The Clumsy Germans
The United States wants more German soldiers for Afghanistan. But before Germany agrees, the government has to clarify its objectives in this war.
For the first time in Germany’s modern history, a member of the government has had to step down because of German involvement in a foreign war. For a long time, German foreign policy was able to hold itself aloof by pointing to the nation’s history, particularly during World War II, in order to justify non-intervention; it also enjoyed media and public approval because of its pacifist positions.
Since reunification, however, Germany has lost any credible justification among world nations to flatly avoid interventionist policies. It is immaterial that a few romantics in the opposition parties try to convince voters that German foreign policy could return to those pre-reunification days. The fact is, a large majority in parliament favors German involvement in Afghanistan. All political factions, with the exception of the Left Party, accept the notion that Germany will have to revise its approach to problems in global politics. But a challenge remains for the government and its at times overburdened officials: how to handle this difficult problem. An answer is owed not only to those involved in party politics, but also to the soldiers sent to Afghanistan by an overwhelming majority in their government.
Germany is now involved for the first time in an opaque mélange of international, transnational and national politics, made all the more difficult by the Afghan government’s involvement in the narcotics trade and accusations of internal corruption. All this comes close to explaining the clumsy actions and reactions of German government officials. Even the foreign press, including the New York Times, is expressing sympathy over Germany’s foreign policy troubles.
But other than a general acceptance of the Afghanistan campaign, those responsible for Germany’s participation in it find it difficult to answer direct questions connected with it, such as whether it is actually a war or not, and whether the German soldiers killed there should be regarded as having been killed in wartime action. They are also finding it difficult to explain the balancing act between defending democratic freedoms and fighting terror.
This dilemma, and hence the necessary degree of democratic transparency, may have contributed to the fall of ex-Defense Minister Jung. Instead of immediately announcing the number of civilians killed in the air strike on hijacked oil tankers called in by the German military and apologizing for the error, the government tried to cover up the incident in the hope that, after a few weeks, people would no longer be interested in combat reports from Kundus.
Answers to the Afghanistan question are certainly not simple, especially for the people of Afghanistan. How valuable are water wells and schools given that, although they represent western standards and give the appearance of prosperity, their construction increases the danger of terrorist attacks and they thus become an issue of life and death?
Perhaps we should simply reflect on how we would react to situations in our own country like those faced by the Afghans in the past few months. Would we send our children to American-built schools or into the streets to fetch water from wells dug by western aid workers? And would we not worry that these schools and wells would have since ceased to exist had it not been for the western troops guarding them after they were built? From the Afghan point of view, there remains the question of support; the West can only hope for the support of the people against the Taliban and al-Qaeda if it remains credible. That is why a massive surge of German troops like the one proposed by the American president has to be considered.
Is such a thing even realistic these days in Germany? A way to start might be to consider the consequences of various scenarios and the formulation of different goals understandable to the German people. In view of the severity and complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, these scenarios could not be universally applicable. But a troop increase with a time limit oriented toward a specific legislative period would surely increase the transparency of the decision and the allocation of accountability as opposed to what voting would accomplish.
Furthermore, substantive goals backed up by metrics must be set so that improvements in the national situation may be measured, for example by school attendance numbers, quantity of wells completed, or improvements in the security situation.
This approach would have the added advantage of the West being able to set goals for the Afghan government in the areas of rooting out corruption or combating the narcotics trade. It is neither the Afghan people nor the German people who should decide why soldiers and civilian aid workers should risk their lives just to enrich the lives of a few people.
For the first time in Germany’s modern history, a member of the government has had to step down because of German involvement in a foreign war. For a long time, German foreign policy was able to hold itself aloof by pointing to the nation’s history, particularly during World War II, in order to justify non-intervention; it also enjoyed media and public approval because of its pacifist positions.
Since reunification, however, Germany has lost any credible justification among world nations to flatly avoid interventionist policies. It is immaterial that a few romantics in the opposition parties try to convince voters that German foreign policy could return to those pre-reunification days. The fact is, a large majority in parliament favors German involvement in Afghanistan. All political factions, with the exception of the Left Party, accept the notion that Germany will have to revise its approach to problems in global politics. But a challenge remains for the government and its at times overburdened officials: how to handle this difficult problem. An answer is owed not only to those involved in party politics, but also to the soldiers sent to Afghanistan by an overwhelming majority in their government.
Germany is now involved for the first time in an opaque mélange of international, transnational and national politics, made all the more difficult by the Afghan government’s involvement in the narcotics trade and accusations of internal corruption. All this comes close to explaining the clumsy actions and reactions of German government officials. Even the foreign press, including the New York Times, is expressing sympathy over Germany’s foreign policy troubles.
But other than a general acceptance of the Afghanistan campaign, those responsible for Germany’s participation in it find it difficult to answer direct questions connected with it, such as whether it is actually a war or not, and whether the German soldiers killed there should be regarded as having been killed in wartime action. They are also finding it difficult to explain the balancing act between defending democratic freedoms and fighting terror.
This dilemma, and hence the necessary degree of democratic transparency, may have contributed to the fall of ex-Defense Minister Jung. Instead of immediately announcing the number of civilians killed in the air strike on hijacked oil tankers called in by the German military and apologizing for the error, the government tried to cover up the incident in the hope that, after a few weeks, people would no longer be interested in combat reports from Kundus.
Answers to the Afghanistan question are certainly not simple, especially for the people of Afghanistan. How valuable are water wells and schools given that, although they represent western standards and give the appearance of prosperity, their construction increases the danger of terrorist attacks and they thus become an issue of life and death?
Perhaps we should simply reflect on how we would react to situations in our own country like those faced by the Afghans in the past few months. Would we send our children to American-built schools or into the streets to fetch water from wells dug by western aid workers? And would we not worry that these schools and wells would have since ceased to exist had it not been for the western troops guarding them after they were built? From the Afghan point of view, there remains the question of support; the West can only hope for the support of the people against the Taliban and al-Qaeda if it remains credible. That is why a massive surge of German troops like the one proposed by the American president has to be considered.
Is such a thing even realistic these days in Germany? A way to start might be to consider the consequences of various scenarios and the formulation of different goals understandable to the German people. In view of the severity and complexity of the situation in Afghanistan, these scenarios could not be universally applicable. But a troop increase with a time limit oriented toward a specific legislative period would surely increase the transparency of the decision and the allocation of accountability as opposed to what voting would accomplish.
Furthermore, substantive goals backed up by metrics must be set so that improvements in the national situation may be measured, for example by school attendance numbers, quantity of wells completed, or improvements in the security situation.
This approach would have the added advantage of the West being able to set goals for the Afghan government in the areas of rooting out corruption or combating the narcotics trade. It is neither the Afghan people nor the German people who should decide why soldiers and civilian aid workers should risk their lives just to enrich the lives of a few people.