Why the Rise of India Is a Problem for the US

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the U.S. on Oct. 29 in a trip widely interpreted as an effort to repair Indian-U.S. relations, which have largely suffered over the past two years. Although India has not affirmed its support for an “Asian NATO” or the U.S. “pivot to Asia” strategy, many analysts in the U.S. believe that regardless of whether India is subjectively willing to join hands with the U.S. in checking China, a strong India would objectively be capable of acting as a restraint against China within Asia.

After Modi’s election, the U.S. immediately cancelled a ban against his entering its territory, which had been imposed nearly 10 years ago. Obama also extended an immediate invitation to the new prime minister, demonstrating the significance of relations with India to the United States, as well as its relationship with Modi himself. But this was not to say that the differences between the two nations had been resolved, nor did it indicate that the U.S. was truly willing to allow the emergence of a powerful India.

The growth of the Indian economy has presented an enormous challenge to the United States. Like many other developed countries, the U.S. has moved a large portion of its manufacturing abroad. The service sector is now the pillar of its economy, accounting for over 60 percent of its gross domestic product. Although India is a developing country, over half of its GDP is derived from the service sector, and receiving outsourced service jobs from more developed countries has turned the field into India’s fastest-growing industry. U.S. workers’ unions and some members of Congress have complained of India taking service-sector job opportunities from Americans.

Recently, U.S. think tanks have been issuing estimates that India will eventually overtake China, and that the Chinese economy will surpass that of the U.S. in the near future. If these predictions prove valid, then the question will not be how well the U.S. can play second fiddle but rather, whether or not its seat in third place will remain secure.

The rise of India will limit the freedom of U.S. action in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Some Indians interpret the Indian Ocean as “India’s ocean,” and maintain a wary and unwelcoming attitude toward foreign powers operating in the region. In 1983, the iron lady of South Asia, Indira Gandhi, raised the idea of a Monroe Doctrine for India, the “Indira Doctrine.” The U.S. military base on the central Indian Ocean atoll of Diego Garcia is seen by some in India as a stronghold prepared to oppose it. If India’s power as a nation grows, the re-emergence of the Indira Doctrine may become a real possibility, and if such a time should come, the U.S. will likely face a far greater challenge than it currently does in the West Pacific.

There exists a dichotomy between the global pluralism India supports and the unipolar hegemony of the United States. As the sole superpower at present, the U.S. is both the master and beneficiary of international political and economic regulations, as well as the guardian preserving the current world order. As emergent powers, India and China will likely want those regulations that are unfavorable to them changed, a decentralization of the authority currently held by the United States, and the establishment of a new international political and economic order. And while India calls itself the “world’s largest democracy,” it harbors a strong sense of cultural superiority over the United States, and its criticism and opposition of U.S. dominance on international issues will be even more blunt than China’s. India’s recent rejection of a World Trade Organization agreement at a meeting on the island of Bali was just such a wrinkle in the forehead of the United States. India’s rise will symbolize the arrival of a new multipolar world order, one that has been fundamentally achieved, and the U.S. will naturally see its days as the sole superpower come to a close.

RAND Corporation political scientist Eric Heginbotham and others have criticized the view that China is the foremost competitor of the United States, while assuming that India is a natural ally. They believe that like China, a rising India will rock the boat, and that the U.S. must anticipate that possibility and prepare accordingly. The U.S. must avoid strengthening New Delhi only to find that Washington cannot control it, as well as guard against unwarranted optimism regarding an alliance between the two nations. What is certain is that U.S. support for India in the present day can be likened to its alliance with China in decades past to oppose the Soviet Union; both may be called alliances of convenience, but hardly long-term strategies.

The author is a research fellow at the Charhar Institute and an associate professor of China West Normal University.