After the De-listing of N-Korea As a State Sponsor of Terrorism

The future of the North Korean nuclear issue after the de-listing of North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism

On October 11, the United States removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. It was twenty years and nine months since the U.S. put North Korea on the list in 1988 following the KAL airliner explosion incident.

Having achieved its desire of twenty years, North Korea will soon likely turn in the verification plan – as agreed to with the U.S. – of its nuclear facilities to China, the chair of the Six-Party talks, and with the confirmation of the Six-Party participants, resume the disablement process of the nuclear facilities that it had suspended since this August. If so, the nuclear negotiations will for now return to its original track after having been derailed for over three months.

North Korea had worsened the situation by threatening the suspension of disablement and restoration of nuclear facilities, proclaiming that the U.S. was failing to uphold its promise of removing North Korea from the terrorism sponsors’ list. Combined with the rumors that Kim Jong Il’s health had deteriorated, North Korea’s move had even raised the fear that the North Korean military, which has been asking for keeping nuclear weapons, had seized control of foreign policy. Even after North Korea is removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, many trade sanctions related to the printing and distribution of narcotics and counterfeit money, as well as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remain in place, making it difficult for North Korea to reap immediate benefits. North Korea will, however, be able to request aid from the international financial sector and increase the import of American goods.

Nevertheless, the negotiations between the U.S. and North Korea that took place between North Korea’s declaration of nuclear activities in June and now have left an undesirable precedent. At first, the U.S. called for verification in line with international standards that would allow inspection not only of the facilities declared by North Korea but also any suspicious facilities, as specified in Six-Party joint statements hitherto released. This agreement, however, asks only for the inspection of those facilities declared by North Korea, and undeclared facilities can only be inspected with North Korea’s approval on a case-by-case basis. Without the Bush administration’s desperation for diplomatic triumphs in the closing days of the term, this sort of yielding without principles would have not happened.

The North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs said on the 12th that it will cooperate with the inspections; this, however, only pertains to the facilities it declared. North Korea will not easily agree to inspections on its undeclared facilities. Our [South Korean] foreign ministry also said that some expressions in the agreement were “indirect” or “condensed” with regard to the North Korean position.

No country outdoes North Korea in offering a solitary, unique interpretation of something that many have agreed upon. In such a country, we have failed to call a spade a spade, instead we are using “indirect” and “condensed” expressions. No doubt another storm will be raised during the concretization of the agreement. Moreover, since North Korea’s typical strategy of making unreasonable demands has worked again this time, we cannot foretell when North Korea will pull out this trump again and turn unreasonable. Although a collapse has been averted, the negotiation process must face further obstacles.

At least from now on, South Korea and the U.S. should draft a clear plan to proceed from disablement to the destruction of nuclear weapons while verifying the fulfillment of the agreed process one by one, and prepare strategies to implement said plan, even if it takes some time.