Saudi-Iranian Negotiations … without America?

Sarkis Naoum wrote an article in Nahar entitled “Saudi-Iranian Negotiations without America,” which broke the news concerning the partial withdrawal of Saudi troops, otherwise known as the “Peninsula Shield,” from Bahrain a few weeks ago. This seems quite curious to the Arab world, which generally fears Bahrain’s Shiite majority and their ally, Islamic Iran. This also raised questions about the reasons and motivations for the move. The diplomatic views and other American research satisfied the raised questions and curiosity once they received information confirming the meetings held in recent weeks between Tehran and Riyadh.

The Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran provided the first hint, while the Deputy Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia provided the second. The symbiotic relationship between the two countries was evident in Iran’s negotiations with Kuwait, which failed because of Saudi Arabia’s desire to lead the Gulf Cooperation Council. Their desire is based upon the conviction that Iran has always adopted a policy of cooperation with more than one party so as to highlight and capitalize upon the kinds of differences which would allow the country to achieve several breakthroughs in its interests…

The most prominent example of this concerned the international negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program. Saudi Arabia attempted to dissuade Iran from sowing dissension within the P5+1 group and other important countries such as Turkey and Brazil.

Did the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inform its number one ally in the world, the United States, of its direct negotiations with Iran devoid of a partner? Why would they have done such a thing?

According to information agencies and American diplomatic research, senior officials in Saudi Arabia have been fully briefing the department on all communications between Washington and Tehran for some time. They also suggested to Washington that Iran and Iraq have cooperated, specifically in regards to operations in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Washington has been allegedly trying to get the approval of an official Iraqi extension of the agreement for the U.S. troop withdrawal from Iraq for some time, which would allow them to keep nearly 10,000 troops in Iraq. The United States knows that this would be difficult due to the good relations between the actual “rulers” in Iraq and their ally Iran.

The U.S. knows that Iran does not want to be perceived as the unquestioned catalyst for the numerous assaults on American forces in Iraq, as well as on the interests of the United States and its own civilian population. The U.S. is expected to accept Iran’s influential and important role in Iraq. The reasons for this are many and varied. Saudi Arabia seems to say to itself, “If Americans are reluctant to include Saudi Arabia in their negotiations with Iran, which generally concern the Gulf and Saudi Arabia in particular, why should we cooperate with the U.S. in negotiations with the Iranians?”

In the opinion of Riyadh, this question stems from the fact that the U.S. does not have a clear strategy to prevent Iran from filling the security and military vacuum in Iraq after the withdrawal of U.S. troops, nor does it have the capacity to implement this ban. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is not sure that America will be able to support it if Iran wins this confrontation. Finally, Saudi Arabia fears that any deal between the U.S. and Iran is susceptible to difficulties.

What is the impact Saudi-Iranian negotiations will have on the United States in the event they resume? Diplomatic agencies and American research provide the same answer: The administration would be put in a difficult and precarious position. Washington needs to negotiate with Iran to build its effectiveness and influence in Iraq. Any direct or bilateral negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Iran could inflict serious damage on America’s aspirations. Moreover, knowing that bilateral negotiations have achieved relative calm in Bahrain, Washington cannot be sure of the direction that these negotiations will take.

But what would the U.S. reaction be if the negotiations between Tehran and Riyadh are extended and include the withdrawal of the American Fifth Fleet in Bahrain in return for Iran’s firm and definite guarantee of Saudi Arabian security? Of course, Saudi officials hope that the White House will pay for this because of Washington’s commitment to saving face and rejecting the use of force against Iran. This is in spite of the fact that it prevents the U.S. from reaching a successful settlement with Iran. But the real problem is the fact that America is perceived to have a weaker influence than Iran.