The Re-education of Russia

Four weeks prior to the presidential election in the United States, the chances of Barack Obama becoming the next master of the White House seem even more substantial. The black senator’s potential victory will create a new situation, to which Moscow will have to react. And it doesn’t matter what approach the democratic team will take when it comes to Russia. The general context of American foreign policy will change, and if Russia does not correct its approach, it may be at a disadvantage.

The administration of George W. Bush beat all records of unpopularity at home and on the world stage. The combination of enormous ambition, ideological bias, arrogance with respect to its partners, aggressive pursuit of its interests at all costs, disregard of the standards of international co-existence, reliance on military force and incompetence in several key areas have made the U.S. a model of how not to behave.

Obama’s message is restoring American leadership, using methods completely different from the ones on which the previous administration heavily relied. The manner in which the U.S. behaves is expected to change, which will make a particularly strong impression due to its contrast with how it acted under George W. Bush. Obama calls for a dialogue and emphasizes the need to strengthen international institutions and multilateral approaches. By itself, this rhetoric will establish a favorable political environment surrounding the future administration.

Furthermore, Obama is popular around the world. Europe (especially its western part) sees in him a chance for transatlantic closeness based on valuable and intellectual affinity, not coercion. Third world countries, of course, will not overlook the fact that a non-white face represents the sole superpower. All in all, the value for global politics of electing Obama remains to be determined; the event, if it happens, would be out of the ordinary, and would signal fundamental shifts.

All of this does not mean that American politics will radically change and that the U.S. will suddenly be reborn, and abandon the idea of world domination. The success of the new approach is not too probable – a reliance on international institutions in their current condition of obvious degradation is unlikely to lead to the desired result.

It’s also hard to imagine that the White House would be willing to initiate a large-scale reform of global governance. Because then, the U.S. would have to share its “authority”, and America is hardly ready for this. Nevertheless, a change in its intonation and the declaration of a new agenda will influence the world atmosphere. What does this mean for Russia?

During the years of George W. Bush’s leadership, Washington became a self-appointed scapegoat. Against the backdrop of stupidities, mistakes and arrogance of the most powerful country on the planet, the actions of the other participants of international relations appeared much more harmless. And the attempts by the U.S. to hold them responsible for their actions provoked sarcasm.

The change in the image of the U.S., which is likely in the event of Obama’s victory, leaves a vacant spot of “the pole of revulsion”. And Russia might fill this vacancy, if it doesn’t correct the way it behaves, and the language it uses to speak to the world.

Prior to the recent events, Moscow took a firm position in its support of international law and collective action to solve world problems. This approach was irritating to many, but it was hard to argue with – Russia stood for clear principles. Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia made this approach by Moscow questionable. Let’s not discuss whether the Kremlin had any other options in this situation. In any event, it is necessary to clearly demonstrate that the undertaken actions were a forced exception, and the general course of Russia on collectivism in politics has not changed.

Otherwise, it will turn out that Moscow has adopted Washington’s practice of “everyone does whatever he’s strong enough to accomplish,” at a time when Americans are trying – with the approval of the rest of the world – to distance themselves from this very thing.

It’s necessary for Russia to intercept the theme of reform of international institutions before it’s seriously taken up by the new U.S. administration. There’s a need for specific initiatives to transform the global system, which is not functioning as it should. Meanwhile, ritual curses against a single-pole world make much less sense – they don’t accomplish anything new, because they’ve become commonplace. And criticism, without any specific ideas to change the situation, is simply annoying.

France is a good example. It’s impossible to accuse the leaders of this country of not worrying about its prestige, or not pursuing national interests. But all of this, they pack into large regional and global initiatives, whose declared purpose is the solution of various general problems. China is another example. Beijing is not yet very advanced in terms of the advancement of global projects, but its entire foreign policy is carried out under the banner of achieving universal harmony and universal good. This, however, does not interfere with China’s systematic strengthening of its position worldwide.

Against this backdrop, the amazing candor with which Russia designates its goals and objectives throughout its foreign policy does not disarm its partners and competitors, but rather arms them. For example, the statement that Russia has a sphere of “privileged interests” is obviously doomed, destined to be used against whoever says it. That’s because there is no chance of anyone endorsing it – why would anyone support the claim by another country to special rights?

In Russian politics, there are elements of initiative-taking approach that shine through, which have the potential to obtain a more or less widespread support. For example, Russia even in 2007, during the election of the managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), put forward an alternative candidate and sought a major reform of the fund. Back then, everyone deemed this as just another attempt by Moscow to demonstrate its own significance and “ruin the party” for Europe and the U.S. But now, in the midst of a global financial crisis, the complete failure of IMF is quite evident, and Russian one-and-a-half-year-old ideas could appear in a different light, if Russia actively expanded a campaign for the continuation of those initiatives.

Dmitry Medvedev’s proposals of a new Atlantic safety system, suggested this year in June, fall in the same category. It’s necessary to not only remind partners about them during meetings, but also constantly improve them, augmenting them with new concrete proposals. We’ve already made a step in that direction yesterday in Evian – that step being the five-point plan, promulgated by the President of Russia, which creates a good reason to continue a serious conversation on this topic. But it must be initiated again and again.

Every country is guided by self-interest; this is an axiom of foreign relations. But to achieve it, everyone strives to ensure the lowest resistance by the external environment. The proud and constantly-repeated public proclamation of national interests being the only guiding star for Russian foreign policy pleases listeners inside the country, but achieves nothing from the point of view of getting support from the outside. And even creates conditions for a demonstration of how Russia transforms into “the bad guy” – badly brought up and selfish.