Edited by Harley Jackson
Afghanistan: Cracks in Obama’s Plan
The reasons and objectives of the president of the United States are more realistic than those of his predecessor. However, numerous political, military and regional events make it impossible that the withdrawal from Afghanistan could begin in 2011.
Barack Obama had few options to substantially change the course of the misfortune that began eight years ago in Afghanistan. His insistence on bringing Republicans to his side and the accumulated debts at this time prevent him from presenting departure as a prudent alternative. Many insist on seeing that measurement as a defeat that will sink the United States and NATO, as if the destiny of the world is being gambled on Afghanistan. Similarly, the commitment to an exclusively military solution was beyond any realistic agenda amid a deepening economic crisis and with a visible public tiring of U.S. involvement in a territory so far away. Counterinsurgency manuals recommend the deployment of 1 soldier per 20 inhabitants, which would require the military to have around 500,000 troops in Afghanistan in order to be effective (rather than the barely 100,000 that are presently there, without counting the inoperative Afghan Armed Forces), an unbearable number as much for the United States as for the rest of the 42 countries integrated in the heterogeneous coalition of forces occupying Afghanistan.
After dismissing the two choices that would truly alter the war, Obama's decision cannot be considered a real military strategy, but rather a house of cards in an unstable equilibrium, subject to permanent risk of collapse if the many conditions under which it was built are not properly aligned. Under these circumstances, it is not easy to find the strengths in Obama's decision, although it may be viewed positively in comparison to the fundamentalist ambitions of George W. Bush and his companions, who started the war in the first place. It is now recognized that we are there to defend our interests (and not those of the Afghans), having abandoned the pretense of building a democracy by force and focused our lenses on three primary objectives: depriving Al Qaeda of sanctuary in the country, breaking the dynamics imposed by the Taliban and Afghan security, and transferring responsibility to local government in a way that ensures the security of its territory and its people.
From there, it becomes apparent that Obama's decision, when examined closely, has too many points in common with what his predecessor did and said after 2002. The similarities begin, at first instance, with the venue used to announce it: West Point. The symbolism of addressing the world from the academy for training future officers of the U.S. Army is not the best way to convey a decision intended to inaugurate a new stage in this bitter conflict. Contrary to this initial inspiration, the obvious fact is that both the stage and the contents are purely military, as if anyone believes that deploying 30,000 soldiers now will change everything for the better. Regarding that announcement, describing it as a diplomatic and economic effort would be contradictory at best.
It is hardly a good idea to omit the military analysis proposal. First, it is important to remember that, at least until the international conference scheduled for January 28, there will be difficult decisions to be made about sending more allied troops (as Germany has announced) and maintaining the already promised numbers (Spain being one country contributing), which barely change the current military balance.
That means they will not be operational on the ground before next summer. Thus, they will have barely a year to meet the time targets for Obama. Furthermore, it is argued that the main effort will be to regain control of cities, consequently leaving rural areas without sufficient control. Is it necessary to remember that Afghanistan is still primarily rural? Why else does the European Union plan to concentrate its efforts on rebuilding only rural areas? Who is to ensure the safety of that population and the community actors involved in this reconstruction? To concede that space to the insurgents is to grant them freedom of action that will allow them to maintain control, by force or voluntarily, over a large percentage of the population while enabling their involvement in the cultivation and marketing of drugs, which are fundamental for funding the insurgents.
Even the idea of accelerating the implementation of the national armed forces clashes with powerful obstacles. In actuality, Afghanistan does not currently have more than 94,000 troops because it has not been possible to meet the deadlines of plans that have already been made. Afghanistan's military cannot even enlist qualified people, nor has it been possible to avoid increasing dropout rates (estimated at 25 percent). With hastening the process of recruitment and training new soldiers comes the considerable risk that members of the Taliban and other violent groups will be able to join the army. Thus, not only will terrorists successfully complete their training and acquire arms (with which they can then defect), but they will also bring intelligence about the intentions of the Afghan army. Without even considering other factors, the prospect of the the incorporation of these elements into the Afghan Armed Forces is the most dangerous because they can hinder the operation of the armed forces once they have to lead the task of national security.
The problem posed by fixing July 2011 as the date to begin redeployment (not withdrawal) is also significant. Its very announcement generates a double effect. For foreign contingents, it increases the pressure to obtain positive results at all costs, and experience teaches that it also translates into major risks for both the civil populace and deployed soldiers (which will increase public disapproval). For local violent groups, it means that time runs in their favor and that sustained resistance will lead them to victory. Knowing this, we can anticipate an increase in attacks, leading NATO forces to adopt a passive attitude until the storm passes or to move to less violent militarized zones, forcing a dispersion of efforts that would reduce the hypothetical effectiveness of the foreign contingent. In those conditions, the inclination of terrorist groups to be accommodating will be improbable since they will perceive the foreign military as temporary occupants.
Pakistan is also a key element in this situation. If the main battle becomes the defeat of Al Qaeda, we must remember that their sanctuary is much more in Pakistani territory (spoiled as useful allies) than in Afghanistan (where it is estimated that it only deploys about 400 troops). Military doctrines stress the need to prevent the enemy from holding a safe haven that serves as a rearguard to feed the violence and provides momentary rest for Al Qaeda fighters. There are huge doubts about the willingness of Pakistan to assist strongly in this way, especially if their military feels punished by Washington (with the new package of economic aid to the country in exchange for political actors acting in self-defeating ways) or fears losing an asset they have managed for years. There is little they will do with the foreseeable increased threat from India and Washington's abandonment.
In short, Obama figures its successful bet will be on factors that only depend on U.S. will, as if all those involved in this scenario were to follow their dictates or submissively accept the division of roles that the U.S. wants to allocate to each. Only for those who believe that Iraq is already a convincing case can Afghanistan be considered resolvable by similar means. Meanwhile, only a few are allowed slight smiles, like Moscow, which sees the deadline to consolidate recovery and renewed control over its traditional area of influence renewed while Washington is busy attending to other matters.
Barack Obama had few options to substantially change the course of the misfortune that began eight years ago in Afghanistan. His insistence on bringing Republicans to his side and the accumulated debts at this time prevent him from presenting departure as a prudent alternative. Many insist on seeing that measurement as a defeat that will sink the United States and NATO, as if the destiny of the world is being gambled on Afghanistan. Similarly, the commitment to an exclusively military solution was beyond any realistic agenda amid a deepening economic crisis and with a visible public tiring of U.S. involvement in a territory so far away. Counterinsurgency manuals recommend the deployment of 1 soldier per 20 inhabitants, which would require the military to have around 500,000 troops in Afghanistan in order to be effective (rather than the barely 100,000 that are presently there, without counting the inoperative Afghan Armed Forces), an unbearable number as much for the United States as for the rest of the 42 countries integrated in the heterogeneous coalition of forces occupying Afghanistan.
After dismissing the two choices that would truly alter the war, Obama's decision cannot be considered a real military strategy, but rather a house of cards in an unstable equilibrium, subject to permanent risk of collapse if the many conditions under which it was built are not properly aligned. Under these circumstances, it is not easy to find the strengths in Obama's decision, although it may be viewed positively in comparison to the fundamentalist ambitions of George W. Bush and his companions, who started the war in the first place. It is now recognized that we are there to defend our interests (and not those of the Afghans), having abandoned the pretense of building a democracy by force and focused our lenses on three primary objectives: depriving Al Qaeda of sanctuary in the country, breaking the dynamics imposed by the Taliban and Afghan security, and transferring responsibility to local government in a way that ensures the security of its territory and its people.
From there, it becomes apparent that Obama's decision, when examined closely, has too many points in common with what his predecessor did and said after 2002. The similarities begin, at first instance, with the venue used to announce it: West Point. The symbolism of addressing the world from the academy for training future officers of the U.S. Army is not the best way to convey a decision intended to inaugurate a new stage in this bitter conflict. Contrary to this initial inspiration, the obvious fact is that both the stage and the contents are purely military, as if anyone believes that deploying 30,000 soldiers now will change everything for the better. Regarding that announcement, describing it as a diplomatic and economic effort would be contradictory at best.
It is hardly a good idea to omit the military analysis proposal. First, it is important to remember that, at least until the international conference scheduled for January 28, there will be difficult decisions to be made about sending more allied troops (as Germany has announced) and maintaining the already promised numbers (Spain being one country contributing), which barely change the current military balance.
That means they will not be operational on the ground before next summer. Thus, they will have barely a year to meet the time targets for Obama. Furthermore, it is argued that the main effort will be to regain control of cities, consequently leaving rural areas without sufficient control. Is it necessary to remember that Afghanistan is still primarily rural? Why else does the European Union plan to concentrate its efforts on rebuilding only rural areas? Who is to ensure the safety of that population and the community actors involved in this reconstruction? To concede that space to the insurgents is to grant them freedom of action that will allow them to maintain control, by force or voluntarily, over a large percentage of the population while enabling their involvement in the cultivation and marketing of drugs, which are fundamental for funding the insurgents.
Even the idea of accelerating the implementation of the national armed forces clashes with powerful obstacles. In actuality, Afghanistan does not currently have more than 94,000 troops because it has not been possible to meet the deadlines of plans that have already been made. Afghanistan's military cannot even enlist qualified people, nor has it been possible to avoid increasing dropout rates (estimated at 25 percent). With hastening the process of recruitment and training new soldiers comes the considerable risk that members of the Taliban and other violent groups will be able to join the army. Thus, not only will terrorists successfully complete their training and acquire arms (with which they can then defect), but they will also bring intelligence about the intentions of the Afghan army. Without even considering other factors, the prospect of the the incorporation of these elements into the Afghan Armed Forces is the most dangerous because they can hinder the operation of the armed forces once they have to lead the task of national security.
The problem posed by fixing July 2011 as the date to begin redeployment (not withdrawal) is also significant. Its very announcement generates a double effect. For foreign contingents, it increases the pressure to obtain positive results at all costs, and experience teaches that it also translates into major risks for both the civil populace and deployed soldiers (which will increase public disapproval). For local violent groups, it means that time runs in their favor and that sustained resistance will lead them to victory. Knowing this, we can anticipate an increase in attacks, leading NATO forces to adopt a passive attitude until the storm passes or to move to less violent militarized zones, forcing a dispersion of efforts that would reduce the hypothetical effectiveness of the foreign contingent. In those conditions, the inclination of terrorist groups to be accommodating will be improbable since they will perceive the foreign military as temporary occupants.
Pakistan is also a key element in this situation. If the main battle becomes the defeat of Al Qaeda, we must remember that their sanctuary is much more in Pakistani territory (spoiled as useful allies) than in Afghanistan (where it is estimated that it only deploys about 400 troops). Military doctrines stress the need to prevent the enemy from holding a safe haven that serves as a rearguard to feed the violence and provides momentary rest for Al Qaeda fighters. There are huge doubts about the willingness of Pakistan to assist strongly in this way, especially if their military feels punished by Washington (with the new package of economic aid to the country in exchange for political actors acting in self-defeating ways) or fears losing an asset they have managed for years. There is little they will do with the foreseeable increased threat from India and Washington's abandonment.
In short, Obama figures its successful bet will be on factors that only depend on U.S. will, as if all those involved in this scenario were to follow their dictates or submissively accept the division of roles that the U.S. wants to allocate to each. Only for those who believe that Iraq is already a convincing case can Afghanistan be considered resolvable by similar means. Meanwhile, only a few are allowed slight smiles, like Moscow, which sees the deadline to consolidate recovery and renewed control over its traditional area of influence renewed while Washington is busy attending to other matters.