Whether this crisis was a chance occurrence or the result of the intentional planning of one of the parties would require more time and the disclosure of more information in order to be verified. However, the development of the situation has people confounded. From Japan’s point of view, the Diaoyu Islands are, in fact, already under its military control. Logically, there was no need to intentionally create an incident about a Chinese fishing boat trespassing boundaries to catch fish and give rise to a conflict between the two nations without any practical benefits. From China’s point of view, expending such huge diplomatic, economic and political resources, whether actively or passively, cannot change the fact that the Diaoyu Islands are already under Japan’s practical control.

It is precisely practical control that is China’s key to regaining the Diaoyu Islands. The Chinese fishing boat captain had to be released sooner or later. Whether there would be apologies is a dilemma for both sides. With the eyes of the agitated people of the two nations — as well as the eyes of the entire world — on China and Japan, both sides would choose to continue the standoff if neither of them could make a graceful exit. The Japanese are worried that if they have to apologize, even after they have released the captain, would they continue to vie for the Diaoyu Islands after the apology? The Chinese are worried that since the Japanese wanted to try Captain Zhan with their domestic law this time around — even if they have released him — it would still leave the bad record of Japan practically owning the Diaoyu Islands. Japan had to release the man, but even after they had done so, the matter is still not resolved! What can be done if the case is not closed? Unless China is already determined to fight for the Diaoyu Islands, there is no practical benefit in fighting with the Japanese for an apology.

The winding and uncertain development of the situation probably has to do with the Naoto Kan administration’s lack of diplomatic experience in handling the highly sensitive Sino-Japan issues, as well as Naoto Kan’s personal extreme fear of America. It could also be due to the lack of a major, comprehensive and implementable future strategy for repossessing the Diaoyu Islands, or even an in-depth study of the future strategic direction of China, the U.S. and Japan in the entire East Asian region. After the incident had occurred, it was unavoidable that, under the pressure of public discourses in their own countries, both sides lost their cool, misjudged each other and fought over long-term strategic considerations and lack of details. Whatever the cause may be, such an incident has become hard to contain since its inception. In the end, when the two nations head toward a larger-scale confrontation, it is of no benefit to the people of China and Japan.

If we retrace the history of the formation of the Diaoyu Islands issue, we can easily see that the U.S. was the hand behind everything. To divide and conquer was a strategy taken from the treasured book of conquest handed down by the Anglo-Saxons, the forefathers of the U.K. and the U.S. who dominated the world for a few centuries. When China and Japan fight over an island to the point that both sides suffer losses — if they did not have the wisdom to understand the strategic meaning of the knot that America tied more than 40 years ago — neither of these nations is fit to be a world leader, no matter how large their economies have become. Once China and Japan have the Diaoyu Islands to vie for, the U.S. will have a firm hold of the strategic initiative of the interaction among China, America and Japan. Due to the special alliance formed between Japan and the U.S. after World War II, unless the integrated strength of the politics, economy and military affairs of both China and Japan, or either one of the two, have reached or exceeded America’s level, China and Japan cannot leave the U.S. out of the picture and establish deep strategic cooperation by themselves. Even if the Diaoyu Islands dispute is resolved, they cannot escape the influence of the American factor.

　

To regain the Diaoyu Islands, China would have to pressure Japan at the right time, and Japan would have to lean on the U.S. and seek the protection of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan. If China were not able to mend the Sino-U.S. relationship at this point, the U.S. would surely use Japan to hold down China and cause the price for China to regain the Diaoyu Islands through its military to be exceedingly high — or even face such unfathomable risks that it has to be abandoned. If Japan tries to shake off the U.S. and heads toward political and military independence, the U.S. can, in the same way, claim that the Diaoyu Islands belong to China, and that it merely handed the jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands over to Japan in 1972, thus using China’s power to hold down Japan and benefiting from the situation.

In the foreseeable 10 to 30 years, the gap in the national powers between China and the U.S. will gradually close, while the gap between China and Japan will gradually be widened. The rise of China is unstoppable, and when the U.S.’ effort to hold it down proves ineffective, the U.S. will have no choice but to start cooperating with China to obtain the maximum benefits and minimize the risks. In actuality, the Sino-U.S. relationship has been progressing exactly along this line. During the process, holding down Japan will be to the mutual benefit of China and the U.S. The first thing that former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton did when he took office in August 2005 was to meet China’s Ambassador to the United Nations Wang Guangya, and they reached a consensus on stopping Japan from applying to be permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, instantly shattering Japan’s dream to be a permanent member. If the cooperation between China and the U.S. on this important matter of national interest is ignored, and the two nations are engaged in a vicious collision, the strategic balance between the three nations will be damaged. The one that will suffer the most will be China.

Going by the present development, Japan’s national power will gradually decline. In contrast to China’s development prospects, Japan’s potential has been exhausted. In the contest between China, the U.S. and Japan in the days ahead, Japan will become the weakest of the three. If China can, in this difficult development process, withstand America’s pressure and clearly admit America’s leadership status, maintaining with the U.S. all the strategic cooperation that is of common interest within the scope of the world, a necessary strategic space for China’s peaceful rise will be created. We can foresee that if Sino-U.S. relations are smooth, we will not see too many complications in Sino-Japan relations.

In regaining the Diaoyu Islands, China should also survey the strategic setup between the three major powers that are China, the U.S. and Japan once again and work out a national strategy that is far-sighted, yet operable. When the national powers of China can stand toe-to-toe with the U.S., it is totally possible for China to have certain strategic exchanges with the U.S. to gain America’s support and regain the Diaoyu Islands without shedding a drop of blood.