It is neither imaginative nor has it proven to be that effective in the past: a massive military attack in the war on terror. Nonetheless, the signs are growing that the United States intends to ramp up aerial strikes in Yemen in response to the failed attack on a U.S. airliner near Detroit on Christmas day.
But experience teaches us somewhat differently. Air strikes may be deadly, but only occasionally are those killed terrorists on the move or their leaders; those who suffer the most are usually innocent civilians. That isn’t the best way to win the hearts and minds of the people in combating terrorism; it’s far more likely to drive new recruits into joining the insurgents.
The United States is taking an especially big risk in Yemen: The nation is in the process of total collapse. In the northern province of Saada, insurgent Shiite Houthists are gaining ground, while in the south there is a tendency toward secessionist activity.
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, in power since 1978, is likely to welcome “help” from the United States in order to stay in power. Military action in the poverty stricken nation is far more likely to hasten governmental collapse than it is likely to postpone it. Meanwhile, the United States has no more of a developmental assistance strategy for Yemen than it had for Afghanistan or Iraq.
Failure is already pre-programmed.
Neue Front mit altem Muster
Von Martin Ling
04.01.2010
Es ist weder einfallsreich noch in der Vergangenheit von Erfolg gekrönt gewesen: massive Militärschläge als Mittel im Antiterrorkampf. Dennoch verdichten sich die Anzeichen, dass die USA in Jemen potenzielle Ziele für Luftangriffe auskundschaften, um das misslungene Flugzeugattentat von Detroit zu vergelten.
Dabei lehrt die Erfahrung anderes: Luftangriffe haben zwar vernichtende Wirkung, aber nur in Ausnahmefällen treffen sie die mobilen Terroristen oder gar ihre Führungsfiguren, während unbedarfte Zivilisten häufig zu Opfern werden. Sympathien in der Bevölkerung für den Antiterrorkampf lassen sich so nicht gewinnen, viel eher sichert man so neuen Zulauf für die Terrorgruppen.
In Jemen laufen die USA ein besonders hohes Risiko: Der Staat ist ohnehin schon auf dem Wege der Auflösung. Im Norden gewinnt in der Provinz Saada ein Aufstand schiitischer Houthisten an Boden und im Süden erstarken die sezessionistischen Tendenzen wieder.
Dem seit 1978 regierenden jemenitischen Präsidenten Ali Abdullah Saleh mag die »Hilfe« der USA zu seinem Machterhalt willkommen sein. Zur langfristigen Stabilität im Armenhaus Jemen wird eine militärische Strafaktion von außen weit weniger beitragen als zum weiteren Staatszerfall. Eine Entwicklungsstrategie für Jemen haben die USA derweil sowenig wie für Afghanistan oder Irak.
Das Scheitern ist programmiert.
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[T]he president failed to disclose that subsidies granted by his government — in connivance with the Republican Party — artificially maintain the viability of fossil fuels.
[The Democrats] need to find a campaign issue which will resonate beyond their liberal-metropolitan heartlands before the midterm elections in the fall of 2026.
In [Weiss'] articles, she attacked the alleged excesses of the left, criticized the 2017 Women's March against Trump and described intersectionality as a new caste system.
In [Weiss'] articles, she attacked the alleged excesses of the left, criticized the 2017 Women's March against Trump and described intersectionality as a new caste system.
Machado’s Nobel Prize is even more significant in light of recent U.S. military actions near Venezuela...A Nobel Prize that rewards peace should be viewed as a warning against military overreach.
Contempt for him is so great that, in this country, Trump is conceded little, and his successes are ignored. One of them is the peace plan for the Gaza Strip.