The Eight-Years War
A military victory in Afghanistan is impossible – but a military defeat could come in many different ways. A troop withdrawal is the wrong way to go because it would have dramatic consequences for NATO’s credibility.
German troops shouldn’t stay in Afghanistan one day longer than absolutely necessary. So says Dr. Peter Ramsauer, head of the CSU faction of the Christian Democrats. Much of what he said came straight from the heart: no one has ever thought any differently. But the decisive and still debatable question remains of how do we define “absolutely necessary?” And necessary for what?
Ever since parliament approved an expansion of military operations in Afghanistan on Thursday, the calls for an exit strategy have again become louder. The war in the Hindu Kush has already become the most costly multinational military and civilian assistance program in history. Eight years after the defeat of the Taliban, 50 nations, 1,000 aid organizations and 70,000 troops have been engaged in reconstructing Afghanistan. More than 200 billion Euros (currently about $290 billion) has been spent, but despite all this, no end is yet in sight.
One can assign two goals in retrospect to the war against the Taliban. First: to eradicate a stronghold of terrorism – a goal that has been at least partially attained. And second, to ensure that security and stability remain after the international military forces and civil assistance workers leave the country. That’s a state of affairs that still remains elusive.
But the order of the day is to remain in Afghanistan, restore balance, take stock and determine what’s lacking – and then start working energetically to solve the problems: a Taliban getting stronger by the day, the booming narcotics trade, a central government in Kabul that’s not taken seriously by the tribal warlords, the lack of international coordination, the innumerable promises made and never kept, such as the training of a police force. The European Union proposal to send 400 trainers was laughable from the outset, but they didn’t even send that many.
No, to withdraw now would result not only in complete chaos, it could result in a return to the nation’s status as a terrorist training ground. It would also make the military sacrifices made there meaningless and in vain. Iraq, where the Americans are currently withdrawing from the urban areas, should also not serve as a model. The conditions in Afghanistan are far too different for that. In Iraq, there was no terrorist activity, no narcotics trade and the terrain isn’t the same. Afghanistan has to go its own way.
There is no way to win the war in Afghanistan militarily, but there are many ways to lose it, and all of them would have dramatic repercussions for NATO’s credibility. If the strongest military alliance in the world can’t win against a few Taliban using homemade booby traps, it would have serious consequences for its deterrent capability. NATO’s threat – whoever attacks one of us, attacks us all – wouldn’t impress very many aggressors. It’s questionable whether that would make the world a safer place.
German troops shouldn’t stay in Afghanistan one day longer than absolutely necessary. So says Dr. Peter Ramsauer, head of the CSU faction of the Christian Democrats. Much of what he said came straight from the heart: no one has ever thought any differently. But the decisive and still debatable question remains of how do we define “absolutely necessary?” And necessary for what?
Ever since parliament approved an expansion of military operations in Afghanistan on Thursday, the calls for an exit strategy have again become louder. The war in the Hindu Kush has already become the most costly multinational military and civilian assistance program in history. Eight years after the defeat of the Taliban, 50 nations, 1,000 aid organizations and 70,000 troops have been engaged in reconstructing Afghanistan. More than 200 billion Euros (currently about $290 billion) has been spent, but despite all this, no end is yet in sight.
One can assign two goals in retrospect to the war against the Taliban. First: to eradicate a stronghold of terrorism – a goal that has been at least partially attained. And second, to ensure that security and stability remain after the international military forces and civil assistance workers leave the country. That’s a state of affairs that still remains elusive.
But the order of the day is to remain in Afghanistan, restore balance, take stock and determine what’s lacking – and then start working energetically to solve the problems: a Taliban getting stronger by the day, the booming narcotics trade, a central government in Kabul that’s not taken seriously by the tribal warlords, the lack of international coordination, the innumerable promises made and never kept, such as the training of a police force. The European Union proposal to send 400 trainers was laughable from the outset, but they didn’t even send that many.
No, to withdraw now would result not only in complete chaos, it could result in a return to the nation’s status as a terrorist training ground. It would also make the military sacrifices made there meaningless and in vain. Iraq, where the Americans are currently withdrawing from the urban areas, should also not serve as a model. The conditions in Afghanistan are far too different for that. In Iraq, there was no terrorist activity, no narcotics trade and the terrain isn’t the same. Afghanistan has to go its own way.
There is no way to win the war in Afghanistan militarily, but there are many ways to lose it, and all of them would have dramatic repercussions for NATO’s credibility. If the strongest military alliance in the world can’t win against a few Taliban using homemade booby traps, it would have serious consequences for its deterrent capability. NATO’s threat – whoever attacks one of us, attacks us all – wouldn’t impress very many aggressors. It’s questionable whether that would make the world a safer place.