Trump Unties Recep Erdogan’s Hands in Northern Syria

The ease with which Donald Trump crossed off the long months of negotiations between the U.S. and Turkey over the so-called security mechanism concerning northern Syria, east of the Euphrates, is frightening.

This security mechanism was supposed to create a security zone, a buffer perimeter made up of three layers, one of which would consist of a joint Turkish-American patrol. The main part of the security zone envisaged the withdrawal of Kurdish forces from there, along with their heavy weapons, as well as the destruction of Kurdish fortifications along the Syrian-Turkish border.

The only motivation for the Kurds in this part of Syria to carry out their part of the deal and abide by American pressure, which was viewed as intermediary with respect to Turkey, was the guarantee the U.S. provided that these steps would end a third Turkish military operation there.

However, one phone call between Trump and Recep Erdogan was enough to remove the deterrent effect the American forces were having in northern Syria, which was actually the reason for the U.S. military’s deployment there. The U.S. was serving as a guarantee against Turkey’s expansionist foreign policy rather than a guarantee against Bashar Assad, who, in any case, has no control over his territory. By withdrawing the U.S. military (or rather pulling into northern Syria along the Euphrates river), Trump gives the green light to his Turkish counterpart to launch an almost official military action on Syrian territory.

Russian President Vladimir Putin took the same action early last year, and then ordered the withdrawal of Russian military police stationed in Afrin and kindly “invited” Ankara to invade the northwestern district in question (operation “Olive Branch”).

If the goal of Turkey in the complex and protracted negotiations with its American counterparts was to make the Kurds relativize their positions all along, which would further facilitate a possible Turkish operation East of the Euphrates, then Erdogan has certainly achieved his goal by outsmarting Trump.

However, due to the lack of strategic vision and political courage, the decision of the American president regarding the situation in northern Syria echoes that of his predecessor, Barack Obama, who allowed Turkey to invade Syria in 2016 (operation “Euphrates Shield”). With this decision, Trump has certainly inflicted damage, the extent of which remains to be seen depending on the nature and dimension of the expected Turkish invasion.

To evaluate the situation, we will have to see: (1) whether it will affect the territory across northern Syria, liberated and ready for the Turkish invasion, or have an effect on a specific perimeter (from Tel Abyad to Ras al Ain, for example); (2) not only how wide, but also how deep the penetration of Turkish forces will be (there are rumors of an approximate 30-km (19-mile) incursion); (3) whether the United States will open airspace to the east of the Euphrates to Turkish aircraft; and (4) how Assad’s regime will respond. (There are rumors of mobilizing pro-government forces in the direction of Manbij.)

Despite the fact that Kurdish forces have already said they will defend themselves, and although the U.S. has not stopped supplying them with weapons, the Syrian Democratic Forces’ capabilities are extremely limited in the face of the regular Turkish army. Thus, the situation that has occurred is likely to further increase the trafficking of people, fighters and weapons along the Syrian-Iraqi border, which will further destabilize neighboring Iraq (especially against the backdrop of a wave of protests there, although they are taking place in central and southern Iraq).

The purpose of the Turkish offensive in northern Syria is clear: (1) neutralizing the Kurds, including the PKK and its local branch of the YPG, and, in perspective (2) changing the demographics of the Syrian part of the border, settling the Arab refugees there who are currently in Turkey (about 3.6 million people). In this regard, the upcoming Turkish operation in northern Syria is not much different from the first two (“Euphrates Shield” and “Olive Branch”).

Ankara’s third conventional military operation against northern Syria will certainly raise a big question about the deterrent effect that the U.S. administration and field military forces will have there from now on. In addition, it has become apparent that, when he is under systemic pressure, the American president is inclined to change his mind. Despite the fact that the Kurds in this part of the country have little choice (they are squeezed from the north by Turkey and from the south by Assad’s pro-government forces), it is certain that their cooperation with the U.S. will be marked by another bitter episode.

Yet when we talk about Ankara’s expansionist policy toward northern Syria (let’s not forget that Turkey has posts in and around Idlib, according to agreements with Russia and Iran), what is also striking are the different ways in which Erdogan has managed to achieve this position. While the Turkish president barely managed to plead his position to Putin, he mostly won his interests from Trump. And this is definitely not a good sign for the U.S. administration.