America and the Middle East after the Egyptian Earthquake

I am writing this article on Thursday, when it seems that an imminent transition of power will take place in Egypt, and the Egyptian army is emerging as the new authority to manage the transition process. These changes come after hours of exchange of open criticism between the Mubarak government and the U.S. administration, reflecting a difference in opinion between the two sides on how to manage the transitional period. It looks like the U.S. prefers to see new people in power. The question here is whether the manner in which the U.S. managed the present crisis reflects a change in its strategic thought regarding the region; additionally, what sort of change does the U.S. want to see in Egypt and perhaps elsewhere in the region?

It is nothing new to say that there are three main factors governing U.S. strategy in the Middle East. The first factor is the guarantee of oil being supplied to global markets, and an independence from oil supplies held by forces in the region hostile to the U.S.; the second is maintaining the security, and ultimately the survival, of Israel; and the third is preventing the rise of anti-American streams in the region, an effort that expresses itself in relation to the first two factors.

Indeed, the Iranian Revolution and what followed the rise of fundamentalist power was a major influence in the formation of U.S. policy toward the Middle East. This policy focused on preserving a ruling elite in the region opposed to fundamentalism. These elite rulers, which declared “the threat of fundamentalism” the only alternative to their rule, thereby secured themselves legitimacy in the international community. Nonetheless, this policy still causes embarrassment for the U.S. and for Western powers in general, which consider democracy, especially after the end of the Cold War, the only legitimate source of authority. They continue, however, to make ideological statements when commenting on the Middle East issue, and there is talk about “independence.”

However, the more important source of embarrassment was the danger represented by the current stalemate occurring in the U.S.-protected Middle East, and the possibility that the stalemate might break and become volatile, resulting in social unrest and hostile political uprisings. Besides, there are great material, military and moral costs required to preserve the status quo.

A change in thought occurred on Sept. 11, when there became no limit to what the U.S. would blame on terrorist groups like al-Qaida. The event reflected the level of hatred felt by the people of the Middle East toward the United States for its role as keeper of the status quo.

From here, the neoconservatives and the Bush administration constructed a new doctrine regarding the region. Faced with the dilemma of choosing between protecting the existing systems and abandoning them, that administration decided, based on the principle that the U.S. is in charge, to start the process of change by toppling Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq, and speaking about democratizing the region. But recent years have shown that democratization via occupation costs much more than maintaining the status quo. Likewise, it results in contradictions between the aim of empowering the people and building a new regime compatible with U.S. interests. Not to mention that this step was taken in a country with a very complicated ethnic and sectarian composition, so the democratization process turned into an effort to rebuild the nation and define its nature and identity. This led to the defeat of the Republicans and the rise of the Democrats to power. Subsequently, Democrats have tried to undo the Bush doctrine and alleviate the costs of war.

One might say that the Obama administration inherited a strategic paradox in the region, and that it did not formulate a new principle for dealing with conflict. It decided instead to deal with events as they happened. And events began to change with the social, political and economic crises occurring in Middle Eastern countries — crises that ultimately resulted in the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions.

Here, the U.S. found itself facing a situation that required a new policy and a choice between supporting the old regime in a losing battle, and aligning itself with a rising opposition that would take power sooner or later. It is neither preferable to grant power to the more radical ones nor to stand by idly waiting for the natural results of the conflict to arise and deal with them in turn.

One might also say that the U.S. never took the whole region into account after determining its strategy in Egypt; instead, they retreated from their alliances with authoritarian regimes when those regimes faced serious popular challenges. Instead of resisting change, they decided to push for change that could be controlled and would not lead to results completely incompatible with their strategic interests in the region.

We are here to redefine the relationship between the Middle East and the major world powers. It seems that the reliance on international legitimacy was not good enough to last. Using the excuse that the region is not ready for democracy is not acceptable, especially given the popular nature of the movement, which rolls back the theory that the only alternative is fundamentalist extremism.